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Editor’s Preface
How should one announce, or greet, the arrival of yet another academic jour
nal in a market
glutted with such publications? Can one possibly hope
to justify such a seemingly perverse enterprise? Perhaps the best and simplest
way to situate Journal x in the immense field of contemporary scholarship on
literature and culture is to say that this journal exists because so much of that
scholarship seems so joyless. At a time when the relationship between intel
lectual work and intellectual pleasure seems ever more attenuated and obscure,
Journal x hopes to reengage and perhaps even renew that relationship, to pro
mote the return of pleasure to an institution (the academy) and a mode of writ
ing that seem to have
wary of it.
Twenty years after the publication of Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the
Text, we
seeing a minor resurgence of scholarly interest in the subject
of pleasure, if recent titles by Slavoj Zizek (For they know not what they do:
Enjoyment as a politicalfactor) and Wendy Steiner (The Scandal ofPleasure: Art
in an Age of Fundamentalism) are any indication. Yet most of us continue to
write, teach, and converse with our colleagues as if
at best irrele
vant to comprehension and critical thinking and at worst an active obstruction
to it. While the vast majority of the reading public goes on reading for plea
sure, in some cases almost exclusively for pleasure, academics on the whole
seem defensive, skeptical, even embarrassed about their pleasures. As Steiner
recognizes, pleasure remains something of a scandal in contemporary intellec
tual life, perhaps nowhere more so than in universities. It may that the obvi
ousness of pleasure as an integral part of, and motive for, reading is too easily
mistaken for triviality, leading us anxiously to focus our intellectual energies on
other things, as if to reiterate for ourselves the value of our professional exper
tise and the necessity of our professional existence as highly skilled readers of
literature and culture.
In particular this problem plagues our critical and theoretical writing: vol
ume after volume, essay after essay, we publish and review as if pleasure had —
or should have — little or nothing to do with the intellectual value of our work.
Nor does the subject typically come up in tenure or promotion reports. Yet
everyone has experienced the difference between academic writing that is use
ful, responsible, original, illuminating — in a word, publishable — and that rarer
sort of writing that thrills, delights, and surprises, that yields a genuine intel
lectual buzz.
Wherein that buzz? That is the question that Journal x sets out to address.
It is of course a multifaceted one: does
inhere in subject, style,
method, voice? Can it be isolated, theorized, taught and
Or is it
hopelessly/gloriously idiosyncratic? Barthes attempted to account for pleasure
in terms of textual gaps and scars: readers receive bliss, he claimed, from a spe
cific kind of textual absence or abrasion that creates desire. This has been an
influential model, but ultimately one too schematic for our editorial purposes.
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Journal x is not committed to any particular set of answers or even approaches
to the question of pleasure, only to the question itself. We will of course wel
come critical or theoretical essays that explore this question directly, but our
immediate editorial
is a good deal more modest, indirect, and open-ended:
to serve as a sort of ongoing research archive for present and future investiga
tions into what Zizek might call enjoyment as an intellectual factor,” by pub
lishing scholarly and personal essays that themselves give pleasure. With that
goal in mind, Journal x instructs its reviewers to make pleasure an explicit cri
terion for acceptance and publication, alongside the more orthodox academic
criteria of originality and responsibility. To poach upon Wallace Stevenss
description of the supreme fiction, the Jx essay must give pleasure, must bring
the thrill of discovery that has always alerted readers to the presence of a firstrate intellect engaged in the exploration of new territory and the definition of
new problems and paradigms.
Hence our title. It was suggested to us by a four-year-old boy who decid
to offer his own contribution to a long list of potential journal
most
of them pompous or ponderous, some of them both, all of them eminently
rejectable. Immersed in his own sophisticated televisual culture of X-Men and
their ilk, he
reached for what was handy. At first, “Journal x” was an
inside joke, standing for little more than our inability to name the journal in a
that would instantly convey its conception. Gradually, however, the work
ing title started to look more and more like the thing we were after. “X,” after
all, is the mathematical symbol for an unknown variable, a value to be deter
mined at some later time; the symbol also demarcates an intersection point, a
e ofassociations.
crossing
stylistic,
or
exchange. The goal ofJournal x is to make good
both of
books
those
We envision a publication whose identity is not presented
from the outset as an editorial fait accompli but instead remains in a productive
sense unfinished, to emerge in an ongoing way as our authors, reviewers, and
readers collectively define the journals personality and direction, “solving for x,”
as it were. We also envision a journal genuinely worthy of a chiasmatic title, a
window onto the fertile crossings and collisions — theoretical, institutional,
disciplinary,
even (mindful of the encounter that christened our pro
ject) generational — that inform intellectual life and literary and cultural study
today. If this policy sometimes creates strange bedfellows between the covers
ofJx, our hope is to create new connoisseurs of that chaos.
In order to achieve these goals, we are dedicating Jx to a principle of short
term reinvention. Many critical journals the profession gain a particular rep
utation and character over time. Inevitably, any successful journal risks getting
into a certain critical groove; it acquires a loyal readership and tries to publish
essays that confirm its identity and meet the expectations of its audience. Such
journals of course do continue to search for innovative pieces, but the institu
tionalization of a journals identity often works against this goal. When we
look at the editorial boards of most established journals, for instance, we read
the names of the professions luminaries — the full professors who have made
their mark and whose critical proclivities are generally well-known and record
ed in multiple
and articles. The
on such editorial pages rarely
change, and getting one’s work accepted by an established journal often means
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figuring out how to fashion one’s views into a form that meets with the approval
of the board. Common sense tells us that this state of affairs certainly slows
and may well stifle important advances in literary studies. Indeed, many young
scholars trying to break into the publishing game find themselves accommo
dating their work to the styles and standards of the leading publications.
Rather than rejecting this paternalistic "peer” review process' outright, Jx
aims to complement it. We envision ourselves as a protean journal. To this
end, we
not court the all-stars of the profession, who hardly need yet
another outlet for their views. For the same reason,
have not invited the
usual suspects to serve on our advisory board. Instead, the editors have sought
to assemble an
group of critics whose star is still very much
the rise.
Moreover, as a sign of our confidence in our
we will not issue specific
review guidelines to referees other than to urge them to recommend essays that
give them intellectual pleasure. Thus, rather than assessing whether or not a
submission fits the subject, method, or audience of Jx, our referees, by recom
mending one submission and rejecting another, will define what they think Jx
ought to be. In addition, to ensure a continuing influx of fresh ideas and
approaches, and to prevent the journal’s identity from becoming calcified, all
board members
have a tenure of no more than five years. The same princi
ple applies to the editors, who will step down after a period of no more than
seven years in order to hand the operation over to a new generation. In this
way we hope to assure that Jx will keep pace with scholarly and professional
innovation in the field.
The principle that we have tried to built into the operating structure of Jx
is thus one of (rapid) obsolescence. Our goal is to remove some of the
inevitable obstacles that traditional journals place in the way of critical work
that does not fully confirm to established standards and expectations, and to try
to bring the best scholarship of tomorrow into the present more rapidly by pro
viding a new generation of younger scholars with a vehicle for their work and
ideas.
In a further effort to distinguish ourselves from other journals and to pur
sue our policy of pleasure, this issue marks the debut of a new kind of review
essay that will run as a regular feature ofJx, one that takes a few liberties with
the existing conventions of the genre. Most academic publications commission
a noted authority to pronounce upon the scholarly merits and demerits of sev
very recent publications in his or her particular “field,” within a paradigm
of what Gregory Ulmer describes in this issue as disciplinary mastery. Jour
nal x, however, wants to reorganize the review genre around the issue of plea
sure. For each issue, our “Reading
Pleasure” series will invite a different
reviewer to choose a handful of texts, published anytime within the last several
years, that have given him or her, as a reader and scholar, the kind of intellec
tual pleasure that our editorial policy seeks to cultivate. The idea is for
reviewer to engage with the texts and their pleasures
a very personal level,
and perhaps
a theoretical one as well, in an essay roughly equivalent in size
and scope to the regular journal
The texts chosen can be
any sub
jects that might be of interest to readers involved in literary and cultural study.
Such texts
range
among the disciplines, even outside the humani-
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ties if the fancy strikes. They do not have to be thematically related nor repre
sent any particular methodological approach to their subjects. They do not
have to
field-specific or even discipline-specific, nor will the reviewers be
expected to comment on their choices specifically from the perspective of their
Yields.” All the texts need have in common is their ability to convey that elu
sive buzz. Our hope is that the cumulative impact of a series of such reviews,
each with different subjective emphases, will help contribute to a fuller under
standing and articulation of the impact of pleasure on intellectual work, and its
place in that
To that end we are looking for polymaths, people who read
widely in a number of fields and for a variety of motives: intellectual, aesthet
ic, political, personal, and otherwise. We seek generous readers with nimble
minds, readers who are forthright, unapologetic, and eloquent about their pleasure(s). We believe that “Reading for Pleasure” represents a promising new
function for the book review in contemporary scholarship, reflecting a new way
of organizing ones reading and thinking.
Finally, from a co-editors perspective, one of the richest pleasures offered
by Journal x has been that of collaborating with the contributors, board mem
bers, outside reviewers, editorial assistants, design consultants, printers, and the
many colleagues whose suggestions and well-founded criticisms have helped
make this debut issue
Special thanks must go to Jennifer Cobb for
designing a database to help us track the progress of submissions, to Debra Rae
Cohen for her valuable and timely logistical support, to Susan Lee for creating
the Jx logo and for countless acts of troubleshooting in person and over the
phone, and to the Department of English, the College of Liberal Arts, and the
Office of Research at the University of Mississippi for their many forms of sup
port. Then there is the matter of collaborative editing, a process that has turned
out to be nowhere nearly as efficient as it sounds, but one that has also brought
its own peculiarly intense forms of collegiality, personal and intellectual growth,
and, yes, pleasure. As we now prepare to extend and widen the field of collab
oration, Journal x
you to our experiment.
Ivo Kamps
Jay Watson
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Journey to the End of the Night:
David Letterman with Kristeva, Céline, Scorsese
John Limon

John Limon, Professor
ofEnglish at Williams
College, is the author of
Writing After War:
American War Fic
tion From Realism to
Postmodernism
(Oxford UP, 1994)
and is currently writ
ing essays on stand-up
comedy, beginning
with Lenny Bruce and
Brooks/Reiner.

1. David Letterman

Intelligence
David Letterman is baffled and balked by intellec
tion; he is heaped by
Wherever it manifests itself,
is awe-stricken. Like most Americans, he is
unsure where to locate it — Ted
is his idea of
an intellectual1 — but wherever he finds it, he is
unmoored to the point of
Disconcerted, but
freed of his inhibitions by her unwittiness, he bel
lowed at Marilyn vos Savant: "I'm as smart as you!”
David Letterman thinks as quickly as anybody in
America — as fast as William F. Buckley, Jr., in one
field, or Stanley Fish, in another. The conundrum
that he seems to confront every day is how it is pos
sible to think dangerously fast yet possess no ideas at
all. His condition is the intellectual equivalent of pri
apism among mannequins. It seems to make him
furious.
It makes him, also, the best comedian of his time,
since jokes are successful to the extent that they
impose the form of thought
disarray. Therefore
Letterman s jokes are, disproportionately, meta-jokes;
they are about the formal intelligence with only dreck
for substance.

Female Intelligence

What David Letterman is least able to comprehend,
of all
of mind, is a particular
of female
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intelligence, as manifest in such personages as Jane Pauley, Ellen DeGeneres, or
Teri
He told an interviewer that “there is something very appealing about
smart women, intelligent women. And you can see the problem there: if
they’re smart enough for me to be interested, then they’re not going to have
anything to do with me” (Zehne 101).
Letterman is apt to refer to such women as “witty.” By this, I think he intu
its the following. Pure comedy is Euclidean form imposed on debris. Insofar
as the shape of humor is congruent with its material, on the other hand, it is
classified as wit. Of course, neither Pauley nor DeGeneres nor Garr is exactly
an aphorist along the lines of La Rochefoucauld or Wilde. What gives their
humor an unexpected integrity is gender: their femaleness is both the sub
stance and shape of their humor. Letterman cannot fathom this, but he adores
it.

In his purity, in what I wish to call his
purity, Letterman can seem
a
disembodied intelligence. Women on his show may fawn on him, but when
they do, Letterman is often repelled — any Letterman theory would have to
begin with the national
of his encircled, beleaguered, castellated
comic mind. We hear that he watches his weight to the point of
(on
a show he said he was ’2”, 170 lbs.); a study of the jaws of afflicted Americans
would force the conclusion that anorexia is the last wilderness of American
Puritanism, where
nourishes itself on its own negation, where self-abase
ment is the only licit form of self-fashioning, where heroic bleeding is the only
sanctioned form of heroism. On “Good Morning, America,”2 after his Acade
my Awards show failure, Letterman said that you learn by “ingesting the neg
ative,” which is unintentionally a bulimarexic pun (the negative once ingested,
Letterman’s most negative emissions are in jest).
You can conceive of Letterman almost as pure velocity. A really great
comedian has a demented time sense: the world appears to be moving too
slowly for
mind. (For a great comic actor, it
be moving too fast.) To
the extent that time is psychological, a comedian is forced to live in concentric
spheres,
at different rates. The scraping throws off sparks, but it
makes Letterman crazy. The effort to put the two worlds in gear may involve
alcohol or drugs; for Letterman, it entails speeding.
“To annihilate both space and time” was the hype of American Protestant
technological millenarianism. The dream of pure soul — or pure mind — is, at
its most intense, to be everywhere at once. The mode of American apocalypse
proceeded from train to telegraph (the increase in speed was a progressive ani
mation) naturally to TV. TV apocalypse is the American style of abjection.
Car-son

The paradox is that Letterman is the loudest American comedian since Sid
Caesar. He yells an astounding fraction of his jokes, with a leonine roar like the
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John Limon
start of an engine, as if his first Indiana jokes had to outshout the whole Indi
anapolis 500. He is also oddly physical: he does facial shtick (the skunk eye,
for example); he plays with his suit; he imposes his body even as far as the cam
era.
Yet all the time you feel that there is a mind at the center of all this physi
cal demonstration, driving it like a machine,
a car, trying to call itself into
the world as the car. The great Protestant comedians turn jokes into violent,
swift, efficient, beautiful mechanisms. Johnny Carson was Lettermans prede
cessor in this pursuit, securing a kind of rock-age technical perfectionism from
the jazzy improvisations of his Jewish coequals, Mel Brooks, Buddy Hackett, or
Lenny Bruce. Carsons mind would plant itself within costumes; costumes
would mortify Letterman; but Lettermans suit and his body itself, and
face
itself, are contraptions, like Walt Disney’s automated Presidents on steroids.
Letterman’s height does matter. You feel slightly disoriented and depressed
when his guest is taller than he is. But I read Letterman’s height, as I shall
argue with respect to a peculiar moment in Céline, as pure verticality, a single
ideal dimension.
Lettermania
Almost everyone is willing, in Letterman’s presence, to play at abjection: his
audience grovels in order to be part of the
and sensibility. They submit
to his thinking of them as his “kids.” Yet when you
him in the compa
ny of those he respects — Pauley or DeGeneres or Garr (who, like mothers, are
adored and unattainable by tacit consent) and Carson (among fathers) — you
fantasize a similar familiarity, by which I mean that he could be, with you, sim
ilarly
The Letterman anecdote that
essay on him has to repeat con
cerns the note he passed to Teri Garr before a commercial: “I hate myself.”
With respect to Carson, the abjection is more balanced (you are not supposed to
be the man your father was): “That’s the guy. Maybe I could work at it, but
I’m not the guy.”3
The TV relationship, which the Academy Awards audience resisted, is not
a meeting of
and objects, as at the movies, but an intimacy of abjects.4
David Letterman
our abjection visible — he puts it before the camera —
but visible in a twice-disowned body, once
self-disjunction, twice by the
technologies of fame; and a corollary is that exposure to the dreck of New York
that Letterman loves to dwell on and in leaves us feeling almost absolved. The
“abject,” as Kristeva calls it, is sloughed
snakeskin.

2. Kristeva/Céline/Letterman
Kristevan Abjection
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being,
directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside
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inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It
lies there, quite close, but cannot be assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and
fascinates desire, which, nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced. Appre
hensive, desire turns aside; sickened, it rejects. A certainty protects it from the
shameful a certainty of which is proud holds on to it. But simultaneous
ly,
the same, that impetus, that spasm, that leap is drawn toward an else
where as tempting as it is condemned. Unflaggingly, like an inescapable
boomerang, a vortex of summons and repulsion places the one haunted by it
literally beside himself. (Kristeva 1)

So begins Kristevas “Essay on Abjection,” and I believe it is, so to speak, empir
ically correct. However you take Kristevas neo-Freudian etiology (“abjection”
is a reminiscence of the condition of the subject, unseparated from the mater
nal body, before it is a subject, the adult
of which is horror of the indis
crete), it is certain that she knows how abjection is
It is experi
enced, first of all, as a
ecstasy — you are “literally” beside yourself; it
be summarized as your failure to know what is inside of what, to find your
own synecdoche, the homunculus that stands for self. This entails a series of
incongruities.
(1) “Abjection,” whose posture ought to be prostrate, is capable of resis
tance, of “revolt,” fact. (2) Revolt leads to resistance (or else the revolt is the
resistance — it is characteristically unclear), which is not to desire, it is ofdesire.
This is understandable enough, except that desire's willfulness and uprightness
seem oddly (for desire) Puritanical. (3) If desire acts like restraint, the object
of abjection — the “abject,” as Kristeva calls it — must resemble, at any rate,
the object of desire;
is summoned by it. Desire is pseudo-conscience
because abjection is pseudo-desire. (4) If desire acts like restraint, it can
a
source of self-pride. But instead of “it [desire] holds on to a certainty of which
it is proud,” we get, “a certainty of which it [desire] is proud holds
to it.”
Desire feels, somehow, as if its power to resist comes from elsewhere; yet the
feeling of self-disenfranchisement must be exactly what, in abjection, desire is
resisting. If abjection is pseudo-desire, desire plays the role of conscience
abjectly.
This flux of
and victimage — such that what is tempting is not desired,
and desire in turn restrains, and desire in turn is proudly held — seems to me
exactly apt as as a social diagnosis of Puritanism (only in the presence of the
abject will desire convert itself into conscience, surviving by self-betrayal). Yet
it is safe to say that Kristeva is not the theorist to appreciate the comic possibil
ities of deriving uprightness from prostration.

Abject Histrionics
The person who is “beset by abjection” (Kristeva 1) puts on, I should think,
y infra-dramas, actor before audience and vice versa. You are, after all, lit
erally beside yourself, watching your faculties — desire, for example — play
unaccustomed roles, always authored by someone else. Kristeva, however, does
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not quite say this. Her abjected subject is caught in a vortex, is haunted; even
its power to resist is merely susceptibility to sickness and repulsion; it is much
more acted upon than active. Nowhere before her culminating section on
Céline does Kristeva focus precisely enough
the histrionic aspect of
tion; and in the Céline passages, I think, she does not contemplate it so much
as just accurately note it, the result being a desideratum for David Letterman
wil
base
base

es.
down
“Abjection” has, in English, an uncollapsible performative dimension. All
of what follows is listed in one dictionary as a single meaning of the term
“abject.” “Sunk to a low condition; cast
in spirit or hope; degraded;
servile; groveling; despicable; as abject posture, fortune, thoughts;
and
abject flatterers.” The oddness is how this meaning silently turns at “servile”;
and how the theatrical dimension of the second example (“abject flatterers”) is
already ambiguously present in the first (“base and abject flatterers”
assume
an “abject posture”); and how the apparent redundancy of adjectives in the sec
ond example (“
and abject”) fudges the question of whether at the root of
abject performance is abject being.
The term “abjection” itself is falsely, therefore appropriately, Latinate and
upright. This would be telling if everyone who was abject was aware that he or
she was “abject” — which may be the case, for all I know. There may be no
abjection without a frustrated definitional literacy. At any rate, all those who
identify themselves as abject, for example Céline,
l feel the telltale self
dramatization of the word. Even if we posit a victim of abjection who is psy
chologically illiterate, nevertheless it
be a symptom of the ego at the edge
of its defenses, scouting for even a counterproductive self-definition, that any
extreme state will be enacted with hostility and lobbed like a grenade to the
back row.

Comic Abjection

Not sufficiently registering the histrionic assertiveness of
is not
ciently featuring, I want to argue, the essentially comic dimension of abjection.
Abjection and Laughter in Kristeva
Laughter ought to have more to do with Kristevas nosography. There are
moments when its exclusion seems almost perverse. Following her initial asso
ciation of the abject with unthinkable permeabilities, Kristeva specifies vague
ly, defines abjectly, that it is a “'something that I
not recognize as a thing.
A weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and
which crushes me” (2). If it crushes her, it cannot be taken lightly; yet the pres
ence of significance without meaning seems comic in general, and like David
Letterman's comedy particular. Its symptom is verbal speed: “The speech of
the phobic adult is also characterized by extreme nimbleness. But that vertig
inous skill is as if void of meaning, traveling at top
over an untouched and
untouchable abyss, of which, on
only the affect shows up, giving not
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a sign but a signal” (41). Here the crushing weight of meaninglessness seems
to take the form of levity; surely
Kristeva’s oxymoron we are approaching
laughter: “But with the borderline patient, sense does not emerge out of non
sense, metaphorical or witty though it might be” (50). Not quite there, howev
er. “On the contrary, non-sense runs through signs and sense,
the result
ing manipulation of words is not intellectual play but, without any laughter, a
desperate attempt to hold on to the ultimate obstacles of a pure signfier that has
been abandoned by the paternal metaphor” (50-1).
Occasionally one is sure that, for Kristeva, it is simply the case that laugh
ter palliates the abject condition. Discussing Dostoevsky’s The Possessed, Kris
teva asserts that “Verkhovensky is abject because of his clammy, cunning appeal
to ideals that no longer exist, from the moment when Prohibition (call it God)
is lacking. Stavrogin is perhaps less so, for
immoralism admits of laughter
and refusal” (19). This would appear to set up a disjunction: abjection or
laughter. Yet when Kristeva goes on to describe the modern world, what she
finds is abjection and laughter undivided: “The worlds of illusions, now dead
and buried, have given way to our dreams and deliriums if not to politics or sci
— the religions of modern times. Lacking illusions, lacking shelter,
today’s universe is divided between boredom (increasingly anguished at the
prospect of losing its resources, through depletion)
(when the spark of the
symbolic is maintained and desire to
explodes) abjection and piercing
laughter" (133).
Which is it: or or d? Laughter would seem to be
ambiguity within a
confusion. But there is a way to be more precise about the relationship. When
Kristeva defines sin as “subjectified abjection” (128), you might feel inspired to
refer to laughter as “objectified abjection.”
finds abjection unfunny
when signifiers have been “abandoned by the paternal metaphor,” when “Prohi
bition (call it God) is lacking,” but piercingly funny “when the spark of the
symbolic is maintained,” which
be the difference between enervated and
an electrified absence. Absent objectivity is funny when it “sparks,” perhaps,
because a joke is dreck enflamed by form, that is, by a standard it inhabits but
to which it cannot aspire. Thus it
clear why laughter, disjoined from
abjection generally, attaches to it when
comes to describe modernity:
in our century, apocalyptic yet Godless, abjection is a psychopathology that
happens to
realistic. When you cannot
abjection, according to
Kristeva, as filth or sin (the God of Jews and Christians alike being dead) —
when objectivity lingers in the world only as a
of abjectivity — you
laugh.
This move allows Kristeva to value Céline without embracing him: an
abject person may show a symptom, but in an abject world, a person
be a
symptom.5 But I still do not think that Kristeva — by positing that Céline’s
laughter makes him a symptom of an objectively abjectifying world — has got
ten his humor exactly right. She arrives at the topic at long last in the brief cul
minating section on Céline.

With Céline we are elsewhere. As in
or even prophetic utter
ances, he speaks out on horror. But while the former can be withstood
because of a distance that allows for judging, lamenting, condemning,
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Céline — who speaks from within — has no threats to utter, no morality to
defend. In the name of what would he do it? So his laughter bursts out,
facing abjection, and always originating at the same source, of which Freud
had caught a
the gushing forth of the unconscious, the repressed,
suppressed pleasure, be it sex or death. (205-6)

Céline is
apocalyptic writer without revelations; his "language of
tion” merely “topples” into “nothing more than the effervescence of passion and
language
call style” (206). The unconscious gushes; the laughter bursts; the
language topples; Céline is overwhelmed. The paradoxical willfulness of abjec
tion drops out: some have degradedness thrust upon them. Yet even Kristeva’s
Céline is capable of knowing that abjection
be histrionic. The two Hendeit.
preserve
mirror.histo the Endprecedes
fact,should
es women
of the Night, which
have been
the
by in Journey
be
name of the David
Letterman show, embody in Kristeva’s phrase “calculated
abjection” (168). It does not gush, burst, or topple: it manipulates and maneu
vers. Abjection may be a recrudescence of the pre-mirror stage, but it practices
before a portable
(Kristeva implies at various points the relation of
abjection to anorexia — food is feces in the abject ethos — but the gagging
nausea she describes is not the anorexic’s willful self-sculpting.)
Céline
What is funny about Journey to the End of the Night?6 Partly its humor resides
in local excesses; but the greater, antithetical joke is Journeys refusal to ascend
or decline: its perfect horizontality. You feel mounting hysteria (under partic
ular circumstances, a condition confusable with hilarity) from the book’s failure
to ascend or decline with you. In the first place, Bardamu seems to
just enough innocence —just enough vulnerability to goodness — to keep hor
ror fresh, from World War I to Africa to New York to Detroit to the insane asy
lum back in France and
own old age. But even the uniformity of that
ment — in which goodness is a blip — is not constant enough. Bardamu’s hor
ror is always ready and prepared; it
existence. Even before the Great
War, a young Bardamu describes God as “sensual” and “grunt[ing] like a pig. A
pig with golden wings, who falls and falls, always belly side up, ready for caress
es, that’s him, our master” (Journey 1983, 4). This God is a bourgeois even
before Bardamu has the experience of impoverished resentment. Bardamu
knows him
inverse empathy, because his own destiny is to fall and fall, belly
side up, ready for abjection.
“You can
a virgin in horror,” Céline or Bardamu notoriously proclaims,
“the same as in sex” (Journey 1983, 9). As a matter of
one is never, in Jour
ney to the End of the Night, a virgin in horror, if that means unacquainted with
I call attention to the possibility that one may be “innocent ... of Horror”
(Marks’s translation \Journey 1934, 9] of “on est puceau
l’Horreur” [Voyage
21]), nonetheless: the point is that something in Céline takes the place of inno
cence, that is, the place before experience. Whatever that something is, it must
have the following skewed characteristics. It must precede experience (so that
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the experience of horror is definite); it must figure experience proleptically (so
that Bardamu can recognize horror as the correlative of what horrified him even
before
encountered it in World War I); it must continue during experience
(so that horrors, anticipated and never-ending,
nevertheless stay fresh).7
The trivial American name for that thing is "attitude,” as when Jerry Sein
feld says that David Letterman “has a great attitude.” The humor of attitude is
that it judges all the time but is strictly non-judgmental; it is not, as Kristeva
says, apocalyptic or prophetic, insofar as there is no experience that precedes it
to judge; and when experience does accrue, it is powerless to make a case,
mocked by its own superfluity. The same attitude greets every eventuality. This
is
without meaning, intelligence without ideas: attitude is a way to
be of the world but not in
Starting with attitude means that there is nowhere
for a journey to get. Bardamu arrives at horror immediately, and
the rest
of his journey — undertaken on the assumption that there is an end to the night
— rediscovering it, until the peripatetic immobility abruptly shuts down.
Céline says brilliantly that “one has to be more than somewhat dead in
order to be truly a wisecracker!” (quoted in Kristeva 138). Death is, technical
ly, infinite repetition without intervals, which makes Bardamu’s travels an
approximation of an after-death experience in continuous disgust. What is the
humor of this? How would The Divine Comedy be comedic if there
only
Inferno? Invoking the trite term “attitude” is only meant to call attention to a
quality of Journeys abjection: its chronic inexperience. The novel may be
described as a monologue that occasionally intersects not experience or other
humans but other monologues. When Bardamu, in the first chapter, describes
God as a pig, he is performing at the time his poem on the subject, before the
history that can only justify
And wherever Bardamu's monologue crosses another, there abject histrion
ics cross. The monologue is the privileged technique of attitude: it comes first,
but it confines reality such that nothing else comes second. And attitude is
abjection on a roll, abjection exuberant in its basic exhibitionism. Tania, a
woman whose beloved has just died, is “intent on her tragedy, and still more
intent on exhibiting it to me full flood” (Journey 1983, 315). In this
she resembles the
blinded Robinson, who “groaned under his bandages
as soon as he heard me climbing the stairs” (Journey 1983, 281). It is impor
tant to locate the performativity within abjection, not outside it and compro
mising it. Robinson is in fact abject — recumbent — but
is also perform
ing abjection. “People live from one play to the next,” Bardamu says, always
ready with the aphorism that is his own emblematic performance {Journey
1983, 224). Thus a “tragedy” such as Tanias feeds comedies such as Célines.
When Bardamu arrives at New York, he shares a laugh — unique experi
ence, since most communal laughter in this book is of a piece with horror,
merely smut amid smuttiness — with his fellow voyagers.
Talk of surprises! What we suddenly discovered through the fog was
so amazing that at first we
to believe it, but then, when we were face
to face with it, galley slaves or not, we couldn’t help laughing,
it right
there in front of us. . . .
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Just imagine, that city was standing absolutely erect. New York was a
standing city. Of course we’d seen cities, fine ones too, and magnificent
seaports. But in our part of the world cities lie along the seacoast or on
rivers, they recline on the landscape, awaiting the traveler, while this Amer
ican city had nothing languid about her, she stood there as stiff as a board,
not seductive at all, terrifyingly stiff.
We laughed like fools. You can’t help laughing at a city built straight
up and down like that. But we
only laugh from the neck up, because
of the cold blowing in from the sea through a gray and pink mist, a brisk
sharp wind that attacked our pants and the chinks in that wall, I mean the
city streets, which engulfed the wind-borne clouds. (Journey 1983, 159;
Céline’s ellipsis)

This is a peculiar passage: not only does Bardamu — uncharacteristically
socialized — share a laugh, but the laugh goes on and on; it is a unique moment
of helpless laughter. Nor is it immediately explicable: what is so funny about
skyscrapers?
It is almost an obvious smutty joke. The city is erect in public; it is an urban
exhibitionist. Or say that the joke is trickier than that, because the European
cities that "recline on the landscape, awaiting the traveler” would seem to be
female (though immobile and inorganic as mannequins), making the grammar
of the translation appropriate, even if its biology is not: “she stood there as stiff
as a board, not
at all.” If the woman repossesses the phallus, will this
be perceived as comical? But the joke is only half-funny, only funny “from the
neck up,”
the “sharp” wind “attacked our pants.” Castration is not
funny when it can be felt; it is only funny insofar as the head can be separated,
for the sake of intellectual amusement, from the body that suffers it. This sep
aration, of course, is not merely a retreat to the intellectual; it is a retreat from
castration to the intellectual by means of an
of self-castration. The joke
here would seem to
the proud reenactment of castration in order to escape
I am not quite satisfied with this exegesis,
the European cities that
lie down assume the abject posture, which is a position normally assumed, in
Kristeva and Céline,
men. I
not think that Bardamu is laughing at a
phallic woman so much as at a phallic abjection: the wind attacks both the voy
agers’ pants and the permeability of the wall. This makes the femaleness of
cities into a metaphor of the abjection of the men who inhabit them, enslaved.
So the joke is not the sort of smut that Bardamu scorns; it reveals the point of
that smut.
When Bardamu goes ashore, he walks down Broadway — in three of the
sensible four dimensions he walks by the Ed Sullivan Theater, where David
Letterman performs. On Broadway, the truth of New York reveals itself to
horizontal after all: “That street was like a dismal gash, endless, with us at the
bottom of it, filling it from side to side, advancing from sorrow to sorrow,
toward an end that is never in sight, the end of all the streets
the world”
(Journey 1983, 166). Broadway, for all the castrated disgust of this passage —
are imagined less as castrated than as the blood of an objectified castration
— has the precise, endless automobility of Céline’s novel. The castration, so
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long as it is objective, is still funny. New York is always the land of the joke in
Céline: below ground, where men excrete, they “laughed and joked and cheered
one another on”; “the new arrivals were assailed with a thousand revolting
jokes” Journey 1983, 169). But this is the sort of smutty joking that Bardamu
despises, as opposed to the real humor of the vertical. New York is the inter
section of perpendicular hilarities.
One of the few uses of the term “abject” in Journey (at least according to the
Marks translation) is in the description of blinded, criminal Robinson who “lay
in . . . bed upstairs
an abject state of mind” Journey 1934, 322; “Lui, dans
leur lit de la chambre d’en haut menait pas large” [Voyage 290]). Yet this is only
a page before we are told that Robinson “groaned under his bandages as soon
as he heard me climbing the stairs.” Abjectness is proneness seeking an audi
ence. Whenever there is
there is performance; whenever abjectness
is exposed as exhibition, it is comic. It is comic because it should be prone but
it is upright. “I was a hundred-percent sick,” says Bardamu, “I felt as if I had
no further use for my legs, they just hung over the edge of my bed like unim
portant and rather ridiculous objects” Journey 1983, 148; “commes des choses
négligeables et un peu comiques” [Voyage 158]). What is comic is that the
essence of verticality should make itself visible as the sign of a complete hori
zontal impotence.
Napoleon said that a heroic
would become comic if the orator
down while orating. Céline implies the inverse: the
monologue becomes
comic when it stands up. David Letterman, stranger in New York, caffeinated
when he should
sleepy, vertical when
should be supine, panning New
York from the Empire State Building down, is the stand-up comedian par
excellence. The gestalt of talk show stand-up realizes the implicit added dimen
sion: Letterman is vertical when we are prostrate, but we take his attitude as
our own. All Americans are now funny, not just Jewish comedians and gag
writers straining
weekly material. (The average gag on the worst situation
comedies now is funnier, judged in isolation, than the best gag on, say, The Honeymooners\ and the terrorized look on Groucho’s contestants has faded from the
face of the earth.) This eventuality — the comedification of America — is the
most astounding fact about the American sensibility from 1960 to 1996.
Where Bardamu meets America — in the New York illuminated night, on
Broadway, at the Ed Sullivan Theater — is the stage on which, at the millen
nial end of his century, its abjection erects its last cross.
3. The King of Comedy
What is the fate of abjection in Martin Scorseses scarily intelligent film, The
King of Comedy? It ought to be everywhere in the film, but seems to be
nowhere. The pathetic comedian Rupert Pupkin (Robert DeNiro) should be
abject but is utterly buoyant, directed, and simple in his psychosis. He knows
where to seek the end of his night. Talk show superhost Jerry Langford (Jerry
Lewis) should be symmetrically abject — if I have justified applying the term
to David Letterman — but shows few signs of having any of the requisite
boundaries whose permeability would horrify him. A first approximation of the
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psychocomic situation is that neither has abjection because they have each
other. Rupert Pupkin begins the movie in
exact copy of Jerry Langfords
suit, and Jerry Langford ends the movie staring at multiple images, in multiple
TVs, of Rupert Pupkin. When Rupert looks at Jerry,
sees his own body
thrown off and replaced by image, out of all time and space; when Jerry looks
at Pupkin, he sees at a distance
own rejected body, rejected identity, reject
ed home.
One of the jokes of the movie is that to all appearances Jerry Langford is
the
host of The Tonight Show and Rupert Pupkin the pretend host, yet the
film gives Jerry Lewis the opportunity to pretend to
Johnny Carson (and
along the way gives Tony Randall, playing “himself,” the opportunity to pretend
to be Jerry Langford). What does it mean to conclude that Jerry Lewis is to
Johnny Carson as Rupert Pupkin is to Jerry Langford? It is almost precisely
true to say that what Jerry Lewis gets to pretend to be is Protestant. When I
first saw The King of Comedy, my initial reaction was: but dont they understand
that Jerry Lewis cannot under any circumstances be the Tonight Show host? Its
host must be a pseudo-hick with attitude arriving in New York from the heart
land; he meets Jewishness there, and the chiasmus (stranger host from the
provinces meets native guest from the home city) is the genius of the genre. He
cannot
a Jew himself: one has only a distant memory of the ill-conceived
Joey Bishop Show, whose only upshot was the subsequent
of Joeys second
banana, Regis Philbin.
My second reaction, however, is that the fate ofJerry Langford’s Jewishness
is the fate of his abjection. Not that Jewishness is the royal road to abjection
— rather that Jerry Langford’s own body is treated like pork in his desire for
pure imagery. Jerry is installed, in The King of Comedy, in layers and corridors
of Waspitude (played by Shelley Hack); like the heart of the Pentagon, he is
protected from invasion not locked doors or impregnable walls but rather by
an aseptic
At his network office, or at his penthouse, or at
country
home, Langford’s life is a Nordic iceberg.
But when Pupkin penetrates Langford’s country home, Jewishness reap
pears, though it is entirely unclear where. The Asian butler, Jonno, summons
Langford home from his golf game, exclaiming over the phone, “I’m getting a
heart attack, already.” For the moment, only the Asian is a Jew. Yet when Jerry
arrives on the scene, he manages to be, for perhaps the only moment of the film,
expressively Jewish
Jerry kicks Rupert out of the house; making the
pathetically tardy inference that Jerry (at a previous encounter) had only
feigned kindness, Rupert says, belligerently, “So I made a mistake.” “So did
Hitler,” Jerry counters. This riposte, I believe, could not have been in the script
— it makes too little sense. It has all the
of what passes in Jerry Lewis’s
mind for a witticism: it is cruel, sharp, and fast, it has the form of a joke, but
it has no humor. Does Jerry Lewis (or Jerry Langford) forget at the moment
who is in power? What mistake of Hitler’s is he thinking of? All that is clear
is that something that has been repressed returns: what Jerry Langford expels,
Jerry Lewis ingests. This is a moment of abject reversibility, only possible if
abjection is the sort of rotatable axis I have described. Céline claims to be the
true victim of World War II, and Heller and Roth (and the Jewish comedians
of their generation) enlist themselves as Céline’s truest
7
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Meanwhile, Rupert (along with his accomplice, Masha, played by Sandra
Bernhard) resolutely distances himself from all the New York nobodies and cra
zies with whom he manifestly has everything common. As opposed to Jerry,
who in this film is
anywhere in particular, Rupert is always
His comedy routine returns compulsively to his place of origin, Clifton, New
Jersey; so does Rupert, who still lives in his mothers house. But Rupert has an
insight: in the world of the media, other people may carry your body for you,
golf clubs.
What Rupert does to Jerry is give him a body and a place. In Rupert's aura,
Jerry’s body turns out to be bizarrely locatable, his world bizarrely pregnable. In
Rupert, at long last, Jerry must ruminate on what he has ejected. Rupert and
Masha capture Jerry, sit him down, mummify
body; for
night he is in
one home, not every home. When Jerry is ensconced in tape, the film cuts to
the network office where Rupert’s blackmail offer (in return for Jerry’s body, he
is to be allowed to appear on The Jerry Langford Show) is being discussed: “Sup
pose we tape him,” somebody says, meaning, “suppose we agree to videotape the
with Rupert before committing ourselves to broadcasting it.” The pun is
really an anti-pun: tape locates Jerry in
chair and one body but displaces
Rupert from his image. When the tape is, in fact, aired, Rupert stands proud
ly beside his own face; Jerry is looking at many identical images in a department
store window; then Rupert’s face begins to multiply across hundreds of copies
of Life, Newsweek, Rolling Stone, and People, Mechanical reproduction is
squared idealism: a machine is intelligence without content, insofar as it dis
embodies and dislocates on behalf of no value.
In fame America, you can lose your body (in images), your voice (when
Jerry Langford phones the office and says that he is being held hostage, it is
assumed that
impressionist is staging a gag), and your name (the movie
begins with a distribution of autographs, some of them pseudonyms). Here is
the logic of abjection taken to its grandest joke: at the end of the night, when
are on the verge of sleep, when our bodies seem so massive that sleeping
itself seems an unfair burden, David Letterman conspires with Jerry Langford
to stand up for velocity and lightness of being — all intelligence, no meaning.
The dream is of a world that makes a joke of class, ethnicity, origins — of all
situations. The American joke, 1960-1996 — which should not be thought
lessly dismissed as a joke — is that, faced with the alienation of body, voice, and
name, we perform

Notes
1. The Family
audience was asked in the
1980s to “name an
intellectual.” The winners of the poll were Henry Kissinger, William Buckley,
Joyce Brothers, and the host of the show, Richard Dawson, himself.
2.
May 11,1995.
3. I am not sure how everyone is in possession of the first anecdote; for the
remark about Carson, see Schruers 32.
4. From Frankfurt to Birmingham, TV criticism has increasingly propped
up its object, the TV audience. First proclaimed to be absorbed and catatonic,
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then peripatetic and distracted, the TV audience is now conceived of as inter
active and contumacious. For variations on the Birmingham view see Hall et
al.; Fiske and Hartley; and Press. The point of my own essay is to explain how
the TV audience as well as the TV star can be symmetrically and simultane
ously absorbed, peripatetic, and interactive.
5. For Céline as symptom in Kristeva, see Hill.
6. Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Voyage au Bout de la Nuit, references to this edi
tion, abbreviated Voyage, will be inserted parenthetically the text. All trans
lations, unless otherwise stated, are from the Manheim translation; references
to this edition, abbreviated Journey 1983, will
inserted parenthetically in the
text. Occasional reference is made to Marks’s translation; references to this edi
tion, abbreviated Journey 1934,
be inserted parenthetically the text.
7. See the special issue of South Atlantic Quarterly entitled “Céline, USA.”
One of the recurring themes is the pervasive Jewishness of Céline's American
audience; the phenomenon is first remarked
Dickstein, who notes the influ
ence of Céline
Heller, Roth, and the sick comedians.
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It is possible to
(with Hegel and
Marx) that, in the history of every mod
ern nation, wherever the argument
apply, there is never more than one single
founding revolutionary event (which
explains both the permanent temptation
to repeat its forms, to imitate its episodes
and characters, and the temptation found
among the “extreme” parties to suppress
it)—Etienne Balibar, “The Nation
Form: History and Ideology”

In 1517, a year after Thomas Mores Utopia was pub
lished at Antwerp, an Englishman named John
Rastell set off from Bristol for the "new found lands”
of the Americas. Not only did he intend to establish
a colony there, but he brought a London printer on
board with him in order to set up a press in the New
World. His crew abandoned him before he reached
Ireland, and the voyage was aborted; but Rastell did
not give up entirely. Two years later he published a
suggest
satirical play called A New Interlude and a mery of the
nature of the Four Elements, proposing that the rich
"new landes” lying to the west should
settled as an
English colony. Rastell saw this continent, named for
the shadowy figure of “Americus,” as replete with
valuable forests and native inhabitants who might be
converted to a more “virtuous life.” In its fertile
abundance, America was there
Englands taking.
Rastell has been called "precocious” in his desire
to colonize America (Rowse 188; Penrose 388-9;
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Andrews 54-5). But often Rastell is left out of studies of early modern colo
nialism or Tudor exploration. When his name comes up it is almost always
conjunction with his famous brother-in-law, Thomas More. Rastell married
More’s sister Elizabeth in 1504, and he must have discussed his expeditions to
the New World with More in the decade preceding the publication of Utopia.
The Four Elements is an unironic advertisement for colonization, whereas
More’s Utopia seems to idealize the impenetrable world of Utopia and to sati
rize the possibility of its annexation. Yet Rastell’s text and More’s are impor
tantly connected. Utopia, like Rastell’s America, overdetermines colonialism,
linking industry, improvement, and imperial annexation with the dissemination
of texts and knowledge. As this essay will suggest, Utopia inaugurates a narra
tive and ideological tradition in which utopian space is seen to construct itself
on and around the rupture of warfare and colonial annexation. Louis Marin has
willthe utopia neutralizes
vision,
for
or displaces
violence:
“new
The positive 
ly argued that
beauty:
each
" fictitious assimilation of Western culture and religion by the
and
world is
a story that conceals the negative and real expansion of the old world by war
and economic exploitation” (“Towards a Semiotic” 270). But as I will suggest,
that neutralization coexists with violence in utopian narrative. Colonialism
becomes one of utopia’s borders — a shore or margin alluded to even as it is cast
out. In order better to understand the connections utopian texts and practices
establish between the “ideal” present and the violent past, I want to consider a
utopia contemporary to our own world before turning back to More and to
Rastell. Here, I
suggest, it becomes possible to understand the way in
which utopia theorizes the idea of rupture.

"

The Antidote: Club Med in Danang

In 1950, a Belgian diamond cutter with the improbable name of Gerard Blitz
opened what he called a “vacation village” in Mallorca. A champion swimmer,
Blitz wanted Europeans “of all classes” to have access to the sea. But if Club
Med had its origins in an egalitarian
that vision was to change. Four
years later, Blitz formed a partnership with a French entrepreneur named
Gilbert Trigano, a man who had already been a professional actor, drama crit
ic, journalist, and Resistance leader during the Occupation. Over the next two
decades Trigano helped to turn Blitz’s modest “vacation villages” into the glob
al empire now called Club Mediterranné.1 In Trigano’s terms, what he has been
selling with such success — the phrase serves as slogan
Club Med — is an
“antidote for civilization.” This palliative metaphor borrows from a long tradi
tion in which culture is associated with disease, for Club Med, like the Euro
pean spa, promises to replenish the body, in part through the “antibody” of the
native.
In its glossy promotional literature, Club Med promotes the curative
resources of its natural settings. (Not surprisingly, mountains and water play a
large part in the photo design of
brochure.) Each Club Med village
promises a location in a setting of supreme natural
the best beaches,
the most beautiful mountain views. Yet the views offered up by such brochures
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— of Luxor, Marrakesh, Ixtapa — often appear largely indistinguishable. Here,
as in Rastell’s Four Elements, nature is seen as a precious commodity. In the
Club Med brochure, nature is a panorama or view; the Club Med room or vil
lage looks out on the scenery of its habitat while remaining distinct from it.
The location of the club facilitates the illusion that the tourist has been dis
placed from the workaday world. Club Med is usually a setting within a set
ting, its village set some distance from the nearest town, its buildings designed
in Club Meds pan-colonialist style rather than reflecting local architecture.
The Club’s “famous Polynesian huts,” as one writer observes, are still part of
Club Med villages Korba (Tunisia) and Corfu (Greece). Trigano defends the
widespread use of grass huts. “You can breathe in them. They’re ventilated.
Perfect for hot weather.” In response to an interviewer’s query, Trigano
that there is anything peculiar “about thousands of Frenchmen or Americans
taking a vacation in Greece to live in a village of Polynesian grass huts.” “Our
entire concept is to offer a rupture — a break with normal life, a normal day,”
Trigano replies. “We break with the banalities and structure of the everyday.
The Polynesian huts were an adventure that worked. The idea is to abolish real
life — urban stress, routine, concrete, cars, even money” (Heilpern 189, 192).
But the “rupture”
by Trigano’s clubs depends on the homogenization of
desire — the turquoise sea, the grass hut — in which the tourist can step into
a fantasy that has anticipated him. He can, in essence, play Crusoe for a week.
Moreover, like Crusoe, the tourist enjoys his or her sojourn only by recog
nizing that his or her club is a refuge. It is that forbidden “other side of the
island” which gives the club’s civility its value. Where is the wilderness to be
found in Club Med’s self-advertisement? In part, it is to be found
nature
itself: the stupendous mountains, the sheer distance of the locale. More often,
wilderness (or wildness) can be seen in the Club’s discussion of what it ubiqui
tously refers to as the “native.” “Native” culture is reproduced for
through “folk pageants” inside the Club Med village. The exotic and the famil
iar are reworked in miniature pageants mirroring the pageant of the vacation
itself. This theatricalized culture is offset by the homogenized European char
acter of the clubs themselves, whose staff is usually French or English. The set
ting of
club thus becomes a backdrop for customs that are reassuringly
European. Far from home (in Marrakesh, in Thailand), the tourist sits at com
munal tables with other tourists
himself and watches pageants in which the
“native” is performed for
consumption. The Club Med brochure can thus
promise tourists two very different things at once: “you’ come across people
just
yourself, with similar backgrounds, as well as countless fascinating
individuals from faraway lands.” If Trigano’s clubs are “antidotes,” the bodies
on stage are antibodies, their “nativeness” used to strengthen and make superi
or the body of the visiting tourist.
Part of the allure of Trigano’s clubs, of course, is that they attempt to break
down customary distinctions: between wild and civilized, native and culture,
work and leisure. If plays become one way in which such binaries are never
theless maintained, as I have been suggesting, playing becomes another. Play
ing — terms of sport, activities, even pure relaxation — is described in Club
Med’s promotional materials in the familiar terms of skill sets and improve-
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ment. Throughout Club Med’s brochure can be seen the contradictory tenets
of upwardly mobile capitalism. The very idea of the "vacation” is complex:
what is it that is vacated, and why? In Club Meds brochures, self-improvement
is assured at the same time as ‘complete relaxation,” and a dizzying roster of
lessons
everything from mastering the flying trapeze to waterskiing and
windsurfing is somehow intended to add up to “total leisure.” Trigano, whose
most recent Club Med (Opio, near Nice) caters largely to corporate confer
ences, admits that the distinction today between work and leisure is breaking
down. One in four Club Med villages now has a computer workshop, and Trig
ano has recently offered guests the chance to learn to conduct a symphony
orchestra. Leisure as a value is reconstructed at Club Med so that what is
offered is not the antidote to civilization but the essence of
Civilization is
not erased but confirmed. When a guest arrives at a Club Med village, he or
she is welcomed as a “g.m.” — gentil membre — by one of many arduously
trained and enthusiastic “g.o.’”s — gentil organisateurs. Solitude in the villages
is discouraged, if not actually prohibited. In fact, Club Med built its reputation
on the idea of bringing people together. In the 1970s Club Med was an idyll
for young singles and couples. Since the late 1980s, however, the clubs have
catered increasingly to families, with only a very few preserved for “couples
only.” Throughout the Club Med empire single tourists are paired off with
roommates; there are no “single rooms” in Club Med villages. Meals are taken
at tables of eight, and group activities are encouraged. Romance and pleasure,
the guest is taught, are to
garnered through solidarity, community, and
effort. The tourist here finds labor dramatized and displaced, made into the
ater in which he or she becomes a participant. Rather than dissolving the
workaday world that the tourist is escaping, the Club Med village superimpos
es its own
that world, creating a diptych in which teamwork can be
refigured as leisure.
Values promoted by Club Meds “spirit of adventure and discovery” are in
this way disguised, made palatable or even unrecognizable to guests. At the
same time, they are belied by one of the
’s greatest myths: that no money
is exchanged in the “
” and nothing costs. Tourists purchase plastic bar
beads at Club Med’s “banks” upon arrival — beads that have value at any Club
Med village in the world, but nowhere else, and that are used for “extras” not
paid for in the package: liquor, snacks, gifts from the well-stocked boutiques
(“eight orange beads please!”). At the same time, the experience of Club Med,
its value and values, is promoted as “free,” in all senses of that word. Trigano’s
early careers as actor and drama critic have in this way allowed him to create a
global theater in which prized cultural values — self-improvement, solidarity,
intimacy — are advertised as attainable. But if Trigano’s career in the theater
has shaped the development of Club Med, so, though perhaps less obviously,
has his earlier career in the Resistance. Club Med villages can be found in loca
tions as varied as Luxor, Marrakesh, Thailand, Bulgaria, and Israel, but the “vil
lage” where each club is located is ubiquitously French and English, its staff
carefully chosen to remind guests that Club Med is a French concern, with
touches
French wine served at lunch as well as dinner, and French
chefs preparing French meals. It is as if Trigano’s mission here, as in the
tance, is to defend what is French by pushing back what is not.
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Since 1978, larger and larger percentages of Club Med’s revenues each
have come from Japanese tourism. Expansion
the Far East
plausi
ble, and in 1989 Trigano signed an agreement with the Vietnamese government
to open a Club Med village in Danang. Trigano s son has acknowledged that
people might find this location peculiar but insists that Club Med has obtained
the “three best beaches in the country.” Club Med will have a village in Danang
within the next decade.
The port of Danang, as Susan Brownmiller puts it, has always been char
acterized by arrivals and departures (78). In the 1850s, Napoleon III sent a
French man-of-war to enter Danang in order to open Vietnam
to European
trade. Eventually Danang fell to the French, who were to control Vietnam for
almost a century. In March of 1965, it was at Danang that
troops enacted
the amphibious landing that marked the official beginning of US involvement
in the Vietnam
By the following year, the airport at Danang was the third
busiest in the world (Brownmiller 80). Not far from the city lies China Beach,
area renowned as a “rest and recreation” site for soldiers during the war, as
well as the home of the Ninety-Fifth Evacuation Hospital on which the televi
sion series China Beach was based.
Serge Trigano does not see the irony in building a French vacation idyll
Vietnam. But whatever else the construction of a Club Med in Danang might
be, it is at the very least a kind of return. Cultural historians have begun to
review the topoi of the “return to Vietnam” in American movies and television:
both Rambo and Magnum P.I., for example, have been read as veterans’
“returns” to the site of combat (see Jeffords; Morris and Ehrenhaus).
the
French, who claimed possession of Vietnam from 1884 until 1954, the antici
pated return via Club Med replicates an even earlier conquest and colonization.
The three “best beaches” the Triganos claim they have “got” uncannily recall the
three territories named and “created” by the French in the 1880s: Annam,
Tonkin, and Cochinchina. Club Med’s expansion Vietnam, in other words,
acts out a kind of repetition compulsion in which
artificial French village is
reconstructed at the scene of an old French colony. To hear Club Med’s anthem
in Danang — “liberty! equality! fraternity!” — is to recognize the conjunctions
between global business and global politics. Gilbert Trigano, who during the
Occupation witnessed a time when France’s identity as a nation was threatened,
found a way to reinscribe the Gallic as signature in every corner of the
globe. The selection of Vietnam as vacation site, however, goes beyond impe
rialist visions. A French Club Med in Danang
a nation’s return to a site
of its own violence. It is perhaps true, after all, as Dean MacCannell argues in
study of tourism, that there is always a connection to be drawn between
armies and tourists. As MacCannell puts it, “What is an expeditionary force
without guns? Tourists” (xviii).
Trigano’s prediction that Vietnam is destined to become a “major tourist
destination” may already be coming true. In May of 1992, a travel writer for
Vogue, John Krich, claimed that Vietnam, the “scorched land that couldn’t be
conquered,” was “staging its comeback as the world’s next ‘hot’ destination”:

Now enough time has passed
Vietnam to pass from the domain of Hol
agents to travel agents. With the lifting of travel restrictions last
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December — preparatory to the long-rumored end of the full economic
boycott imposed back in 1975, expected to take place after this year’s pres
idential elections — American companies are finally free to book Vietnam
flights, hotels, and tours. . . . While some rebellious highland zones are still
off-limits to
less-restricted travel will be a certain result of the
forthcoming
onslaught. (278)

While touring the Museum of War Crimes, Krich seems almost nostalgic for
that lost “treacherous Vietnam.” The beaches are indeed beautiful, he writes.
But have all the land mines been cleared? While marketing Vietnam as a last
wilderness (“Go before they start inventing things for you to see”), Krich is also
acutely self-conscious of the peculiarity of American tourism in Vietnam.
“Travel,” he writes, “is essentially tragic. . . . [T]o paraphrase Norman Mailer’s
classic question, 'Why are we in Vietnam
”’ (284).
Why indeed? Krich describes Saigon as “
vast assertiveness-training
session, a nonstop workshop in learning to say no” to the children who beg him
for money or plague him with faded photographs of “some long-lost Lieutenant
Bill or Jim.” What Krich wants is to find a way “to wrench Vietnam out of the
realm of the symbolic.” Even if this should happen, however, the war
con
tinue to be a conscious or unconscious part of Vietnam’s attraction for Ameri
cans. As a recent article in the Boston Globe reported: “
the traveller, the war
hangs over everything, like the thick morning mist in the Mekong Delta jun
gle. While the bomb craters are all fishponds now, it’s hard not to gaze over the
palm trees and rice fields and imagine the clucking of helicopter
and
machine-gun fire” (Flint B-27). In the most recent example of such “returns,”
the June 1996 issue of Vogue includes a photo session of Kate Moss “sent off to
explore the new Vietnam” on
page modelling a “tiger-striped top” (about
$320) in an “old French colonial house” (148). One caption over her blandly
serene
pronounces, “At peace in Vietnam” (147).
If the American desire to return to Vietnam is mired in one “
of the
symbolic,” the French return has its own complicated history. What can it
mean for the Triganos to return to Vietnam, which the French “lost” the year
Gilbert Trigano started the empire of Club Med? Perhaps in the idea of Club
Med in Vietnam, the Triganos have found the new realm of the symbolic
desired by tourists like Krich. Club Med in Vietnam
enable the French to
return to Vietnam, to rebuild French villages on the scars of the old colonies.
If a visit to Vietnam will provide Club Med tourists with a “rupture,” it will
in large part because of the paradoxical power of these villages set in the
“scorched country” that France and America fought so hard (and so unsuccess
fully) to control. Trigano, however, alludes to none of this. For him Vietnam
is described as curiously new, unexplored, without history. It is less a country
than a backdrop, a view — a beach and not a beachhead. But this is the pecu
liar work of utopia as praxis: both to erase and to reinscribe the colonialist ori
gins of its past.
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The Antedate

The island of Utopia visited by Raphael Hythlodaeus, More’s fictitious explor
er, is at once an "antidote” for the civilization represented by the disputatious
courts of Europe in Book One and an anamorphic representation of that civi
lization. Here, too, the exotic and the familiar overlay each other so that the
island at once resembles England and destabilizes the very possibility of resem
play of the country
widely
waste
one cross 
each
. The whole
games,
one
center
is a harbor "which lets
ships
every direction,” thus inviting entry; but the mouth of that harbor is ""rendered
perilous” by hidden reefs, shallows, and crags (More, Utopia 111). Thus the fig
ure of utopia as text and as space is both inviting and impenetrable: we are
asked in, we are held at bay; and we are warned that the placid harbor is mined
with possible danger.
In Utopia, Hythlodaeus tells Morus, everything is designed for the benefit
both of profit and of pleasure. Rules are strict but simple, designed largely to
prohibit idleness or waste. While the Utopian work day is short — only six
hours — the distinction between industry and leisure is blurred so that hours
""off” may be as arduous as hours ""on.” The Utopian timetable is strictly regi
mented: ""Utopians . . . divide the day and night into twenty-four equal hours
and assign only six to work. There are three before noon, after which they go
to dinner. After dinner, when they have rested for two hours in the afternoon,
they again give three to work and finish up with supper. Counting
o’clock
as the first hour after noon, they go to bed about eight o’clock, and sleep claims
eight hours” (127). To quote Hythlodaeus: ""The intervals between the hours
of work, sleep, and food are left to every man’s discretion, not to
time in
revelry or idleness, but to devote the time free from work to some other occu
pation according to taste. These periods are commonly devoted to intellectual
pursuits.” Public lectures are delivered in the hours before daybreak, and while
attendance is compulsory only for those selected as scholars, ""both males and
females flock” to hear them.2 While this zeal for edification is
acknowl
edged as More’s paean to the ""new learning,” it is possible to see here, as Club
Med’s popular computer workshops or intensive sports-training programs, a
dissolution of the boundaries between labor and rest, a Foucauldian structure of
improvement that keeps citizen or tourist under constant pressure to improve.3
In Utopia, citizens constantly test
another. At mealtimes, which are taken
communally (like Club Med’s tables of eight), the elders deliberately draw out
the young men ""so that they
test each one’s ability and character, which are
revealed in the relaxed atmosphere of a feast” (145). Relaxation and testing
become disguises for
other in a community predicated upon winning and
losing. Utopian
for instance, allegorize moral lessons, as Hythlodaeus
describes: ""They do
two games not unlike chess. The first is a battle of
numbers in which one number plunders another. The second is a game in
which the vices fight a pitched battle with the virtues” (129). Strikingly,
Hythlodaeus describes these games as battles: ‘"one number plunders another”;
""the vices fight & pitched battle with the virtues.” Utopian battles, conversely, are
described like complex and intruiging games. Utopians use their wits to con
found their enemies, employing the gold they devalue within their culture to
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bribe foreign mercenaries, laying ambushes and avoiding them, using their keen
minds to "‘invent war machines,” and
actual combat fighting to the death,
using battle-axes at close proximity to thrust or hack at their enemies. Once
the enemy has been subdued the Utopians do not destroy the offending coun
try but rather annex it, sending some of their own citizens under the title of
Financial Agents “to live there in great style and play the part of magnates.”
Though critics are often troubled by the military aggression of the Utopi
ans, it is actually part of a consistent cycle in their history: the citizens “civi
lize” others as they themselves once were “civilized.”4 Their own history, after
all, is
of invasion, transformation, and annexation.
As the report goes and as the appearance of the ground shows, the island
once was not surrounded by the sea. But Utopus, who as conqueror gave
the island its name (up to then it had been called Abraxa) and who brought
the rude and rustic people up to such a perfection of culture and humanity
as makes them now superior to almost all other mortals, gained a victory at
his very first landing. (113)

Utopus’ division and renaming of this territory,
the French division and
renaming of Vietnam, accompanies a moment of colonialist conquest.5 The
creation of Utopia is at one and the same time the destruction of Abraxa, whose
natives are subsequently employed in the literal reformulation of their home
land. The isolated status of utopia is at once deliberate and imperfect; Utopia
annexes Abraxa but cannot entirely forget the latter’s surrender, instead incor
porating it into collective memory. Thus utopia is the product of colonialism
as much as its subject.
In More’s Utopia, England is the absent presence; explicitly named only
passing, it is nonetheless an important subject of both books of More’s text. In
Book One, Hytholodaeus recounts a lengthy debate set at Cardinal Morton’s
table, in which England is threatened by the ravages of a hungry underclass
that, according to Hythlodaeus, it is exploiting and worsening by turns. The
violent poor threaten, literally, to consume the land, like the ravenous sheep to
which Hythlodaeus compares them. Similarly, in Utopia neither violence nor
inequity is eradicated. Certain offenses are considered
and the entire
society is both patriarchal and acutely class-conscious, in true Platonic fashion.
But violence is displaced, disguised, moved out to the margins of the cities,
where the sick are kept in hospitals, where meat is decontaminated, where
papers and permits are
inspected. At the center of every Utopian
city a spectacle of value is played out in the centralized markets, where all com
modities are brought and
taken away without compensation.
Indeed, the very terms used in Utopia for reward — “industry,” “employment,”
“progress,” “diligence,” “advancement” — as well as those for punishment —
“falsified,” “reduced” — are market terms. But Utopia’s moneyless markets can
function only within the
market of Utopia as system.6 Beyond the
island, a different currency is needed, and the “valueless” gold that the
secrete away from the people is melted down for trade. In the island’s “other”
economy, the economy that allows the commonwealth to import and export, to
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make profits, to manipulate prices for its neighbors, gold has value indeed. The
market thus destabilizes value by demonstrating that it can be endlessly altered,
augmented
decreased, that it is not real but made up, constructed, fictional.
The same ore that as a child’s bauble or slave’s chain or a chamberpot is a stig
ma is at other times “treasure not kept as treasure” (151). Like Club Med,
other words, Utopia operates on two distinct economies: an internal economy
in which nothing costs, experience is free, and every need is answered; and an
external economy in which one’s bar-beads are worthless and a more legitimate
currency must be tendered. Though Hythlodaeus explains that it is war that
creates the need for this double economy, one might reverse his argument.
Wars must exist to bolster the split Utopian economy, so that violence and value
might be kept distinct.

More’s Utopia, like Trigano’s Club Med, masks the identity of its site of origin
in a way that seems to dissolve nationalism but actually serves it. Written in
Latin, published in the Netherlands, More’s literary “nowhere” is, despite its
nationlessness, an English space, an exploration of a “rude and savage people”
civilized to the point of civilizing other “rude and savage peoples,” on an island
at once exotic and familiar.7 More’s “new world” was devised less than twenty
years after Henry VII offered an award of ten pounds to “hym that found the
New Isle” (of Brasil),
award won by John Cabot in 1497, though what land
Cabot actually discovered on that expedition is still disputed. Though Eng
land’s heyday in maritime exploration was still generations away, expeditions
intensified after Cabot’s “discovery.” In August of 1502, three men were taken
from the “New Found Isle Land” and
presented to the King, only to die
later in captivity. It was during these years that Rastell began plans for his
unsuccessful attempt to establish the first English colony in America. For
Rastell’s character Experience, America is a land of commodities:

O, what a thynge had be then
If that they be English men
Might have been the first of all
That there sholde have taken possessyon
And made first buyldynge and habytacion,
A memory perpetuall! (762-7)
It would have been a great honor — “both to the realme and to the King”
to
extend England’s dominion, Experience argues. For in America there are great
riches to be had: stores of copper, an abundance of fish, trees (pineapple and
fir) from which “great riches might come.” Intermingled with this description
of the land’s value are details of the natives’ simplicity: their lack of clothes,
their crude shelters, their ignorance of Christ. The English, Experience says,
could teach them to live virtuously while mining their land of its ore. Thus
Rastell sees in his “new world,” as More sees his, a land where nothing would
“cost,” where valuable property could be traded for beads.
Rastell’s
of Americus, like More’s Utopus
and in a sense like
Gilbert Trigano — represses or displaces the violence of the idyll. The acqui-
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sition of land, the artificial construction of the antidote, the subjugation or
eradication of one population so that “kind organizers” and “kind members” can
be brought in their stead: none of this is visible in the fiction of utopia. But
utopia is
seamlessly colonialist. Instead, its rendering of colonialism is
unstable, for the utopian text is a site where binaries dissolve. It is not the
escape thatTrigano has so successfully marketed, but that elusive concept of the
rupture, that “break with normal life, a normal day.” Like the rupture of war,
the rupture offered by utopia is reassuring as well as destabilizing. It becomes
a tear or space that
the master text to keep getting told.
Trigano’s Club Med at Danang can be
another way as well: as yet
another postmodern testimony to the end of novelty. For however hard Trigano
try to find a location beyond the reaches of the ordinary, civilization
civilization
l have gotten there
before him. What the tourist
in finds
in Club Med —and
in
in
wil
Luxor, in Morroco, in Vietnam — is not the antidote to
but rather
its antedate. To this extent, Trigano’s Club Med
Vietnam — still only a
blueprint — seems an uncanny postscript to More’s romance. This may be why,
to my mind, utopia as a literary form always feels familiar or retold. More built
this sense of belatedness into Utopia in 1516, insisting that the narrative was
not his own but part of a metonymic chain of telling and listening. Every
utopia since More’s has compounded this sense of déjà raconté. We have a dis
turbing sense that we have heard this before, that this is not new. We may, in
fact, have already been here. But like the French in Vietnam, we may not be
comfortable remembering why.

Notes
1. Information on Club Med in this essay has been culled from promo
tional materials from the company’s corporate headquarters in New York
from John Heilpern’s essay.
2. Edification is, in fact, one means of social mobility in Utopia. “Not sel
dom does it happen that a craftsman so industriously employs his spare hours
on learning and makes such progress by his diligence that he is relieved of his
manual labor and advanced into the class of the men of learning” (133).
3. For a discussion of the “New Learning” in England, see Simon 59-101
and Cressy. What Foucault identifies as the three methods of the timetable are
deeply encoded
the Utopian system: the establishment of rhythms, the
imposition of particular occupations, and the regulation of cycles of repetition
(149-50). Like Cardinal Morton’s table in Book One of Utopia, the schedule
is a taxonomy of place and function, providing a grid which assures that order
l not be disrupted and that every citizen
in will be functioning as usefully as 
possible at every minute. Like the map, the timetable imposes its own logic
direction, controlling and organizing down to the smallest detail. Interesting
ly, Hythlodaeus’ dread of waste is linked
Utopia to the citizens’ distaste for
excrement, brought forward in the famous discussion of gold chamberpots.
Waste in Utopia is abhorrent in any form.
4.
Davis argues that the Machiavellian behavior of Utopians outside of
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Utopia is appropriate, while it would be inconsistent at home. In the “Hobbesian state of nature” they must
this way in order to defend themselves
(56). Herbruggen is more critical, objecting to what he sees as an “intolerant,
even brutal attitude towards . . . differently-minded neighbors.”
5. There are two figures of the colonist in More’s text, which takes as its
starting point the fact that none of its characters is “home.” In a letter to Eras
mus dated December 4, 1516, More famously revealed his own identification
with Utopus: “In my daydreams I have been marked out by my Utopians to be
their King forever; I can see myself now marching along, crowned with a dia
dem of wheat, very striking in my Franciscan frock, carrying a handful of wheat
as my sacred scepter, thronged by a distinguished retinue of Amaurotians
with this huge entourage, giving audience to foreign
and sover
eigns” (More, Correspondence 83-5). Hythlodaeus’ position as colonist is more
complicated and in some ways more interesting, as his role is to teach Utopia
about Europe as well as vice versa.
6. Marin distinguishes these interior markets from exterior storehouses,
which share with Utopian hospitals a position of marginality. He also argues
that the spatial grid of Utopian cities negates the geographical loci of these
markets, so that they exist, literally, “nowhere” (Utopics
7. Marin argues that Utopia erases or neutralizes the violence of colonial
ism, projecting it into the distant past and rearticulating it as cultivation or
improvement. See Utopics 109ff.
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If we take the author of The Book ofMargery Kempe at
her word, then we can say that some time in the fall
or summer of 1413 a rather extraordinary meeting
took place between Margery Kempe, lay mystic and
wife of a well-to-do burgher in the East Anglian
town of Lynn, and Thomas Arundel, Archbishop of
Canterbury. Arundel was the highest-ranking cleric
in the realm, deeply involved in national politics and
the intrigues of court. He is — and was — best
known for his decisive role in the heretication of the
teachings of John Wyclif and the persecution of his
lollard followers. When Kempe arrived in Lambeth,
she had recently been accused of lollardy for the first
time, by a group of Canterbury monks who cited her
excessive weeping and her quoting a “story of Scriptur” as evidence of heresy and chased her out of the
monastery, crying "ϸow xalt be brent, fals lollare”
[You shall be burnt, you false Lollard!] and pointing
to a "cartful of thornys redy for ϸe & a tonne to bren
ϸe wyth” [a cartful of thorns ready for you, and a bar
rel to burn you with] (27-8).1 She faces similar
"many
s”
Arundels very doorstep: when she
reproves certain of the Archbishops clerks for swear
ing
gret oϸis” [many great oaths] and speaking
"many rekles wordys” [many thoughtless words], a lay
woman declares she wishes Kempe were at Smithfield, the site of several notorious heresy trials, where
she herself would gladly "beryn a fagot to bren [her]
wyth” [bring a bundle of sticks to burn her with]
(36). But once Kempe is closeted with Arundel him
self, the question of heresy never arises. Quite the
opposite, in fact: rather than questioning her on arti-
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cles of faith, and before he has even had a chance to talk with her at length,
Arundel grants her permission to choose her own
and to receive com
munion weekly, privileges reserved not only for the orthodox but for those
deemed particularly holy. When he has heard her account of herself, he further
commends her “maner of leuynyg” [manner of
accepts her criticism of
his clerks’ behavior “ful benyngly & mekely” [in the most meek and kindly
way], and stays talking with her of God “tyl sterrys apperyd in ϸe fyrmament”
[until stars appeared in the firmament] (37).
The lollard teachings that Arundel and his colleagues sought to combat
granted
unprecedented spiritual authority to the laity, questioning the need
for ecclesiastical structures such as the sacraments to mediate between the
layperson and God, and arguing (for example) that laypeople should be able
dismiss an ecclesiastic from a post for which they find him spiritually under
qualified.2 By 1413, any layperson who claimed that his or her spiritual wel
fare was independent from the institutional structures of the church, or whose
theology seemed independent of its teachings,
tried for heresy and
persecuted for treason. The series of episodes described above acknowledges
the possibility that certain aspects of Kempe's behavior — her weeping, her
command of the scriptures, her tendency to reprove others for their unholy liv
ing — could
read as signs of lollardy. The unquestioning support of Arch
bishop Arundel himself then establishes the correct reading: these manifesta
tions are in fact signs of grace. Kempe’s grace derives from her special rela
tionship with Christ, the “dalyawns ϸat owyr Lord
to hyr sowle” [the
dalliance3 which our Lord conversed with her soul] (36) that she tells Arundel
about once he has won her confidence by granting her petitions. By proclaim
ing this “dalyawns” to be genuine, evidence of the “grace” that “owyr mercyful
Lord Crist Ihesu schewyd ... in owyr days” [our merciful Lord Jesus Christ
showed ... in our time] (37), Arundel grants to Kempe a great deal of spiritu
al
Because Christ speaks directly to her, the Archbishop of Canter
bury even cedes to her spiritual authority, meekly submitting to her criticism of
his clerics. The rest of the chapter — a chapter which began with a laywoman
threatening Kempe with the
— continues in a quietly triumphant vein:
Kempe meets with a very
popular success in London, where “hir dalyawns
& hir comunycacyon”4 are much sought-after and move many to tears that mir
ror her own, and back in Lynne she finds a confessor who proclaims her to be
“hyly inspyred wyth ϸe Holy Gost” and promises never to forsake her (37-8).
Once Arundel has not only confirmed her orthodoxy but acknowledged her
special grace and the spiritual authority deriving from her dalliance with Christ,
both the laity and the clergy fall (for now) effortlessly into line.
Whether or not these events
transpired as Kempe narrates them we
can of course
know. Lynn Staley posits that many of the stories Kempe
tells are fictional. Because they can be successfully read either of two ways, as
confirmations of Kempe’s orthodoxy or as criticisms of the church, episodes
such as the meeting with Arundel both “clear [Kempe] from charges of heresy”
and “allow her to confront the issue of moral authority dramatizing a fiction
in which Margery’s accusers are confounded by her holiness and simplicity”
(Dissenting Fictions 149). These “lollard episodes” thus reveal the Book to be a
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carefully composed text, one that makes use of the kinds of strategies, ranging
from the appropriation and manipulation of generic conventions to the deploy
ment of deliberate ambiguity, familiar to modern students of literature. Staley
continually draws
between Kempe (whom she identifies as the author
of the Book and distinguishes from her "protagonist” Margery) and Chaucer, on
the grounds that both “used the literary tradition to which [they] were heir as
well as the world around [them] to compose a fiction .... [They] understood
the meaning of and thus the need to assert mastery over communal and liter
ary codes” (xii-xiii; emphasis added). I hope to confirm both Staley's sense of
the Book as a deliberately composed text and her claim that it raises the issue of
spiritual authority in a carefully ambiguous way. But without undermining her
claims for Kempes authorship and textual savviness, I want to move away from
Staley’s tendency to categorize the Book as a specifically literary text, resisting
her unspoken assumption that any text with a discernible structure relevant to
its meaning, and self-conscious about its own textuality, must perforce
“lit
erature.” This conflation of the composed and the literary discourages the rig
orous examination both of vernacular literature as a textual category and of the
variety of non-literary ways in which vernacular textuality was used, quite
self-consciously, in this period.
Margery Kempe was writing within a traditional medieval understanding
of religious texts as sites of spiritual authority, but she was writing at a time
when traditional conceptions of textual authority
everywhere and confus
ingly contested. For Kempe, “religious texts” were no longer restricted to the
Latin theological treatises and biblical commentaries that constituted the priv
ileged realm of the clerisy and the source of ecclesiastical authority. They
included as well the vast range of what Nicholas Watson has termed “vernacu
lar theology,” texts written for, and occasionally even by, laypeople, which
ranged from manuals for devotional meditation on the life of Christ, through
mystical texts designed to record and inspire bodily experiences of the divine,
to the lollard translations of the biblical words that formed the basis for theo
logical and doctrinal debate into the vernacular — just to name a few. Watson
defines the term as follows:

To refer to the “Middle English mystics” as “vernacular theologians” is . . .
to assert two different sets of connections, with other kinds of theology and
with vernacular writing in general.... The fourteenth-century “mystics” are
part of a huge cultural experiment involving the translation of both Latin
and Anglo-French texts, images, conceptual structures — all the apparatus
of textual authority — into what contemporary commentators termed the
“barbarous” mother-tongue, English.... As such, [they] are involved in the
socio-political discussion as Chaucer, Langland, and the Lollards —
and in the contentious part of that discussion that had to do with the artic
ulation of theological
in English. (“Middle English Mystics” 8)

I hope to show that The Book ofMargery Kempe participates in these efforts to
think theologically in English, and
the broader “socio-political discussion”
about the nature and status of vernacular textuality in which such efforts play a
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crucial part; Kempe was, to put it differently, engaged in a redefinition of the
nature of textual authority. Kempe dubbed her book a “tretys,” a word used in
Middle English to describe all kinds of more or less didactic texts. Her project
was to invent a kind of “tretys” whose spiritual authority
not from its
participation in any single discourse of traditional textual authorizing but rather
from the spiritual experiences and “dalyawns” with Christ that formed the cen
ter of her lived life.

In order to understand the problems and potentials of thinking theologically
the vernacular in Margery Kempes England, I would like to begin with Arun
del and the lollard controversy, and particularly with its consequences for writ
ing in English.
Between 1407 and 1409, just a few years before he (allegedly) talked of
God with Margery Kempe “tyl sterrys apperyd in ϸe fyrmament,” Archbishop
Arundel drafted and issued thirteen Constitutions regarding religious ortho
doxy and its enforcement, the final word in the heretication of lollardy. The
Lambeth Constitutions, as they are generally referred to, go about their work
not by enumerating, refuting, and censoring individual heretical views but
rather by seeking to control the (perceived) sources and means of transmission
of heresy.5 Like lollardy itself, Arundels Constitutions have their origin in
Oxford, as the culmination of long-standing debates about the intellectual
autonomy of the university and the virtues and dangers of translating the Bible
into English. More than a power struggle between the ecclesiastical hierarchy
and the university, however, they represent an attempt to pull heresy out by the
roots: to control theological speculation at Oxford (and the Constitutions pro
vide for the examination of the views of every student in an Oxford hall once a
month) is to control the discourse out of which heresy is born, particularly if
one is unable or unwilling to conceive of sophisticated and subversive theolog
ical arguments originating with uneducated laypeople. But despite their acad
emic origins, and despite their concern to prevent heresies from developing in
the universities which alone were thought capable of producing them, the Lam
beth Constitutions direct the majority of their regulatory energy to preaching,
teaching, and writing among the non-academic laity to which Margery Kempe
belonged. For by 1409 lollard teachings had spread far beyond the walls of the
burgeoning academy, muddying the increasingly vague line between cleric and
lay by encouraging the latter to read and interpret the Bible for themselves and
by undermining the right of the
to the final word on questions of theol
ogy and doctrine (not to mention undermining their right to secular authority
and temporal
Arundels Constitutions sought to re-clarify and re
fortify the cleric/lay divide by codifying the authority of the eccesiastical hier
archy over any and all lay theological speculation.6
The spread of lollardy itself— both what Wyclif taught regarding the need
for vernacular translations of the Bible, and the literacy of many lay lollards evi
dent in surviving trial depositions7 — was testament to the fact that in order to
control theological speculation in late-medieval England, one had to control
writing in the vernacular, both what got written down and who had access to it.
Archbishop Arundel clearly saw it that way: the 4 central” Lambeth Constitu
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tions (both in Anne Hudsons formulation and quite literally, as they are the
sixth and seventh of thirteen) sought to control the spread of heresy by strictly
controlling the production and circulation not just of the English Bible but of
(potentially) all vernacular texts, allowing the church to censor any book or tract
made in Wyclif’s time or since (see Wilkins 317). After 1409, no English book
could be read without the hierarchy’s authorization, or so the letter of the law
stipulated. And the possession of, or even exposure to, unauthorized Bible
translations was declared a sign of heresy, making the church the effectual
source of the authority of the scriptures. Finally, what these two Constitutions
sought to do is to bring the spread of reading and writing among laypeople
firmly under the control of Arundel and his church, thus preserving the
distinctions between cleric and lay, literatus and illiteratus, upon which rested so
much of that institution’s spiritual and temporal authority.
It was a
that was already doomed to fail, not least because of the wide
variety of “books and tracts” already abounding in Arundel’s England. But it
was not a simple dream, and it did not die easily.8 Nor did it lack support
among many of those whose books and tracts were responsible for, and respon
sive to, the increase in lay literacy. In 1410, no doubt with the injunctions of
the Lambeth Constitutions clearly in mind, Nicholas Love sought and
obtained Arundel’s authorization for his Mirrour of the Blessed Lyf ofJesu Crist,
a loose translation of the immensely popular pseudo-Bonaventuran Meditationes Vitae Christi. The Mirrour presents itself as a collection of “diuerse ymaginacions of cristes life,” compiled for “symple creaturs Pe whiche as childryn
hauen nede to be fedde with the mylke of lyȝte doctryne & not with sadde mete
of grete clargye & of hye contemplaci n” [various imaginings of Christ’s life ...
simple creatures which, like children, need to be fed with the milk of light doc
trine and not with weighty meat of great clergy and of high contemplation]
(Love 10).9 Love enjoins his readers to reimagine the individual events in the
life of Christ
any way that makes them more vivid, to “sette in mynde Pe
image of crystes Incarnation passion & Resurrection” and “in Pat manere make
ϸe in ϸe soule present” to those
[set in mind the image of Christ’s incar
nation, passion, and resurrection ... in that manner, make yourself present in
your soul]. It is not even vital to know what the gospels themselves say but
rather to meditate on what “we resonably
suppose” [what we reasonably
might suppose] (168) in the most effective — which is to say the most affective
— way possible. There is even a sense in Love’s prologue that the life of Christ
by nature cannot
be told but can only be fruitfully imagined:
[C]ristes life . . .
worϸily be cleped ϸe blessede life of Jesu Christ, Pe
which also because it may not be fully discriuede as ϸe lifes of oϸer seyntes,
bot in a maner of liknes as the ymage of a man’s face is
in ϸe mir
rour. (11)

[Christ’s life . . . can worthily be called the blessed life of Jesus Christ, also
because it can not be fully described as the lives of other
can,
in a manner of likeness, as the image of a man’s face is shown in the mir
ror.]
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With this oblique reference to the title of his work, Love gives new life to the
common medieval trope of the book as mirror, as speculum, by using it to artic
ulate a very specific understanding of what it
to read the story of Jesus’
life, to encounter it in a book and turn it to one’s own use. For Love’s ortho
dox lay reader, suited to imaginative engagement with the manhood of Christ
rather than the puzzling out of doctrine, to read a book is create an image by
meditating upon the events in a narrative.
Marginal notes identifying passages throughout the Mirrour as “contra lollardos” [against lollards], as well as clear statements by Love himself that his
text stands “in confusion of alie fals lollardes” [to confound all false lollards]
(154), echo Arundel’s statement of authorization, copied diligently (in Latin)
into nearly all of the existing manuscripts between an (English) table of con
tents and a (Latin) notice regarding Love’s additions to the Meditationes', “ad
fidelium edificacionem hereticorum siue lollardorum confiitatcionem”
the
instruction of the faithful and the confutation of heretics and lollards] (Salter
1-2). There is a tantalizing irony, for the modern reader, in the fact that a
church hierarch willing to burn heretics over seemingly fine semantic distinc
tions regarding the nature of transubstantiated bread would champion a gospel
harmony presenting two competing versions of the crucifixion and inviting the
reader to choose between them (see Love 176-7) — would authorize it, more
over, as a direct refutation of lollard teachings, a self-consciously orthodox
alternative to lollard translations of the scriptures. While Arundel felt the
social and spiritual autonomy of his church to be threatened by Wyclif’s mak
ing a vernacular text claiming to present the actual words of the gospels avail
able to the lay public, he saw a layperson’s imaginative recreations of the story
of the gospels as strengthening his or her orthodoxy. The laypeople could have
the stories, but they
not have the words. Arundel was attempting to keep
religion a matter of
and devotional meditation for an increasingly lit
erate lay population, to channel their
with texts into an imaginative
relationship with religious narratives rather than an intimate acquaintance with
the words of the scriptures themselves.10 In doing so, he sought to establish
and enforce an implicit dichotomy between two ways of reading the
as
text: the laity were to read the
as a structure of narratives, narratives that
do their work in the realm of the devotional imagination; the clergy
to
read it as a structure of words, words that provided them with the basis for
developing and defending orthodox theology and doctrine. It was, to risk a
simplification, an attempt to enforce a strict division between propositional
logic and emotional response, intellect and affect.
The two possible understandings of what it means to be a text implicit in
Arundel’s legislation suggest a new way to answer a perennial question about
The Book ofMargery Kempe: who is its “real” author, Kempe or her scribe?
Kempe, I would argue, the relevant question is not so much “Whose words?” as
“Whose story?” Both prologues to the first Book repeatedly tell us that the
work is “of ϸis creature” [of this creature], and that it
“schewyn
party
[her] leuyng”
show in part her life] (2). Even if we take many of the
words of the prologues to be the work of Kempe’s priest-scribe,11 there is no
question that the story of the Book is hers.12
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The stories Kempe tells give us a glimpse into the wide variety of religious
writing and thinking, especially rich and varied in her native East Anglia, out
of which grew both the necessity for, and the terms of, Arundel’s dichotomy.
Lollardy flourished in Kempe’s native region, as did official
of combat
ing it: the Norwich heresy trials of the early fifteenth century, contemporane
ous with the later events Kempe narrates and with the writing of the Book itself,
are the best-documented instances of the anti-Wycliffite inquisition; they also
provide us with our most intriguing records of who the
were, of how the
teachings of an Oxford heretic were transmitted to and incorporated into the
lives of laypeople. Gail Gibson demonstrates beautifully the strength and per
vasiveness of what she terms the “incarnational aesthetic” in East Anglian wor
ship, drama, art, and architecture of the period, a brand of lay devotional spir
ituality based on
intimate incorporation of the fact of Christ’s manhood and
the details of his life into the facts and details of East Anglian lives.13 Julian of
Norwich (whom Kempe visited
on in her converted life) wrote a com
pelling and distinctly theologically-minded account of her own practice of
imaginative meditation on the life of Christ, influenced, as Kempe was, by the
mysticism of writers
Hilton and Rolle.
Kempe draws
these rich and varied vernacular theological traditions to
challenge the assumption that late-medieval lay religious life and thought could
be contained neatly within the terms of Arundel’s dichotomy. Her Book ties
together the whole mess of
that Arundel sought to dichotomize
neatly along lay/clerical lines into a narrative which is neither a traditional
devotional manual nor a traditional theological text, exposing the ways in which
Arundel’s constitutions oversimplify the traditions of vernacular theology and
the variety of lay religious
that they seek to control. On the one
hand, it is at least partly true, as Watson suggests, that Kempe’s predilection for
the concrete often allows her to remain “willingly contained within the world
of images” (“Middle English Mystics” 37), as Love and Arundel would wish her
to be. In fact, the Book reveals enough of the strong, direct influence of Love’s
Mirrour for Gibson to
that “it is often when Margery Kempe sounds
the most like her inimitable self that she is, in fact, the most Pseudo-Bonaventure” (49). But its technically illiterate author also demonstrates an intimate
familiarity with the words of the Bible — and even, more extraordinary still,
with “doctowrys Per-up-on,” or exegetical commentaries (143).14 Again and
again, she defends her orthodoxy in ways that work against the very heart of
Arundel’s project: attacked for living a life deemed inappropriate for a married
woman (her detractors often mention her wearing white and traveling alone,
and at least
fears she will persuade other women to follow in her foot
steps),15 and accused
clerics of heresy
to her “preaching” and her knowl
edge of the scriptures, she successfully defends herself by citing the scriptures,
once even in Latin,16 in the course of remarkably theological-sounding debates.
And just as Kempe proves her orthodoxy by appropriating a discourse (theo
logical debate) that
prove her heresy, so she uses her
Loveinspired meditations to legitimate exactly the behavior that calls her orthodoxy
into question the first place: “preaching,” traveling alone, living chaste as a
wife, and so forth.
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The second prologue to Book One famously announces that Kempe’s
“tribulacyons ... schal ben schewed aftyr, not in ordyr as it fellyn but as ϸe creatur cown han mend of him whan it wer wretyn” [tribulations ... [are] not writ
ten in order, every thing after another as it was done, but just as the matter
came to this creature’s mind when it was to be written down] (6). This state
ment has generally been read as proof that the Book as a whole has no premed
itated structural principles but is simply a rambling account of various events
that happened to occur to Kempe, told in the order which they happened to
occur to her.17 In
it indicates the structural principle that governs her
transformation of her experiences into text: memory, not chronology, orders
this Book, and it does so by association, arranging episodes by kind. The result
is narrative — not in the most basic modern sense of narrative as a chronolog
ical relating of events, nor purely in Love’s sense of a series of recorded and
remembered events that one engages with imaginatively again and again in an
ongoing process of spiritual growth, but rather narrative as a series of episodes
linked in a progression of emotions and ideas that the reader is meant to
low, learning from his or her own affective and intellectual engagement.
The entire first book can
broken down fairly neatly into sections
less on the chronological development of Kempe’s life story (though despite her
caveat
section does confine itself primarily to the events in
period of
her life) than on the kinds of vernacular theologizing she appropriates in each
and the individual lessons in reading and appropriation that she learns. The
sections I see are as follows:
1) the establishment of Kempe’s relationship with Jesus and of the terms
and consequences of that relationship (Capitula 1-24);
2) the pilgrimages to Jerusalem, where Kempe’s tears are augmented by
roarings and weepings at the actual sites of the passion and the crucifixion, and
to Rome, where she is married to the Godhead of Christ the capital city of
his church (Capitula 25-45);
3) a series of episodes in which Kempe is persecuted as a lollard and suc
cessfully defends herself to various clerical authorities (Capitula 46-55);
4) Margery’s life and tribulations in Lynn, including confrontations with
various local laypeople and clerics and the illness and death of her husband,
punctuated by long reassuring speeches by Christ and other confirming experi
ences (Capitula 56-78);
5) a series of participatory meditations on or visions of the passion, death,
and resurrection of Christ, following Love’s account in the vast majority of their
details (Capitula 79-83); and
6) a concluding section of statements of authenticity and purpose, first in
direct speeches from Christ to Kempe and finally from Kempe and her scribe
directly to the reader. (Capitula 84-9)
Each section corresponds to a phase in the development of Kempe’s pro
ject, both lived and written. Taken together, they are remarkable for the thor
oughness with which they reflect the various ways people wrote about religion
in Kempe’s world. Read in sequence, they trace her appropriation of all those
systems of religious thought into the intertwined narratives — spiritual and
worldly, interior and exterior — of her life. By following the development of
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her narrative from section to section, we as readers participate in her struggle
to come to terms with an authoritative and potentially authoritarian way of
thinking (Arundel’s dichotomy) which sought radically to simplify and limit
her
of God and her ability to think and talk and write about that
experience. In a parallel development, we learn with Kempe to grant her the
spiritual authority bestowed upon her by the voice ofJesus speaking from with
in. Kempe thus redefines “tretys” by exploiting the potential inherent in the
reader’s participatory relationship to narrative.
The first section of Book One reads as a microcosm of the text as a whole,
establishing the Book's two primary structural principles, narrative and episod
ic, as it establishes the source of its own authority: Kempe’s relationship with
Christ. On one level, this first section constitutes a narrative in and of itself:
Kempe grows and develops in her relationship with Christ as we move from
one episode to the next. But each of these initial episodes also serves retro
spectively as a foil for a later section of the Book, allowing us to see how Kempe
learns and develops with regard to each aspect of her relationship to Christ and
her relationship to the world as she learns to read them both properly. I
take advantage of this structure in the reading that follows, progressing in order
through the episodes of the first section, and jumping back and forth between
the episodes of the first section and the corresponding later sections. I hope
thus to demonstrate how — and why — the Book works both narratively and
episodically.
At the heart both of Kempe’s life and of her Book lies the voice of Jesus
speaking from within, a relationship with the humanity of Christ that is both
revelatory and deeply personal. Kempe’s initial conversion directly juxtaposes a
hostile clerical authority to the comforting authority of Christ as he appears
and speaks to her. Seriously ill, Kempe confesses to a man who “gan scharply
to vndernemyn hir er ϸan sche had fully seyd hir entent” [began sharply to
reprove her before she had fully said what she meant] (7). Feeling trapped
between the threat of damnation and his “scharp repreuyng” [sharp reproving],
Kempe goes mad. She is cured of both physical and mental illness when Christ
appears to her “in lyknesse of a man” and addresses her directly as “Dowter”
[Daughter] (8). The conversational voice and immediate presence of Christ are
thus clearly established, by substituting at the moment of conversion for an
individual cleric’s failure, as the final source of authority in Kempe’s life and her
Book.
But Kempe is painfully aware of the fact that “sumtyme ϸo ϸat men wenyn
wer reuelacions it arn decytys &
” [sometimes those that people think
were revelations are deceits and illusions] (219), and much of the Book concerns
itself with the validation of Kempe’s spiritual experiences, for herself as
as
for her readers, and with the justification of the spiritual authority conferred by
her special “dalyawns” with Christ. In their introduction to the Middle Eng
lish treatise The Chastising of God's Children, Joyce Bazire and Eric Co ledge
note that experiences
Kempe’s, which they term “enthusiasm” (54; and pas
sim), were often seen as signs or harbingers of heresy. In a reading that paral
lels the Canterbury monks’ interpretation of her excessive weeping as a sign of
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heresy, Bazire and Coiledge see Kempe herself as the quintessential example of
this heterodox enthusiasm: “There is no [such] excess of conduct or belief
which is not recorded for us the spiritual autobiography of that queen among
enthusiasts, Margery Kempe (55). The Chastising itself (probably composed
some time between 1382 and 1408), which instructed its readers on how to read
adversity productively as a sign of Gods involvement in ones life, warns that
“many men and wymmen bien
by reuelacions and visions” [many men
and women are deceived by revelations and visions] (169) and carefully sets out
“seuene special tokenes by Pe whiche a man
knowe visions of a goode spir
it fro illusions of the Pe deuel” [seven special tokens by which a man shall know
visions of a good spirit from illusions of the devil] (171).18 Throughout the
Book, Kempe combats the kind of reading Bazire and Colledge suggest by seek
ing to verify her experiences just as the Chastising would have her do, making
it clear that she is (in the words of the author of the Chastising) “vndir obedi
ence and techyng of [her] goostli fadir” [under obedience to and the teachings
of her spiritual father], that she feels a “goostli swetnesse or sauour in ϸe loue
of god” [spiritual sweetness or savor in the love of God] and a “sodeyn comyng
of a goostli heete” [sudden onset of a spiritual heat], that her visions (despite
her detractors’ critiques) lead her to
“inward knowynge and goostli liȝt of
triewe shewing” [inward knowledge and spiritual light of true showing] and “to
honeste and to uertuous lyueng” [to honest and virtuous living], and that her
holiness is confirmed by the “shewyng of miraclis” [showing of miracles]
(Chastising 177, 187,181, 179, 181).19
Kempe’s anxieties about the authenticity of her spiritual experiences, like
the various episodes in which she is accused of lollardy, represent a
at which
subversive suggestions about her spiritual authority are both evoked and con
tained safely within an orthodox discourse. Such episodes are linked through
out the Book into a narrative that progresses from Kempe’s need for clerical
confirmation of her “felyngys” in the first section, to her final assertion, at the
end of the first book, that they are “very trewth schewyd
experiens” [very
truth, shown in experience] (220), a narrative that ultimately makes those
“felynygs” and her “dalyawns” with Christ the guarantors of their own authen
ticity. In the early chapters, Philip Repingdon, Bishop of Lincoln (the most
spectacular instance of a recanted lollard making good in the ecclesiastical hier
archy), as well as various anchors, friars, and priests, and the celebrated “Dame
lelyan” of Norwich, all play an authenticating role similar to Arundel’s, reading
Kempe’s potentially heterodox behavior
as an external manifestation
of her spiritual gifts, and proclaiming those
to be genuine. But the
unquestioning support of Arundel, the approbation of the Londoners on the
way home from Canterbury, and the absolute trust of her
confessor in
Lynn are soon replaced by the near-universal
of clerics and laypeople
alike as Kempe's spiritual experiences, and the outward signs that accompany
them, intensify.
In order to read this
properly as itself a sign of grace, Kempe must
learn to rely on the “internal” evidence of her spiritual experiences themselves
and on the hermeneutic guidance of the voice of Jesus speaking from within,
which tells her that “ϸat thing ϸat I lofe best ϸei [that is, “religiows men” and
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“prestys”] lofe not, & ϸat is schamys, despitys, scornys, & repreuys of ϸe pepil”
[that thing which I love best they do not love — and that is shame, contempt,
and rebukes from
(158). This shift from "external” to "internal”
testing is dramatized in Capitulum 59, when Kempe refuses to believe that cer
tain revelations she has had about who is to be saved and who damned have
come from God. God responds by depriving her of her spiritual gifts, replac
ing them with “horybyl syghtys & abhominable ... of beheldyng of mennys
membrys & swech oϸer abhominacyons” [horrible and abominable visions . . .
of seeing men's genitals, and other such abominations] (145) — the polar oppo
fail appropriate

closed marriage to speak
er and a particularly
e of her spiritual
the Godhead,
means
punishment for stage
betraying it. When she cries out to him for relief,
him
of abandoning her, he returns, chastising her for failure to “beleuyn Pat it is
God which spekyth to Pe Sc no deuel” [believe that it is the spirit of God that
speaks to you, and no devil] (146) and meting out a specific period of twelve
days’ punishment. The authenticity of the voice of Jesus speaking from within
is confirmed by that voice itself, and by the spiritual gifts it grants; Kempe’s
of testing the authenticity of her experiences has
as it were, selfreferential, a
circle operating increasingly in the realm of affect and
interpretation. By Capitulum 64 the tables have turned completely, and the
"felyngs” which began as the object of clerical examination have become stan
dards for testing the holiness of clerics: "ϸ is no clerk can spekyn a-ȝens ϸe
lyfe whech I teche ϸe, 8c, ȝyf he do, he is not Goddys clerk; he is ϸe Deuyls
clerk” [There is no clerk who can
against the life that I teach you, and, if
he does so, he is not God’s clerk, he is the devil’s clerk] (158).
The second
of Kempe’s conversion, which turns her away from her
ed worldly
desire
forspiritual:
worldlytears
acclaim, takes the
form
t,
[and]
she projects and from thesection,
of an experience that is at once bodily and
she hears a "sownd of
melodye so swet & delectable, hir poȝ as sche had ben in Paradyse,” making
her realize that "it is fill myry in Hevyn” [melodious sound so sweet and delec
table that
thought she had been in Paradise. ... It is full merry in heaven]
(11). This "melodye” causes her "to haue ful plentyouws & habundawnt teerys
of hy deuocyon wyth greet sobbyngys & syhyngys aftyr ϸe blysse of Heuen” [to
shed very plentiful and abundant tears of high devotion, with great sobbings
and sighings for the bliss of heaven] (11). Kempe’s
reappear in almost
every episode of note in the first
and are augmented by cryings and
roarings during and after her pilgrimage to Jerusalem, just as her "melodye” and
the "swet smellys” that often accompany it are augmented (in the second sec
tion) by two additional "tokyns” of grace upon her reluctant marriage to the
Godhead in Rome: a vision of "many white thyngys flying a-bowte her” [many
white things flying about her] and a "bodyly”-sensible "flawme of fyer
of
love” [flame of fire and of love] (89). These bodily-spiritual experiences have
led modern scholars to classify Kempe as one of the four or five Middle Eng
lish mystics. As divinely-inspired experiences over which Kempe herself has no
control (as she insists repeatedly), they serve as evidence for the authenticity of
Kempe’s relationship with Christ. As we have seen, they also participate in the
orthodox means of testing spiritual experiences outlined in The Chastising of
God's Children, And as Karma Lochrie has remarked, Kempe’s account of her
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experiences also echoes the fervor, dulcor, and canor that Richard Rolle describe
in his Incendium Amoris
a highly influential mystical text, and one that we
know Kempe knew, since she later cites it as one of the “boke[s] of contempla
ron” [books of high contemplation] she has read to her. Lochrie suggests that
Kempe may in fact have known Rolle’s book in the Latin original, and that she
uses these references to authorize her Book in the eyes of those who, like her
scribe, cannot conceive of spiritual authority as located
but in a Latin
text.20
Nicholas Watson has recently
into question the meaningfulness of
“Middle English mystics” as a category, arguing that this label falsely distin
guishes authors like Rolle and Kempe from other vernacular theologians, and
that only modern belief in [their] usefulness or quality ofexperience ... serves to
distinguish their writing from many others equally engaged with the interior
life and with the attainment and analysis of states of soul” (“Middle English
Mystics 7). Texts like The Chastising of God’s Children, however, would seem
to grant mystical experiences a certain amount of categorical autonomy, if only
by counseling their readers to take these bodily-spiritual “tokens” as one among
many kinds of signs of the authenticity of visions and revelations. And studies
like Lochrie’s, by focusing both on the bodily nature of mystical experiences in
order to understand how mystical texts claim spiritual authority and on the
modes of “reader response” such texts demand, reveal a textual project specific
to an identifiable “sub-category” of Middle English vernacular theology,
that seeks its authority not through its participation in an authorized textual
tradition but rather in the bodily experiences of the mystics themselves and in
the imitatio of those experiences constituted by the mystical text and practiced
by its (ideal) readers.21 As vernacular theologizing, late-medieval English mys
ticism participated in a much broader tradition of affective spirituality, one
which laicized the “three-stage program for spiritual growth progressing from
compassion to contrition to contemplation” designed for Franciscan and Cis
tercian contemplatives in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Baker 27-8). In
these programs, according to Bernard of Clairvaux, imaginative meditation on
the
of Christ’s life was a “lower”
that prepared the contemplative
for the “higher” contemplative union with the divinity of Christ. Denise Baker
notes that in the fourteenth century “meditation” on the humanity of Christ
was increasingly isolated from the “contemplation” of his divinity and recom
mended as a lay devotional practice; the Meditationes Vitae Christi, which
translated into his Mirrour of the Blessed Lyf ofJesu Christ, was the most popu
lar of these lay devotional texts.22 Mystical experiences like Kempe’s tears and
Rolle’s melody can be seen as side-effects — even side-steppings — of the pro
gram of prayer, meditation, and contemplation originally
for contem
platives in religious life, granting the mystic immediate bodily experience of the
spiritual intimacy with Christ that was the goal of affective spirituality.
Love’s officially orthodox Mirrour seeks to contain the laicizing of affective
spirituality safely within the categories of Arundel’s lay/cleric division. Citing
Bernard, Love argues that “contemplacyon of Fe monhede of cryste is more
likyng more spedefull & more sykere Fan is hyje contemplación of the Godhede” [contemplation of the manhood of Christ is more pleasing and more sue-
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cessful and more sure than high contemplation of the Godhead] for laypeople
or “symple soules” (Love 10), and the exercises
recommends are imaginative
and devotional rather than contemplative or mystical. Kempe’s text is full of
the terms in which contemplation was laicized in Love’s and other lay devo
tional texts,23 and her reluctance to marry the Godhead on the grounds that she
“cowde no skylie of ϸe dalyawns of ϸe Godhede, for al hir lofe & al hir affeccyon was set in ϸe manhode of Crist” [had no
of the conversation
of the Godhead, for all her love and affection
fixed on the manhood of
Christ] (86), seems to confirm Bernard’s and Love’s claim that contemplation
of the divinity of God is, and should remain, beyond the scope of laypeople.
The internal voice of Jesus also seems to establish a hierarchy of spiritual expe
riences that echoes the contemplatives’ three-fold
24 But Kempe’s mar
riage to the Godhead does take place, accompanied by an increase in mystical
“tokyns.” Her use of the vocabulary of devotional meditation conflates “meditacyon” and “contemplacyon” into a collocation suggesting that if she needs
both terms, they are more or less interchangeable (for example, Jesus promises
her that if she puts aside her conventional prayers
will give her “
medytacyon and very contemplacyon” [17]). And the hierarchy Christ establishes in
his “dalyawns” with Kempe rewrites the ladder of devotion as it was conceived
orthodox thinkers in order to place Kempe’s spiritual experiences at its apex,
telling her that her “thynkyng, wepyng, & hy contemplacyon is ϸe best lyfe on
erthe” [thinking, weeping, and high contemplation is the best life on earth]
(89). Kempe’s mystical experiences and her “dalyawns” with both the humani
ty and the divinity of Christ thus go beyond the program recommended by
Love, using many of his own orthodox structures of thought to challenge his
assumption that laypeople are by nature restricted to a lower echelon of spiri
tual experience.
The
kind of carefully veiled challenge governs Kempe’s devotional
meditations on the lives of Mary and Jesus. Kempe experiences the first of
these long “meditacyons” in the chapter in the first section immediately follow
ing Christ’s first long speech to her, in which he commands her to think “swech
thowtys as I wyl putt in ϸi mend” [such thoughts as I will put in your mind]
(17). This meditation concerns itself with the events surrounding the birth of
Christ; those in the corresponding later section will focus on the passion, death
and resurrection.25 The details in of all of them are remarkably close to those
in Love’s gospel harmony.26 Arundel would have sanctioned this move, in the
ory if not in Kempe’s practice. It is as if Christ were saying that
as her ulti
mate spiritual father, will guide her in matters of theology, and that she should
spend her time and energy in the kind of devotional meditation appropriate for
an orthodox laywoman. Christ apparently provides her as well with her text:
while the details of the narrative follow those in the Mirrour with an accuracy
that could only
deliberate, this episode takes place before Kempe is exposed
to any “bokes of hy contemplacyon.” And the meditation itself,
inspired and bodily in its intensity, has the flavor of a mystical gift rather than
of an imaginative exercise. To use Love’s text and follow his advice but to rep
resent both as coming from Christ, and to transform a layperson’s devotional
exercise into a divinely instigated mystical experience, sends a wonderfully
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mixed message, flying in the face of
's assumptions about the spiritual lim
itations of laypeople and their need for clerical guidance. The whole episode is
at once completely orthodox and completely destructive to the orthodox
attempt to make spiritual authority the privileged domain of the clergy.
Kempe’s own role in her meditations, moreover, diverges significantly from
Love’s recommendation: she transforms presence into active participation.
he begins
description of the Incarnation, Love enjoins
readers to “take
hede, & haue in mynde as ϸou were present in ϸe pryue chaumbur of our lady
where ϸe holi trinyte is present with his angele Gabriele” [take heed, and visu
alize in your mind that you are present in the private chamber of Our Lady,
where the Holy Trinity is present with his angel Gabriel] (Love
Kempe
not only imagines herself in Mary’s “private chamber,” she becomes the hand
maiden of the Virgin, an intimate of the Holy Family,
directly with
Mary and Elizabeth and begging for the Holy Family’s food, lodging, and
clothing in Bethlehem. David Aers suggests that Kempe’s participation in the
“imaginary realm” of the Holy Family, after her definitive break with her earth
ly, nuclear family in the “real realm,” enables “both
affirmation of her com
munity’s conventional stereotypes and their negation” (108), as Kempe works to
carve out her own, relatively autonomous identity.27 But if her active partici
pation in these “imaginary” meditations works on
level as a substitute for
participation in a “real” family, it also serves to link that imaginary realm with
the real one, suggesting that they aren’t such different places after all. In both
of Aers’s “realms,” Kempe insists on living an active life: her active role and
domestic duties as Mary’s handmaiden parallel, not so much her abandonment
of domestic duties in the
of the real, as her refusal to abandon the active,
secular life altogether for life in an anchorage or a cloister.
The link between Kempe’s spiritual and worldly lives is made visible and
concrete by her weeping. The details and motivations of Kempe’s tears are first
given in the context of this initial meditation, in a passage whose individual
ments and turns of phrase will sound throughout the text:
ϸ went ϸis cretur forth wyth owyr Lady, day day purueyng hir herborw
wyth gret reuerens wyth many
thowtys & hy medytacyons & also hy
contemplacyons, sumtyme duryng in wepyng ij owyres & oftyn lengar in ϸe
mend of owyr Lordys Passyon wyth-outen sesyng, sumtyme for hir owyn
synne, sumtyme for ϸe synnes of ϸe pepyl, sumtyme for ϸe sowlys in Pur
gatory, sumtyme for hem ϸat am in pouerte er in any dysesse, for sche
desyred to comfort hem alle. Sumtyme sche wept ful plentevowsly & fill
sly for desyr of ϸe blys of Heuyn & for sche was so long dyfferryd
ϸerfro. (19-20)
[Then this creature went forth with our Lady, finding her lodging day by
day with great reverence, with many sweet thoughts and high meditations,
and also high contemplations, sometimes continuing weeping for two hours
and often longer without ceasing when in mind of our Lord’s passion,
sometimes for her own sin, sometimes for the sin of the people, sometimes
for the souls in purgatory, sometimes for those that are in poverty or any
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distress, for she wanted to comfort them all. Sometimes she wept very
abundantly and violently out of desire
the bliss of heaven, and because
she was being kept from it for so long.]

At some unidentified point in this fit of weeping, Kempe passes out of the
vision and into direct communication with Christ, who tells her that he has
“ordeyned” her to "prey for all ϸe world” (20). Thence she moves directly back
into the world in which she must now learn to make her way in the context of
her new spiritual life. It is a perfectly composed episode, and it fits perfectly
into the larger structures of the Book. The wide range of motives that Kempe
gives for her weeping directly engages both Christ and the world, both Kempe
as sinner and Kempe as mystic. And at the (vague, unspecified) moment of
transition between devotional, even visionary,
and the experience of
external reality, Christ’s voice intervenes, giving Kempe a mission — to pray for
all the world — that is at once both internal and external, and that will serve as
the single purpose running through both of Aers’s realms. Kempe’s tears
stand throughout the text as a double sign of the authenticity of her spiritual
experiences: she weeps
her “felyngys” and “deuocyons” are genuine, and
the act of weeping becomes a sign to others not only of the authenticity but also
of the moral and spiritual content of those experiences. And in a final twist,
the scorn and danger that weeping brings her will become both sign and instru
ment of grace.
Unfortunately, those around her often do not see it that way. No sooner has
Kempe negotiated the terms of her new secular or active life by bargaining with
her husband to allow her to live chaste, than she finds herself defending her
orthodoxy to the first in a long line of clerics — the Canterbury monks who are
suspicious of her weeping and of her knowledge of scripture. The proximity of
the two episodes suggests causality: she is accused of heresy because of how she
has chosen to live in the world. Aers points out the faulty logic inherent in this
and many of the other accusations: because Kempe is persecuted for posing a
threat to the "sexual, religious, and social order,” she cannot be convicted legit
imately of heresy on theological grounds (Aers 100). Eventually, Kempe will
learn to see this logical gap as dependent on Arundel’s dichotomy, and to
exploit it accordingly. At this point the narrative, however, she can only iter
ate that she is “neyϸyr eretyke ne lollar” [neither heretic nor lollard] (29), and
she is rescued by two young men who simply believe her.
is dependent, as
she will be at Lambeth, on the accurate readings of others.28
On one level, this episode participates in the larger narrative pattern of
learning to read
and persecution as signs of grace: after she is rescued,
Kempe is rewarded by a “great reste of sowle” [she was very much at rest in her
soul] and a particularly intense period of “hy contemplacyon,” “many swet terys
of deuocyon” [many sweet tears of devotions], and “many holy spech &
dalyawns of owyr Lord Ihesu Cryst” [many a holy speech and confabulation
with our Lord Jesus Christ] (29), confirming the holiness of her life and teach
ing her — and us — to
the whole episode as a sign of that holiness. But
the content of her interchange with the monks sets another pattern as well,
that challenges the
between lay ife and theological discourse that the Lam-
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beth Constitutions seek to enforce. When Kempe responds to the first monks
inquiry with a "story of Scriptur,” the monk asserts famously, "I wold tow wer
closyd in an hows of ston ϸat ϸer schold no man speke wyth ϸe” [I wish you
were enclosed in a house of stone, so that
should speak with you] (27).
Her knowledge of the Scriptures allows him to articulate his sense that she is
dangerous, a sense inspired by her weeping and her “maner of leuyng,” through
an image that evokes both the imprisonment of a heretic and the cloistering of
a religious recluse;
could not ask for a nicer demonstration of the fine
between orthodox lay devotional practice and heresy, especially for a woman,
nor of the ways in which Kempe’s living and thinking conflated and
the categories.
The second monk cuts straight to the heart of the matter, raising the ques
tion of spiritual authenticity which lies at the heart of the Book's project by
invoking the terms of Arundel’s dichotomy. “Eyϸyr ϸow has ϸe Holy Gost or
ellys ϸow hast a devyl wyth-in ϸe,” he tells her, "for ϸat ϸu spekyst her to vs is
Holy Wrytte, and ϸat hast ϸu not of ϸiself ” [Either you have the Holy Ghost
or else you have a devil within you, for what you are speaking
to us is Holy
Writ, and that you do not have of yourself] (28). In fact, Kempe tells us that
she has it from "sermonys & be commownyng wyth clerkys”
sermons and by
talking with clerks] (29), an orthodox possibility which the second monk does
not seem even to consider. The challenge Kempe faces is to turn her interest in
theology and her knowledge of the scriptures to her own advantage in debates
with clerics whose new standards of orthodoxy could easily have cited that
knowledge alone to condemn her — clerics naive (or perhaps brazen) enough
about the newness of those standards to claim that a laywoman could only have
read the scriptures with diabolical assistance. Kempe succeeds, eventually, by
exploiting the sheer absurdity of the second monk’s implication about
ple’s textual innocence, as she learns to turn the oversimplifying tendencies of
Arundel’s dichotomy against it.
This particular narrative development reaches its peak in Kempe’s interview
with the Archbishop of York in Capitulum 52, in the middle of the third sec
tion. The Archbishop begins by ordering Kempe fettered when she tells him
that, though she is wearing white, she is a wife. Her transgression of the social
codes that reserved white clothes for virgins is clearly legible to him as a sign
that she is a "fals heretyke.” But when he examines her on her faith he can find
nothing to condemn her for: "Sche knowith her Feyth wel a-now. What xal I
don with hir?” [She knows her faith well enough. What shall I do with her?]
(124). As
as he makes this concession (as Aers might predict), the power
dynamics in the interview shift dramatically. For by stating that Kempe’s faith
is orthodox, the Archbishop has relinquished the better part of his authority to
judge her. The reader is stunned by the equal footing on which Kempe now
bargains with and challenges the Archbishop, telling him that she hears "ϸat ȝe
arn a wikkyd man” [that you are a wicked man] (125) and refusing his offer to
release her on the condition that she leave his diocese. And he seems power
less to do anything about it; she has driven a wedge into his authority by rec
ognizing the confusion between articles of faith and "maners of leuyng” that
formed the basis for his original
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When the Archbishop allows Kempe to stay and conclude her business if
she swears that she “ne xa[l] techyn ne challengyn ϸe pepil in my diocyse” [will
not teach people or call them to account in my diocese] (125-6) he is on stabler
ground, as there
in fact strict regulations under the Lambeth Constitu
tions regarding who could teach and what could be taught. Kempe responds,
in blatant violation of the Constitutions, by engaging the Archbishop in a
specifically theological debate, citing the authority of the scriptures for her
actions:

“And also ϸe Gospel makyth mencion ϸat, whan ϸe woman had herd owr
Lord prechyd, sche cam be-forn hym wyth a lowde voys & seyd, ‘Blyssed
be ϸe wombe ϸat ϸe bar & ϸe tetys ϸat ȝaf ϸe sowkyn.’ ϸan owr Lord seyd
a-ȝen to hir, ‘Forsoϸe so ar ϸei blissed ϸat heryn ϸe word of God and kepyn
it.’ And ϸerfor, sir, me thynkyth ϸat ϸe Gospel ȝeuyth me leue to spekyn
of God.” (126)

[“And also the Gospel mentions that, when the woman had heard our Lord
preach, she came before him and said in a loud voice, ‘Blessed be the womb
that bore you, and the teats that gave you suck.’ Then our Lord replied to
her, ‘In truth, so are they blessed who hear the word of God and keep it.’
And therefore, sir, I think that the Gospel gives me leave to speak of God.”]

The
relevance of the passages she cites has been a topic of some debate,
but it is clear that she sees them as authorizing her right to speak, and none of
the clerics who respond to her challenge that reading. Instead they challenge
(at least at first) her knowledge of the passage in the first place, exactly as a stu
dent of Arundels Constitutions might expect them to: “her wot we wel ϸat
sche hath a deuyl wyth-inne
for sche spekyth of ϸe Gospel” [here we know
that she has a devil in her, for she speaks of the Gospel] (126). But instead of
simply resting their case here, the clerics slip back into the discourse of theo
logical debate that Kempe herself had initiated, presenting Kempe with a pas
sage from Paul forbidding women to preach. It is a move diametrically opposed
to the second monks “naive” adherence to the new standards of orthodoxy, a
move that exposes the artificiality of Arundel’s dichotomy between theology
and lay thinking: confronted with an actual lay woman arguing theology and
citing scripture, the Archbishop and his clerks are betrayed, so to speak, into
abandoning their own artificial categories.
Given her voice, Kempe defeats her opponents with a seemingly simple
semantic distinction between preaching and other kinds of speech: “I preche
not, ser, I come in no pulpytt. I vse but comownycacion & good wordys, & ϸat
wil I so whil I leue” [I do not preach, sir; I do not go in any pulpit. I use only
conversation and good words, and that I will do while I live]
“Comownycacion” is a word that Kempe uses to link any number of officially
distinct modes of thinking throughout her Book, ranging from her “dalyawns”
with Christ to her reproving of wayward clerks.29 Here she uses it to claim the
right to communicate her experiences and what she has learned from them —
the project of the Book itself. Where the Lambeth Constitutions sought to
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bring all textuality under the vigilant control of Arundel and his church in a
gesture protective of the clergy’s spiritual authority, Kempe’s gestures here
egate clerical authority to certain very specific rhetorical situations (such as
‘coming” in "pulpits”), claiming as the site of her own spiritual authority all the
realms of lay religious communication. The Archbishop’s clerk’s final
attempt to condemn her by accusing her of telling “ϸe werst talys of prestys fat
euyr I herde” [the worst tale about priests that I ever heard] (126) only serves
to allow Kempe to ring one more series of changes on Arundel’s dichotomy: in
a context that should have been dominated by the accurate performance of a
catechism, and in which Kempe has instead usurped the clerical prerogative for
theological debate, she now asserts the overwhelming power of narrative. The
story she tells moves even her most hostile accusers and assures the sanction of
the Archbishop once and for all:

ϸan ϸe Erchebisshop likyd wel ϸe tale & comendyd it, seying it was a good
schal
e. & ϸe clerk whech hadbe
examynd
hir
werkys
be-for-tyme
ϸe absens
exemplar
of ϸe
works
Erchebischop, seyd, “Ser, ϸis tale smytyth me to ϸe hert.” (127)

schewen
in

[Then the Archbishop liked the tale a lot and commended it, saying it was
a good tale. And the cleric who had examined her before in the absence of
the Archbishop said, “Sir, this tale cuts me to the heart.”]

The Archbishop releases her unconditionally and provides her with a personal
guide, and “ϸe Erchebisshop likyd wel ϸe tale” becomes a kind of litany in her
further examinations.30 Kempe’s self-presentation as an orthodox teller of tales
has brought her examination by the Archbishop of York to a successful conclu
sion; and it has done so, moreover, by establishing the narrative
—
one way of describing the generic status of the Book — as quite literally the last
and unanswerable word on religious authority. She has thus constructed her
stories as both spiritually affective and theologically effective.

In its opening sentence, The Book of Margery Kempe announces that it is a
“schort tretys and a comfortable for synful wrecches” [a short treatise and a
comfortable one for sinful wretches] (1). In order to live up to this goal — not
of instructing, or even of inspiring, but of comforting — the Book must rede
fine not only what it means to
a “tretys” but the status and purpose of tex
tuality itself as a site of spiritual authority. The word “tretys” is used twice more
in the first two pages: once we are told that “ϸis lytyl tretys schal tretyn
sumdeel in parcel of hys [Christ’s] wonderful
” [this little treatise shall
treat in part of his wonderful works]; and once the text refers (as we have seen)
to “ϸis creature, of whom ϸys tretys . . .
party ϸe leuyng” [this
creature — of whom this treatise . . . shall show in part the life]).31 In order to
lead us to or through or by means of God’s
(for “tretyn” derives from the
Latin “tractatus,” from “tractare,” to lead or drag), the Book will “schewen” us
Kempe’s life.32 The textual status of Kempe’s book cannot be fit neatly into
Arundel's dichotomy, because it refuses to recognize the finality of his (implied)
definition of texts as either stories in the service of devotion or words in the ser
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vice of theology. The Book was written neither to argue theology nor to inspire
Nicholas Loves brand of devotional meditation but rather to show a life, to
record a project of appropriation and individuation. For Kempe, a “tretys” is a
narrative of a life. We as readers are meant to follow in the various processes
of development her narrative traces, and hence to receive comfort
grace
ourselves as we increase our faith in the authenticity of Kempes experiences
and witness her struggles for confirmation.
Writing the Book represents both the culmination of those
and the
final authentication of Kempes experiences. Books in general play
authen
ticating role throughout The Book ofMargery Kempe not unlike that of Kempes
meeting with Archbishop Arundel or her mystical “tokens”; if anything, they
are more reliable, less prone to betray her, than any other figure or
of
authority. Kempe desires greatly to be read to (see, for example, Capitulum 58),
and she seems to have gained a great deal of her familiarity both with affective
spirituality and with biblical exegesis through books. Karma Lochrie even finds
this self-proclaimed illiterate
citing Latin texts as an authorizing
technique (see note 20). But from their first appearance, books, like the author
ity of individual clerics, are clearly subordinated to the “deuocyons” and “reuelacyons” Kempe will have within the context of her relationship with Christ.
Their limitations are linked, furthermore, to the mystical inexpressibility of
those experiences.33 Books primarily serve,
the miracles and verified pre
dictions through which Kempe occasionally (and reluctantly) proves herself, to
convince others of her authenticity, most notably the priest/scribe who “writes”
the Book: he himself is given a gift of tears “whan he xulde redyn ϸe Holy
Gospel,” a gift which causes him to “drow a-geyn & inclin[e] more sadly to ϸe
sayd creatur, whom he had fled & enchewed thorw ϸe frerys prechyng”
towards and incline more steadfastly to the said creature, whom had fled and
avoided
of the friar’s preaching] (153). A book remedies the effects of
a bad preacher and restores the reader’s faith
the authenticity of Kempe’s
experience so that that experience, too, can be written in a book.
The
process of writing the Book is attended by many of the difficul
ties, outward signs, devotional tears, and inward reassurances that have marked
the narrative of her life from the very beginning. As Holbrook and others have
remarked, Kempe has a great deal of trouble getting the thing written down at
all: she goes through three scribes, the last of whom needs several miracles or
signs before he can seriously settle down to work (Kempe records this process
in some detail, both in the prologues and at the end of the first Book; most
famously, a miracle reverses the priest’s inability, presumably at least partly dia
bolical in origin, to read the text of the previous scribe).34 While the Book is
being written she has “many holy teerys & wepingys, & certeyn-tymes ϸer cam
a
of fyer a-bowte hir brest fill hoot & delectabyl, and also he ϸat was
hir writer cowde not sumtyme kepyn hym-self fro wepyng” [many holy tears
and much weeping, and often there came a flame of fire about her breast, very
hot and delectable; and also he that was writing for her could sometimes not
keep himself from weeping] (219). The power that Kempe experiences through
her relationship with Christ is transferred, like the authenticity of that experi
ence, to the text itself. And finally, Christ reassures Kempe that she is doing
the right thing, even though the work causes her to neglect her usual prayers.
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“Be ϸis boke,” he tells her, “many a man xal be turnyd to me & beleuyn ϸerin”
[by this book many a man shall be turned to me and believe] (216). Writing
the narrative of her life has
into the step on the spiritual ladder occu
pied in Rome by “thinkyng, wepyng, & hy contemplacyon”; at the same time, it
has made Kempe’s spirituality visible and accessible to others.
Right before her series of participatory visions, of the
death, and
resurrection, Christ gives Kempe her clearest and most eloquent statement of
his purpose in giving her these experiences: “I haue ordeyned ϸe to be a merowr
amongys hem
to han gret sorwe ϸat ϸei xulde takyn exampil by ϸe to haue
sum litil
in her hertys for her synnys ϸat ϸei myth ϸerthorw be sauyd” [I
have ordained you to be a mirror amongst them, to have great sorrow, so that
they should take example from you to have some little sorrow in their hearts for
their sins, so that they might through that be saved] (186). Whether or not
Kempe had Love’s Mirrour in mind with these lines, they suggest, through their
invocation of the trope of book as
a textual status for Kempe’s life. Just
as the “imaginary” and “real” realms of her life are linked by her active — and
potentially heterodox — participation in both, so Jesus’ final injunction and all
of
reassurances about writing the Book link those intertwined realms of liv
ing to the textual realm of the Book itself. The text is not unlike Kempe’s tears,
in that both authenticate her experiences and make them public, linking her
interior and exterior, her spiritual and worldly lives and serving as a publicly
visible conduit between them. In the pages of the Book, Aers’s two “realms” and
Kempe’s two Eves are intertwined, as the narrative flows seamlessly back and
forth between them, challenging our instinct to think of them as distinct. In a
that tears are not, however, this text also is Kempe’s life, a narrative of her
living, carefully composed to realize the intertwining of the religious and the
secular. Life and text are virtually indistinguishable — Kempe employs the
deliberate compositional strategies that mark her Book as textual to efface the
distinction between them, linking both inextricably into a single site of spiritu
al authority. Instead of buying Alison of Bath’s much-quoted dichotomy
between experience and authority, the
lived and the other textual, Margery
Kempe has transformed her lived experiences, through the power of narrative,
into a spiritually authoritative vernacular theological text.

Notes
1. Page numbers refer to Kempe’s text and will be given parenthetically
after Windeatt’s translation.
2. Anne Hudson remains the predominant authority on lollardy; I refer the
reader to her Premature Reformation,
3. Windeatt simply has “the manner in which” where I give “dalliance,”
eliminating Kempe’s redundancy, but “dalyawns” is a key word in Kempe’s text
and merits its own modern English equivalent, and her repetition seems to me
to be deliberate; see n. 4 below.
4. Windeatt translates this collocation as “conversation.” Kempe general
ly uses “dalyawns” to refer to her “internal” communication with Christ and
“comunycacyon” to refer to her “external” communications with others, but as
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this usage attests, she occasionally interchanges them — reinforcing the read
er’s sense that Kempes “internal” and "external” lives were deeply intertwined
(see below).
5. For the Latin text of the Lambeth Constitutions, see Wilkins III.3149. For a sixteenth-century Modern English translation, see Foxe iii.242-9.
Anne Hudson paraphrases them and discusses their significance, particularly as
regards writing in English, in Lollards and their Books (146-9).
We do not have a clear date for the Constitutions: according to Hudson,
“Arundel
to have drafted the Constitutions in 1407 and issued them in
1409” (Lollards 146 n. 2); the text printed by Wilkins is dated in Oxford, “Anno
Christ 1408.”
6. The Constitutions are particularly concerned to control preaching, but
no situation that could remotely be construed as instructional was exempt:
“The [fifth Constitution] went beyond the preacher to forbid anyone teaching
others from concerning himself in his instruction from any matter of theology.”
And Arundel provides ample means within the Constitutions for their own
enforcement, devoting the final two to “the penalties for infringing the Consti
tutions and the method of procedure against such infringements” (Hudson,
Lollards 147). The dictates — indeed the dictations — and the censorings of
the church regarding questions of theology and doctrine were to be always and
everywhere absolute.
7. For a study of the implications of one such deposition for the relation
ship between lay literacy and heresy, and the confusion between the muchdebated terms of laicus and litteratus which it implies, see Hudson, “Laicus lit
teratus”
8. Watson, in “Censorship and Cultural Change,” ascribes the dramatic
decline he traces in the production of vernacular theology after 1409 to the
effects of the Lambeth Constitutions.
9.
Modern English translations of
are mine.
10. It has been suggested more than once that Arundel may have had a
hand in the production of Love’s Mirrour, intending it as a kind of layperson’s
substitute for the gospel translations banned by the Lambeth Constitutions.
See, for example, Watson, “Middle English Mystics” 35. Certainly
played
beautifully into Arundel’s hand by giving laypeople their own non-theological
way to read the scriptures.
11.
See Hirsh, for example.
12. In fact, the prologues often seem to go out of their way to attribute the
words of the Book to Kempe as well: we are told that the priest “red it ouyr beforn ϸis creatur euery word, sche sum-tym helpyng where ony difficulte was”
[read every word of it in this creature’s presence, she sometimes helping where
there was any
that it was written “lych as ϸi mater cam to ϸe creatur
in mend” [just as this matter came to the creature’s mind], and that “sche dede
no ϸing wryten but ϸat sche knew rygth
for very trewth” [she had nothing
written but what she well knew to be indeed the truth] (5); and in the first
chapter of the Secundus liber, we are told directly that the book was written
“aftyre her owyn tunge” [as she told him with her own tongue] (221).
Sue Ellen Holbrook provides the most sensible account of the Books
authorship that I have seen, arguing that as it is Kempe who “selected the expe
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riences to include and the order for them,” as she "helps with the revision by
correcting against her knowledge of what the text should say,” as it is she "who
decides to write the book,” and as she "organized the book’s production,” she is
"the chief maker of the book: she is its writer in the essential modern sense of
the word” (271-3). Lynn Staley takes this position one step further, reading the
scribe as a trope that Kempe manipulates to her own authorizing ends —
though even Staley cedes that we cannot assume him to be fictional (see "The
Trope of the Scribe”).
13. "It is the truth of the imagination,” Gibson believes, "which is the fun
damental truth behind late medieval lay spirituality and is the shaping aesthet
ic for the religious drama and the lyric . . . What fired the popular imagination
about late
religion was religion’s focus on just these human rites of
passage [birth, marriage, and death] in the lives of Christ and his mother and
saints, events whose less holy but still recognizable patterns were revered
and celebrated in their own lives” (Gibson 10, 41).
14. The status of Kempe’s literacy remains a topic of much debate; see, for
instance, Lochrie, Translations 101-4.
15. The "Meyr” (presumably of Lincoln?) says to her, "I wil wetyn why ϸow
gost in white clothys, for I trowe ϸow art comyn hedyr to han
owr wyuys
fro us & ledyn hem wyth ϸe” [I want to know why you go about in white
clothes, for I believe you have come here to lure away our wives from us, and
lead them off with you] (116).
16. "Crescite et multiplicamini” (121) — which, Watson points out,
Kempe interprets correctly, "avoiding a charge of antinomianism” ("Middle
English Mystics” 37).
17. Watson, for example, cites this passage as evidence that the Book "not
only does not represent [Kempe’s] career as having an abstract structure . . . but
is . . . explicit in insisting on the associative nature of its own composition,”
arguing that Kempe’s "auto-hagiography .. . resists speculation and intellection
in all their forms, insisting on a communion with the incarnate Jesus which sig
nifies only itself” — though "[h]er very refusal to think in fixed theological
terms carries ... its own theological implications” ("Middle English Mystics”
36, 38). Hirsh, on the other hand, argues that "[t]he work falls into two sec
tions, bisected by Margery’s pilgrimage and Rome. . . . Up to this point,
Margery
even be said to develop. ... [S]he emerges as wise in God’s ways,
not man’s, and her Book contains a lesson not less than a biography” (Hirsh
148).
18.
Translations from the Chastising are my own.
19. Kempe accedes to the authority of such “good” confessors as the anchor
of the Friar Preachers in Lynn whom she meets on returning from her visit to
Arundel; the plethora of clerics she visits
confirmation of her experiences
also fill this first requirement. Tears are her most abundant "mystical” token,
but, as we shall see, they are accompanied by many others. Kempe reluctantly
prophesies on several occasions, generally as a means of proving her spiritual
authenticity to others; once she is miraculously saved from death (21), and once
her prayers bring snow to save a burning church (Capitulum 67). And Arun
del’s commendation of her "maner of leunyg” is one example among many of
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Kempe’s justifications, often in the face of direct clerical challenges, of her
manner of life as “honeste and uertuous.”
20. Lochrie bases her claim primarily on close readings of the passages of
the Book that echo Rolle, stating that they are closer to the Latin original than
to any known Middle English translations. She argues that “[t]he Latin traces
of Rolle’s work are not the result of scribal mediation, nor do they reflect the
efforts of Kempe to authorize her own discourse. Rather, they represent
Kempe’s own inscription of the Latin culture which excludes her into her text
by way of translation. At the same time that her own text echoes Rolle, it
rejects Latinity and authorization of Latin discourse altogether” in favor of the
spiritual authorization of the mystic’s bodily experiences of God and the neces
sarily imperfect rendering of those experiences in the body of the mystical text
(Translations 119). In Lochrie’s reading, “[d]alliance replaces auctoritas as the
foundation of authorship and textual authority” (113).
21.
See especially Lochrie, Translations 56-7, 63-4, 69.
22. For a clear explanation and history of late-medieval affective spiritual
ity, see Baker 15-33.
23. Kempe uses “meditacyon” and ‘contemplacyon” more or less synony
mously, a practice not uncommon in Middle English lay devotional texts. To
describe her divinely-initiated spiritual experiences themselves, Kempe uses the
words “felyngys” and, less frequently, “meuynggs” and “steringgys” (see, for
instance, 3); her direct communications with Christ are termed “reuelacyons.”
“Deuocyon” appears alongside all these words, comprising all of these practices
and experiences and the grace that pervades them.
24. Fasting, praying “bedys” [beads; that is, the rosary] and “discrete
penawns” [discrete penances; that is, acts of penance assigned by the
in expiation of individual
he tells her, are “good for ȝong be-gynnars”
[good for young beginners] and “good to hem ϸat can no bettyr do ... a good
wey to-perfeccyon-ward” [good for them that can do no better ... a good way
towards perfection] (89).
25. Lochrie sees a crucial distinction between the earlier and later visions,
arguing that the former “make up a pretext
her
on Calvary.... In this
way the narrative prepares for her readings of Christ’s body by first authorizing
her ability to receive the divine Word” (Translations 169).
26.
See, for instance, Love 18-21, 30-3, 36-40, 51-5.
27.
See
Aers 99, 103-8.
28. Aers’s gap also suggests an attempt
Kempe’s part to point out the
esiastical hierarchy’s theologically in
shaky tendency to conflate spiritual and
temporal authority: if Kempe’s spiritual and secular lives are deeply inter
twined, and if she rejects Arundel’s artificial dichotomy between lay/affective/devotional and clerical/intellectual/theological, she calls into question the
intertwining of spiritual and secular power.
29. See note 4 above for one instance of this word’s ability to link Kempe’s
“external” and “internal” communications.
30.
See, for instance, 130 and 134.
31. Beckwith argues that “the dual
[of the Book] — to celebrate the
glory of God through his workings
one of his creatures — is split, and
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revealed in the repetitive partiality of its language. For the book will deal
‘sumdeel in parcel’ of God’s wonders, and ‘ party’ it will deal with the ‘leuyng’
of Margery Kempe. But these parts will not necessarily cohere, they
not
necessarily add up” (173).
32. “Schewen,” a word which takes up almost twelve full pages in the Mid
dle English Dictionary, had meanings ranging from the mundane to the pro
foundly spiritual and mystical; Julian of Norwich, to take the most famous
example, referred to her “mystical” experiences as “xvi shewings or revelations
particular” (Julian 1).
33.
relates to the Vicar of St. Stephen’s, for example, that Christ told
her that “sche xuld lofe hym, worshepyn hym, and
hym, so excellently
ϸat sche herd neuyr boke, ne Stimulus Amoris, ne Incendium Amoris, ne non
oϸ ϸat euer sche her redyn ϸat spak so hyly of lofe of God but ϸat sche fels
as hyly in werkyng in hir sowle yf sche cowd or ellys mygth a schewyn as sche
felt” [how she should love him, worship him, and dread him — so excellently
that she
heard any book, neither Hilton’s Book, nor Bride’s book, nor
read,
ulus Amoris, nor Incendium Amoris, nor any other book that she ever heard
that spoke so exaltedly of the love of God as she
highly working in her
soul, if she could have communicated what she felt] (39).
34.
See Holbrook 276-8 and passim.
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Nuns fret not at their convents narrow
room;
And hermits are contented with their
cells.
—William Wordsworth, from Mis
cellaneous Sonnets
I am not I, pity the tale of me.
—Sir Philip Sidney, from Astrophil
and Stella

Cell walls communicate. The etymological and
semantic membranes of “cell” afford us multiple
entries into Lyn Hejinians 1992 volume, The Cell.
The Latin word cella denotes a narrow room, a kind
of “stanza.” Many Roman cells were storerooms, a
function that survives in the meaning of “cellar” and
“
” In the extrapolated Indo-European root
kel- the interconnected verbal senses of “cell” are
stored: to save, to cover, to hide. These subterranean
passageways link “cell” to such unexpected relatives as
“heh,” “ho ow,” “hole,” “holster,” “helmet,” “color,”
“occult,” “Calypso,” and “conceal” (Watkins 1521).
“Ars est celare artem,” goes the Latin proverb: Art is
the art that hides its art. The Cell is composed of 150
narrow poems, most of which are confined to a page,
none longer than two, their lines further grouped into
indented cells that resemble contiguous stanzas.
These poems may be described with Hejinian s words
from The Cell as “Charged closets and dark batteries
/ of sound / Time is storage, with times / increase /
The bulk of something lost / in storage” (85). There
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may be no “hidden meanings” stored in The Cell but there are concealed prin
ciples of construction. The first line quoted above, for instance, was produced
by recombining the expected modifiers of “dark closets” and “charged batteries,”
a procedure that discovers truths latent in language. Hejinians poems are as
charged as they are dark.
Though there are unicellular organisms (the ovum being most prominent
The Cell) and remote hermit’s caves, cells most often exist and work in con
junction. Cells are discrete structural units: work cell, cell block, monastery,
tissue, honeycomb.
Hejinian puts it, “the doors are shut / and the walls are
romantically / linked” (190). Hejinians cellular poems are often verbally ringed
and connected. One poem, for instance, contains the ring word “hefty” its
bordering lines, “Hefty and conjugal — come over 7 air” and “Minutes ... their
hefty and / provocative widths” (85; ellipsis added). The subsequent poem
revises “Time is storage, with time’s / increase” (85) with its opening line,
“Anger is storage, with time’s / decrease,” which it continues to resonate in its
close, “Too little danger, too much / love” (86). The communication within
between poems (and lines) here is both semantic (“increase,” “decrease”) and
alphabetical (d/anger). All units, all cell mates, are constructed equal. In cell
theory, the cell (not the molecule or the gene) is the smallest unit capable of
being integrated into life. “Omnes cellulae e cellula,” postulated the early cell
theorist Rudulf Virchow in 1855: all cells come from cells. In Hejinians
“composition by juxtaposition” (“Strangeness”
“every single line is internal
ly complete and is of equal weight and importance” (“Line” 192). The lines in
The Cell differ widely in “width” but none are grammatically subordinate or
enjambed; each stands paratactically on its own.
But independence inhibits cell structure. Commenting on her prose poem
“Resistance,” Hejinian remarks: “One of the results of this compositional tech
nique, building a work out of discrete intact units (in fact, I would like each
sentence itself to be as nearly a complete poem as
is the creation of
sizeable gaps between the units” (“Rejection” 1984, 136). An extremely dis
junctive poem, Peter Quartermain notes, “so undermines ordinary decoding
procedures that the reader is forced to take account of both the individual par
ticulars (each separate word) and the totality in which those words appear (the
whole text). In effect, such work presents islands of localised meaning” (17).
As we shall see, however, the poems of The Cell are composed not of absolute
ly disjunctive but of relatively discontinuous elements, insofar as “discontinu
ous” conveys balance in its offsetting prefixes. The fruitful, destabilizing com
plication of cellular identity is lost if the individual units are either too distant
ly or too nearly, too haphazardly or too predictably related. A purely disjunc
tive poem is an assemblage of individual words, phrases, or lines; how we read
it is solely up to us. A seamlessly conjunctive poem offers no particular reso
nance or resistance; how we
it is solely up to the poem. The gaps in Hejinian’s poems are meant to present readers not with walls but with projects: “The
reader (and I can say also the writer) must overleap the end stop, the period,
and cover the distance to the next sentence” (“Rejection” 1984, 136). The
entirely disjunct or conjunct poem is already destroyed or locked into place; the
discontinuous poem is always under collaborative construction.1
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The poems in The Cell are written and arranged in chronological, though
not in narrative, sequence, extending from October 6, 1986, to January, 21,
1989. These anonymous poems are distinguished not by titles at their heads
but by dates at their tails. The dates are one formal measure; almost every poem
is one day long. Whatever happens on that day (including the writing of a
poem), whatever is thought about or experienced, may be comprehended by
that day’s poem. We may think of
poem as a time capsule: “One unit of
rain taken / by dictation” (42). With its daily editions, The Cell recalls the
discourse of the daily paper; but Hejinian’s poem is scarcely journalistic: “Lyri
cism — it makes the country / seem far away” (174). Though she wrote The
Cell during both the Iran-Contra scandal and the 1988 Presidential election,
Hejinian does not report comment on the public events of her day.
she
laments elsewhere, “And then there is the news
of course, or rather my
despair over the efficacy (or inefficacy) of poetry in the course of events — the
imperviousness of the world to such improvements as might be suggested by
artistic work and artistic thought” (“Strangeness” 39). The poem dated
November 7, 1986, for instance, the day Reagan first stammered the news of
the diversion of funds from Iran to Nicaragua, begins vaguely with “Govern
ment is dizzy without capitals / to name” (26) before proceeding to its larger
topic, the linguistic character of the imagination: “Every place the imagination
occurs / replace it with the working / term "language”’ (26).2 But The Cell is
political, after its fashion, describing the linguistic, social structure of “natural”
cells. These strange descriptions have their own salutary political effect of
focusing attention on perception: “An emphasis on the medium / bares what is
assumed” (116).
Though
chapter of Hejinian’s My Life closes with the sentence “The
very word "diary’ depresses me” (46), the dated entries of The Cell recall the
diary form. As Hejinian has reminded us, diaries were one of the first avenues
open for women writers: “of course, there haven’t been few women writers, but
what they’ve been writing was letters and diaries, more often than published
works. And those forms are fragmentary, and sometimes exoskeletally [that is,
externally, habitually] determined — like the diary is just what we do every day
and what we think about what we do” (“Rejection” 1985, 286).3 Traditionally,
a diary is something women and writers “keep”; its discourse is personal, pri
vate, “feminine”: “my mother . . . kept a diary but she never read it” (My Life
31). But though the language of The Cell is
private, it is not diaristic
in content. There are intermittent narrative traces of a death and a birth, but
Hejinian claims none of these stories as her own. For one thing, the book is
almost devoid of proper names that would provide narrative continuity and
location. Narrative statements such as “Then a huge wave hits / the beach at
Santa Cruz” (199) are the exception for this California poet.4 As Hejinian
speculates, “To the weather what it / writes is not a proper / weather diary”
(172). And such
sentences as occasionally appear have only a rep
resentative personal character, (with) which any reader might identify: “Every
one knows I’m in love” (16). Nevertheless, The Cell is a diary of its time. It is
meditative and exploratory of its world and its linguistic medium.
With its 150 untitled, comparably-sized poems, The Cell resembles a son
net sequence (Shakespeare’s 154 poems in particular). Yet
too comparison
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draws our attention first to differences. The Cell offers us no tortuous and halt
ing progress of love.
poems such as the delightful
beginning “With
a wave of yourself / you’re here with me” (148) are few and far between. The
more objective, physical topic of sex is more frequent. The sonnet’s first-tosecond-person addresses are replaced in The Cell by third-person descriptions,
and the narrative past tense gives way to the habitual or general present. Yet as
one of Shakespeare’s sonnets gives birth to the
Hejinian’s cell structure is
generative: “Such poetry is reproductive” (166). And as the real subject of
Shakespeare’s and other sonnet sequences is not the love object but the sub
jected loving subject, Hejinian’s main topic will
the cellular self. The Cell is
personal, subjective poetry in that it takes the person as its object.

The Poetics of Description
Hejinian formulates her cellular poetics in a contemporary essay, “Strangeness,”
which is divided like The Cell into dated journal entries (July 10-August 30,
1988; cf. The Cell 179-98). Hejinian begins by distinguishing her “poetics of
description” both from traditional realism and from a realist “theory of lan
guage.” Hejinian’s poems are not “after the fact” descriptions of inner or outer
reality. Rather, description is discovery: “Description, in my sense of the term,
is phenomenal rather than epiphenomenal, original, with a marked tendency
toward effecting isolation and displacement, that is toward objectifying all
that’s described and making it strange” (“Strangeness” 32). Hejinian here
alludes to the Russian Formalist Victor Shklovsky’s concept of defamiliariza
tion,5 but also to Andrew Marvell’s “The Garden”: “Annihilating all that’s
made / To a green Thought in a green Shade” (47-8). It is the (metonymically “green”) shade that turns Marvell’s thoughts green, not vice versa. With his
own bemused objectivity, Marvell calls things by their own true names: “Fair
Trees! where soe’er your barkes I wound, / No Name shall but your own be
found” (23-4).
on-the-scene reporting, “at once improvisational and pur
posive” (“Strangeness” 32), is dependent on
and events both out
side and inside the reporter. Thus Hejinian takes as models of description nei
ther realist fiction nor journalism but, surprisingly, dream reports and explorer’s
journals. She discovers uncanny similarities between these descriptive dis
courses: “the same apparent objectivity, the same attempt to be accurate about
details and to be equally accurate about every detail” (33). In both models, the
mysterious multiplicity and the disparate tendencies of the worded “object”
(less observed than aspired to)
disorient and disintegrate the intensely
absorbed describer. “Description then is apprehension” (33) in both senses of
the word. The results of this “expectant knowledge” (33) are not known before
hand. As Hejinian recommends in a contemporary entry from The Cell, “You
might anticipate, to apprehend” (192).
Scattering, displacing, and estranging, Hejinian’s poetics of description is
governed by metonymy:

If one posits descriptive language and, in a broader sense, poetic language
as a language of inquiry, with analogies to the scientific methods of the
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explorers, then I anticipate that the principal trope will be the metonym,
what Roman Jakobson calls “association by contiguity.” The metonym
operates within several simultaneous but not necessarily congruent logics,
oscillating inferentially between induction and deduction, depending
whether the part represents the whole (reasoning from the particular to the
general) or whether the whole is being used to represent the part (reason
ing from the general to the particular). Or again an object may replaced
by another adjacent, the cause by the
or the effect by the cause, spa
tial relations may replace temporal ones or vice versa, an action may replace
the actor or vice versa, and so forth. Metonymy moves attention from thing
to thing; its principle is combination rather than selection. Compared to
metaphor, which depends on code, metonym preserves context, foregrounds
interrelationship. And again in comparison to metaphor, which is based on
similarity . . . the metonymic world is unstable. While metonymy main
tains the intactness and discreteness of particulars, its paratactic perspective
gives it multiple vanishing points. . . . Metonymy moves restlessly, through
an associative network, in which the associations are compressed rather
than elaborated. . . . Comparing apples to oranges is metonymic.
(“Strangeness” 38-9)

Hejinians citation of Jakobson is an index of her abiding interest in Russian
Formalism and the Russian avant-garde. For her poetics Hejinian draws not
only from Jakobson s often anthologized essays, “Two Aspects of Language and
Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances” (1956) and “Linguistics and Poetics”
(1958), but from his important
discussion, “Marginal Notes on the
of the Poet Pasternak” (1935), where Jakobson first described the metonymic
horizon. Important for Language poets, like Hejinian, as for literary theorists,
Jakobson brought metonymy into prominence in structuralist and poststruc
turalist criticism by pairing it with metaphor as an equal and opposite gravita
tional pole of language production, noting
that literary
who
applied the “amputated, unipolar scheme” of metaphor in their analyses exhib
ited a behavior which “strikingly enough, coincides with one of the two apha
sic patterns, namely with the contiguity disorder” (144).6
“What does it have against / metaphor” (121), The Cell seems to ask of its
creator.
understand Hejinian's prejudice, it helps to associate along Jakobson’s axes. The vertical axis of resemblance appeals to a higher (deeper, inner)
authority, a relatively
region of truth and value; the horizontal axis of
combination overthrows this upstanding vertical and places all things, includ
ing all of us, on the same democratic level. Metaphor likens things out of con
text, whereas “There is
marginality in / metonymy” (195), which ties things
to their “associative network.” On the metonymic horizon everything corre
sponds to everything else rather than to
Platonic forms; the “metonym
is anti-platonic” (111). Like narrative, metonymy “moves attention from thing
to thing.” And
paratactic syntax (note that these likenesses are themselves
metaphorical), metonymy provides “multiple vanishing points” rather than a
single main clause or ruling conceit. Metaphor is true
virtue of correspon
dence, metonymy by virtue of (in)coherence; though incomparable (so they
say), apples and oranges are side by side in the same fruit cart. But it is worth
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noting that despite all these advantages, metonymy is no utopian alternative to
metaphor. In everyday life, metonymy is a conservative trope relying on habitual public and private associations (“our song,” “that prick”). Similarly, adver
tisers, who forge mass consumer response, frequently give their product (Diet
Coke, Steve Forbes) a fresh new look, its intrinsic properties notwithstanding.
Writing in the New Critical 1950s, Jakobson emphasized the distinctness
and autonomy of poetry; writing in the postmodern 1980s, Hejinian and other
Language poets strive to reconnect the poem with the world. Though Hejin
ian aligns her poetics with Jakobson’s axes, she diverges from his views in at
least two respects. First, whereas Jakobson defined the poetic function's the
“focus on the message for its own
” (69), reserving the “so-called . .. 'deno
tative,’ cognitive’ function” (66) for non-literary, referential language, Hejinian
considers the metonym “a cognitive, perceptual, logical unit” (“Strangeness” 40)
and associates synecdoche (for her as for Jakobson, a kind of
with
the logics of induction — whole for part — and deduction — part
whole
(38). Thus she is able to characterize her own poetic method as “scientific”
(40), leaving the word in quotation marks. Hejinian’s poems are themselves
cognitive metonyms, inextricably bound up in the world’s network of associa
tions. A second point of divergence between Jakobson and Hejinian concerns
the relationship between trope and genre. While noting that there are “poems
which are woven through and through with metonymies, while narrative prose
may be studded with metaphors” (309-10), Jakobson argued that metaphor
tends to predominate
romantic (and symbolist) verse, metonymy in realist
prose (111). But Hejinian takes the poetic line of most resistance
describ
ing her poetry as realist: “When the term realism is applied to poetry, it is apt
to upset our sense of reality. But it is exactly the strangeness that results from
a description of the world given in the terms 'there it is,’ 'there it is,’ 'there it is’
that restores realness to things in the world and separates things from ideolo
” (“Strangeness” 44).7 The Cell is a non-narrative metonymic sequence, its
“realism” resulting not from the succession of detailed events but from the
strange metonymic juxtaposition of perceptions.
In arguing that poetic realism is a “medium of strangeness” (44), Hejinian
departs from the traditional identification of realism with ordinary and roman
ticism with extraordinary experience. In Hejinian’s synecdochic realism, the
description gets displaced or derailed by the stray detail or association, result
ing in “[l]oss of scale accompanied by experiences of precision” (32). In this
regard, Hejinian models her descriptions after Stein’s Tender Buttons, a work
reflecting, in Stein’s words, her growing excitement “about how words which
were the words that made whatever I looked at look like itself were not the
words that had in them any quality of description” (Lectures 191; also quoted in
Hejinian, “Two Stein Talks” 132). Hejinian’s description of Tender Buttons as
“a hard-edged, rigorous, analytical, merciless, romantic realism” (“Two Stein
Talks” 133) also characterizes The Cell, Nothing out of the ordinary happens
in The Cell, but in her depictions of ordinary life everything is made strange.
The skeletal key metonym and ultimate object of The Cell is the person.
Hejinian outlines her idea of personality in “The Person and Description,” a
contemporary essay in which unattributed aphorisms from The Cell appear.8
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For Hejinian, the idea of the immortal soul has led to a poetics of expression in
which the poem issues “from an inner, fundamental, sincere, essential, irre
ducible, consistent self” (“Person” 166). Such a spirit — an Imago Dei, an
embodied Form, an unparaphraseable poem — is metaphorical. Hejinian
the alternate route of metonymy, asserting that “there is no self undefiled by
experience, no self unmediated in the epistemological situation, but a person
instead” (167). The Cell displaces both “the self” and “the soul,” which never
theless resonate in Hejinian’s title. The word “person” itself is divided among
discursive spheres. It is a grammatical term used to categorize pronouns and
verb forms, a term used to define nouns (a noun is commonly understood as a
person, place or thing; see “Person” 168), a legal and political term for individ
uals (or corporations) with rights and responsibilities without reference to gen
der or age (hence the value of nondiscriminatory titles such as chairperson), a
philosophical term for humans (as distinguished from animals) as “self-con
” or “rational,” and a
and psychological term for individuals
conditioned by their environment. In American usage, a person is more cor
poreal than a self: “I am an unattractive person,” “Alcohol was found on his per
son.” Hejinian juxtaposes these senses in her poetry and poetics. “Drawn into
the world by perception, implicated by language,
around in life” (168),
Hejinian’s person is contextual and contingent, “a relationship rather than an
existence” (167).9 In The Cell she most often treats the person objectively, less
as a “person” than as another
or a thing, an “it.” With witty scientific
detachment, Hejinian dissects modern subjectivity in the third person: “a per
son pitying / itself having identified with a / storm” {Cell 18); “A person has a
favorite / food” (25); “But the person with bodily / exercises identifies with its
city” (20); “Every person is born preceded / by its desire” (194); “A person to be
funny / buried itself in sand” (173). As Sidney’s subjected lover implores, “I am
not I, pity the tale of me,” so Hejinian’s deconstructive narrator
“From
under the cape of / penmanship the person signs its / name / It is not it” (207).
The person who signs its name is never the same.
As with the leveling of metonymy, the disintegration and objectification of
the (American) individual is tied to
implicit political agenda. In Leningrad,
co-authored with three other Language poets, Hejinian relates a conversation
with the Russian poet Arkadii Dragomoschenko (whose works she has trans
lated): “Subjectivity is not the basis for being a Russian person. Our indepen
dent separate singularity can hardly be spoken of, but, Arkadii said, many peo
ple wish it.’ ‘You know,’ I said, ‘many of us wish to overcome it. We think that
if we
surpass or supercede the individual self we can achieve a community’”
(Leningrad 34).10 But for a community to be more than pieces of persons and
poems it must have readers, which means its descriptions must in some sense
be readable. For Hejinian, description means “simultaneously exploration, dis
covery, and communication,” which, as she reminds us, “brings us to the read
er,” another “entity we call a person” (“Person” 168). The poetics of description
then is necessarily a poetics of interpersonal communication.
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The Poetry of Grammar
The “literary situation,” which Hejinian imagines as “a scene in which the
writer is standing on a concrete curb in the commercial district, the reader is
standing beside the writer, and many many people are moving up and down and
across the street — many heads, many stomachs, many bags,
shoes and
boots” (“Person” 168), is described in the initial poem of The Cell. The poem is
a kind of envoy, traditionally a dedicatory poem or stanza
to a
beloved first reader. In the opening envoy of the Amoretti, Edmund Spenser’s
first person dedicates his book to his terrifying second, placing himself
(metonymically) in her hands:
Happy ye leaves when as those lilly hands,
which hold my life in their dead doing might
shall handle you and hold in loves soft bands,
lyke captives trembling at the
sight.
Avoiding the direct address in her envoy, Hejinian puts the writer, the readers,
and at first even “I,” in the objective third person. This reader’s object will be
to read Hejinian’s poem not so much “closely” as productively, treating it not
as a thing but as a goal:

It is the writer’s object
to supply the hollow
and yellow life of the
human I
It rains with rains supplied
before I learned to type
along the sides who when
what we have in
common with nature replied opportunity
and size
Readers of the practical help
They then reside
And resistance is accurate — it
rocks and rides the momentum
Words are emitted by the
rocks to the eye
Motes, parts, genders, sights collide
There are concavities
It is not imperfect to
have died (Cell 7)
The literary situation of this poem involves the writer, nature, language, the
poem, and its readers. But although the poem lies before us, the word “poem”
is missing, and we miss it particularly. As John Ashbery writes in a related
poem, “Paradoxes and Oxymorons,” “You miss it, it misses you. You miss each
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other (283). But here instead of “the poem” we find its metonym, the life for
which it stands: a yellow “flower” (another conspicuously missing word) on its
green stem, a cellular organism, an anthologized flower of speech. We hear
expectantly too a Shakespearean pun on “eye” in “human I.” The composite
image of the observant natural object may derive from “i-stem,” a Latin gram
matical term for adjectives and certain nouns of the third declension.11 In any
case, we are drawn to see the capital, stem-like “I” as well as to hear “eye” in
This flower is flourishing but “hollow” (a distant cognate of “cell”). Unlike Sid
ney's or Petrarch’s love objects, this I-stem has no hallowed soul or Platonic
essence at its core but rather draws its inner productive life from abroad.
Hejinian’s next cellular segment sets up an analogy: as rain supplies life to
the flower, language gives vitality to the human, writing I. Reading produc
tively, we supply “letters” for “rains,” which yields a drumming rain of fingers
sending letters pouring over the sides of the manual typewriter. Language is
not the means by which the writing I represents nature; as the writer experi
ences it, it is part of nature itself. Language is as right as rain that nourishes
itself through the budding typist. This segment introduces us to a primal scene
of typewriting. But
the rhythmically regular phrase “along the sides who
when,” the relative pronoun is missing its grammatical antecedent (cf. “along
side one who, when asked”). The omission is significant: Hejinian’s originary
story calls for a biological antecedent, an instructor who first operated “the
paternal typewriter” (41; cf. “I borrowed my father’s typewriter” [My Life 30]).
Alongside such a
the child learns the facts of life and language — how to
typify. Compare the conventional writer’s life: “I learned about life, those rainy
afternoons, from my mother, who . . .” In Hejinian’s scene only the language
machine remains.
Hejinian turns in the middle of her poem from “writer’s” to “readers” (mak
ing the poem a one-to-many correspondence), but her lines turn away from
easy readers. “Readers of the practical help” is grammatically ambiguous (“prac
tical” may be an adjective or, if we take “help” as a verb, a noun) and unidiomatic
as it stands. But it is not unresponsive to a productive reading. Readers of the
poem (“practical” may evoke “paratactical,” or A. Richards’ “practical criti
cism”) help make it into a structure where they may “then reside.” The next
unit appears to be tacked on paractically with a relatively
And.
But the bridge between “They then reside / And resistance is accurate” is made
not by grammar, logic, or narrative but by phonemic contiguity; resistance
encrypts “residence.” Many lines in The Cell begin with coordinating conjunc
tions, but their juxtaposition tends to be askew.
The vocabulary of “And resistance is accurate” is patently derived from
Wallace Stevens, who wrote a great deal of poetry about reading. In
influ
ential observation, from “Man Carrying Thing, he advises poets and their
readers that “The poem must resist the intelligence / Almost successfully”
(Palm 281). And in “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” the actuarial poet
invokes a plainsong for the major(ity) man: My dame,
for this person
accurate songs” (214). The accurate resistance of Hejinian’s poem exerts its
own force on readers, who
the poem as a wave (the crypt word
here) they "ride” that “rocks” their boat or surfboard. To suggest the physical
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nature of this encounter, Hejinian adopts scientific discourse. We read things,
first of all, by seeing them, as reflected light waves are inverted in the eyeball.
This collision is physical (“eye / Motes,” “rocks,” “sights” encrypting sites), sex
ual (private “parts,” sexual “genders”) and linguistic (mots, “parts” of speech,
grammatical “genders”). The accident ties up stimulating writers and respon
sive readers: “One person responds by fixing / motes, another person by float
ing / them” (Cell 167). Hejinian discovers an erotic vitality in these experi
ments. So her penultimate
completely incomplete, points out geological
and amorous “concavities.” A poem is a hollow, animated thing.
One prominent grammatical feature of this poem (and this book) is that its
first, second, and last statements begin with “It.” Hejinian has remarked how
attracted
is to “the all-purpose,
ambiguous, forever serviceable It. .. .
I find this pronoun and its usage fascinating, because of its flexibility: It’s rain
ing tonight. What is?” (quoted in Perloff 209). Hejinians manipulations of
“It” are instances of what Jakobson calls the “poetry of grammar” (see Jakobson
121-44). Poets such as Hejinian choose and misuse their grammatical struc
tures as strategically as they do their words. Grammarians currently distinguish
between an anticipatory “it,” which delays and
the subject (as
Hejinians first and last statements), a dummy or empty “it,” which stands for
agentless subject such as time or the weather (as in the second), and a neuter
pronominal “it,” which indicates an inanimate or impersonal object. In this
poem both the dummy and the anticipatory “it” do double duty as the imper
sonal pronoun. This ambivalence widens its scope immeasurably. Like a big
bang radiation detector, Hejinian's omnidirectional “it” points outward toward,
and stands in for, something so immense, tacit, and ubiquitous that it cant be
pinpointed: “That of which it is / said it is rain” (205). In the twentieth cen
tury, Stevens, Hemingway, and Stein have experimented with this indefinite
pronoun, but no poet has explored its outer reaches more assiduously than Ashbery, as in these wide openings: “It’s this crazy weather we’ve been having”
(221); “All that we see is penetrated by it —” (259); “It
about that there
was no way of passing” (281); “It was me here” (286). If “It” is Hejinians
object, what is it? Language, life, poetry, interpersonality, and so on. Each of
these short answers, vague and vast, merits only partial credit.
The poetic grammar of Hejinians closing remark, “It is not imperfect to /
have died,” is particularly resistant. An infinitive is an infinite verb form
unbound by gender, person, time, or number. As such, it shares the steady state
of death and makes good grammatical poetry. But “to / have died” is a present
perfect infinitive, which describes an act or event completed in the past with
relevance to the speaker’s and hearer’s (writer’s and reader’s) present. One may
say, as Tennyson did, “’Tis better to have loved and lost,” but not “It is not
imperfect to / have died,” because the “persona” who has died can no longer
speak. Moreover, Hejinian introduces her perfect infinitive with the litotes “not
imperfect,” whereas death is as perfect a state of nonbeing as anything we know
(and we know next to nothing about it).12 In “The
of Our Climate”
Stevens announces that “The imperfect is our paradise,” or perhaps our infer
no, “Since the imperfect is so hot in us, / Lies in flawed words and stubborn
sounds” (Palm 158). We miss something in Hejinians “to have died” like “to
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have written.” Supplying this missing sense would allow us to read “to / have
died” figuratively with its missing object: “to have died [into],” or in other
words, to have survived as, a poem.
Though the poem progresses metonymically, the metaphorical principle of
equivalence is also operative. With its infinitive construction, the last line
roughly parallels the first: “died” recalls “life” both antonymically and sonical
ly (entering the internal rhyme scheme: “I,” “supplied,” “sides,” “replied,” “size,”
“reside,” “rides,” “collide”). As with rhyme, in grammatical parallelism “unlike
things, being made alike grammatically, become meaningful
common and
jointly” (“Rejection” 1984, 136). The first poem may then be read in a circle, a
not imperfect figure: to become an “It,” the poem as a
and a thing, is “the
writers object.” The Elizabethan sense of “die” is also appropriate in these cli
mactic, promiscuous collisions. To have died into poetry
this erotic sense
would indeed be a “not imperfect” ongoing act or event. Hejinian affirms at the
end the possibility that poetry ought to be more than a subjective expression or
even an objective description; it should
at least in part, real communication.
The game the poet wages her life on is that poetry
read, that the life it
supplies
be thought about and felt by each new set of ears and eyes.

Cell Divisions
We can better read The Cell if we know its cell structure. For Hejinian, struc
tural form is not a container but “a means of setting the materials in motion and
keeping them moving, active, undergoing change. In this sense, form is a
poems dynamic” (Hejinian and Miller 36). What, then, is the formal dynam
ic, the reproductive mechanism, of The Cell? What is its “cell,” its generative
unit? Each poem or lyric cell — with its short, indented, scarcely punctuated
“lines” — looks like modified free verse. In a brief review of The Cell, Mark Jar
man described “
entry” as having “a central column with arms extended to
the left margin.” With some frustration, the New Formalist poet confesses that
“the soul of Hejinians poetry is not ultimately formless, though I cannot
describe it” (415-6). The Language poets can
as formal as the New For
malists, but their forms are less familiar. We may begin taking the measure of
The Cell by counting — not accentual feet or stresses but words. Each “line
segment,” as I’ll call it, whether capitalized and left-justified or uncapitalized
and indented, contains up to five words (for instance, “It is the writers object”);
several have fewer, but only one has more.13 Each sentential “compound line,”
as I’ call the capitalized line segment
its optional indented continuations
(for instance, “It is not imperfect to / have died”),
contain any number of
words. If it runs over five, it continues indefinitely through indented segments
until it concludes, often a segment under five words.
Hejinians tantalizing versification deconstructs the line as we know
Does the opening poem, for instance, have nine lines (capitalized, justified) or
twenty (also counting the eleven uncapitalized, indented segments as lines)? It
depends on what counts as a line, and there is no adequate way of taking both
types into account. Both segments and compounds have claims to being the
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poems main line. This undecidability is highlighted by Hejinians simple but
suggestive device of indenting her compound lines as though they were runovers. Think of the difference between an enjambed line (as in Paradise Lost)
and a run-over line (as in Leaves of Grass or Howl): the poet determines line
breaks for the one, the printer for the other. But the compounded lines of The
Cell are both enjambed and run over, conflating both stages of verse production.
Hejinian herself counts her compound lines as her poems lines, as is evident
from her composite poem “The Composition of the Cell” — a Cagean rewrit
ing of The Cell which Hejinian produced by extracting, numbering, end-punc
tuating, and sometimes rewording lines from her book (at least one per poem).
Here are the first two lines of “Composition,” drawn from compound lines 1
and 6 of The Cell:

1.1 It is the writer’s object to supply.
1.6 Rocks are emitted by sentences to the eye. (Cold 111)
As these aphoristic lines demonstrate, the poet counts compound lines at the
expense of her five-word segments, which have disappeared.14 Line 1.6, which
revises “Words are emitted by the / rocks to the eye,” provides us with a nice
instance of metonymic verbal recombination. The verb “emitted” generates a
descriptive syntax for both
an emitting source, a medium, and a ter
minal/receiver. Both sentences describe reading as a subset of seeing. Both ver
sions are “true”; both correspond to the mutual emission of certain words and
things. A sentence with “rocks” in it makes us think of (if not imagine) rocks.
And (in the stranger, “original” version) “the rocks” we see make us think of the
word “rocks.” Each sentence stores its own semantic charge.
The singular hybridity of Hejinians verse form may be appreciated by mea
suring it against the two complementary postmodern forms distinguished by
Joseph Conte: “The series [that] is determined by the discontinuous and often
aleatory manner
which
thing follows another” and “procedural form
which consists of predetermined and arbitrary constraints” (3). Conte charac
terizes serial form as discontinuous, “paratactic” (22), and “metonymic” (23) —
terms familiar from Hejinians poetics. Yet with its pentaverbal segmentation
and its “imposed exoskeletal . . . predetermined temporal framework” (“Rejec
tion” 1984, 136-7), The Cell also qualifies as procedural form.15 But Hejinians
book won’t stay put. In procedural poems, according to Conte, “formal choic
es precede content” (40); but
The Cell
new compound line length is
determined by the content, the variable length of the statement. The Cell may
be described just as fruitfully in pre-postmodern terms, as an organic sequence
(as its organic title and opening image and its resemblance to the sonnet
sequence suggest), with each thought leading indirectly to the next. But here
too the local discontinuities, the lack of a narrative and a characterized “human
I,” keep The Cell from remaining in traditional categories.
By making her threshold five words or black piano keys long (“The verte
brae crackle down the / pentatonic scale” (Cell 34), Hejinian renovates the
Elizabethan line
postmodern, post-subjective usage. Her pentaverbal seg
ment is objectively, though not audibly, registered in a way that the accentual-
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syllabic pentameter is not. We may read Shakespeare's first sonnet line, “From
fairest creatures we desire increase,” with either four or five stresses, but we may
only read five words in “It is the writer’s object.” Hejinians quantitative meter
thus underscores her poetics of
objectivity. In a narrative compound
that may be applied to herself and her fellow Language poets, Hejinian relates
that “They abandoned the sound in / large measure to a large /
/ A tis
” (168). The Cell is a cellular tissue of segmented lines.
In modern poetry, the quantitative measure is best known from the syllabics of Marianne Moore. But Hejinians nearest prototypist in The Cell is the
Objectivist poet Louis Zukofsky, who in his lifelong poem A invented the pen
taverbal line. Zukofsky’s lines differ significantly from Hejinians segments,
however, in that they always contain exactly five words — a formal invariance
that tends to compact and fragment the line into counted words, as in this pen
taverbal quinzain from A-22 (511):

shard porcelain learned blue veined
by wreathed penny in ice—
coo (where?) dig or not
piece dig who with what
what with ninth year’s gait
In The Cell, by contrast, the segmentation varies according to the fulfillments
of the sentential line. Though Hejinians “line is not continuous” (Cell 8), it
proceeds more smoothly — “not one word / at a time” (125). This process is
promoted by the fact that Hejinians segmentation is variable. Every line in A22 contains five words, whereas every line segment in The Cell contains any
where from one to five. Hejinians variable segmentation embodies the poetics
of imperfection; in her highly formal design, the desire
formal perfection
goes unfulfilled. As she reminds us (in a nine-word compound), “My thought
is a prospect / of increase, not attainment” (86).
It will be surprising for some readers to learn that Hejinian actually com
posed the bulk of The Cell in seven-word segments and only in revision
trimmed them down to five.16 Why seven? Hejinian may have adopted it as a
manageable factor of the sonnet’s fourteen lines, a word count left untried by
Zukofsky. But she may also have derived it from the English sonnet line; when
remeasured into seven words, the opening and closing segments of the first
poem scan as pentameters: “It is the writer’s object to supply,” “It is not imper
fect to have died.” However she arrived at her new segment lengths, Hejinians
retrospective revision raises questions for her readers. Since the line segments
mathematically redetermined, should their enjambments
discounted?
Do the segments have any local or only a general significance? Even if we
overlook them (which we can’t), I don’t think we would arrive at an easy answer,
or an easy way of disentangling subjective from objective determinations.
Compare these successive opening versions, dated July 3, 1988:

The crossing is very soft where the
ant is on its stomach
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Halfin degrees, half in gallons — these
are the intimates of the description
(“From The Cell” 227)
The crossing is very soft
where the ant is on
its stomach
Part object, part subject — these
are the intimates of the
description
(Cell 174)

In this summer lyric, the objectified describer adopts the ant’s scale and per
spective, imagining a “soft” (smooth) oceanic “crossing” on “its” (the ant’s) half
submerged stomach, across either a beach bucket or “its” (the describer’s) own
“soft” stomach. In the first scaled-down compound, Hejinian doubles her
enjambments (“soft / where,” “on / its”), which gives the boundary words more
visual prominence and accentual stress. In the second, she decided to retain her
border deictic “these,” which she managed to do by dropping the rhyming
“degrees” and by broadening her allusion to Wordsworth’s Tintern Abbey (“Of
eye, and ear, — both what they half create, / And what perceive”). The
Cartesian subject-object dyad, “Part object, part subject — these” expresses
more accurately her relative, composite situation, antlike herself perhaps
the
sea’s side or ship’s deck. Hejinian’s wholesale word-reduction gave her the
opportunity to recompose more particularly.
Hejinian best articulates the formal dynamics of The Cell in “Line” (with
out a definite article, the title reverberates “Lyn”), a
roughly contempo
rary essay. Here she nominates the (compound) line as her nonmetrical, cellu
lar unit of measure: “If there is such a thing as a perceptual rhythm (and pos
sibly there isn’t), the line would its gauge in my work. The line affixes detail
to time, and it is at least rhythmic to that degree. In any case, it is for me the
standard
variable) of meaning in the poem, the primary unit of obser
vation, and the measure of felt thought” (“Line” 191). In The Cell there are
rhythms of discovery and disclosure, observations made and felt: “Syntax is a
measure and / on it are increments of / pleasure” (Cell 140). Each compound
line, counterpointed or discontinued by the pentaverbal segment, is also a sen
tence, an utterance or observation: “[R]ecently I have been writing lines which
are equivalent to sentences — to full thoughts. ... I mean my lines to be read
as if hyphenated — one cognition” (Hejinian and Miller 36). The poet best
known for her book-length
poem My Life (recalling Dickinson’s similar
ly capitalized line, “My Life had stood — a Loaded Gun ”)
reveals her
new “inchnation to reject the sentence (or at least my own uses of it) except as
it is modified by the line (which discontinues the sentence without closing it)”
(“Line” 191). The Hejinian of The Cell skeptically balks at making sentential
claims: “The authority of the line (intrinsic) is different from that of the sen
tence, and momentarily I have lost faith in what I can say in a sentence. . . .
Imagine then that I turn to the line in order to begin again, writing, basically
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(“Line” 191). Though the sentential compound lines of The Cell are composed
of “hyphenated” pentaverbal segments, they are themselves grammatically
(though not poetically) independent: “The sentence is complete and / separate
a hedgehog, like / a charcoal, or a rock” (Cell 8). In other words, each com
pound line in The Cell is end-stopped.17 This surprising feature explains the
scarcity of final punctuation
in The Cell; verse capitalization and inden
tation make full stops redundant.
Hejinian's cellular line resembles what the fellow Language poet Ron Silli
man termed the “new sentence.” In his influential 1980 essay, Silliman charac
terizes the new sentence as one which, among other things, resists being incor
porated into an intersentential narrative or argument. Claiming that “sentence
length is a unit of measure,” Silliman proposes a fascinating experiment:
“Imagine what the major poems of literary history would look like if each sen
tence was identical to a line” (90-1). Hejinian did; she made each of her sen
tences equal to compound lines. But these compounds, though discontinuous,
function differently from Sillimans new sentences. Combining any number of
indented line segments, Hejinian’s
lines operate more
stanzas or verse
paragraphs.
Hejinian s cellular lines vary widely in length and type: “Lines . . . may be
rigid or relaxed, increasing or
long or short, ascending (questioning)
or descending (decisive), predisposed (necessary) or evolving (speculative), rep
resentative of sequence or of cluster” (“Line” 192). Consider the following
unattributed dialogue on nonverbal communication (Cell 11):
Eyeball-to-eyeball, a small spot, and
its temporary moment-to-moment hoarding stasis
Exactly!
Here the proliferating compound words elongate the pentaverbal segments to
describe the hyphenated line of sight from (“Blue”) eye to eye. Each of these
s comprises syntactically incomplete but discursively complete remarks
(note the rare final punctuation). The compound line, which may as brief as
a single word, is practically immeasurable as in the following (180):

be

The waters are bulging with
description
Glossy with stillness, cups gliding
The waves sucking up the
rising sand close so it
stands but only into part
of the wave above which
there’s an effect of red
glints, as in green rock
This ocean-view “description” is a nice example of what Hejinian diagnosed as
the “loss of scale accompanied by experiences of precision” (“Strangeness” 32).
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These lines are “torqued” with crypt words and phrases (“Glossy” — “Glassy,”
“cups” — “[wave]
” “close so” — “so
” “standing]” “waves”) and
metonymy (wavelike sand, red compared with green). The run-on syntax of the
final run-over compound line, afflicted with the loss of punctuation, captures at
least the urgency to get the flux of description on dry paper.
One entry in The Cell begins with an allusion to Gertrude Steins longest
work in verse, Stanzas in Meditation: “Lines in meditation — or inspection /
— convinced of my head's substantiality” (124). Hejinians distinction is accu
rate. Lyn writes lines, Stein stanzas. Steins book-length meditation on social
ization, like Hejinians comparably long meditation on “personification,”
with a primal scene of parental instruction:
I caught a bird which made a ball
And they thought better of
But it is all of which they taught
That they were in a hurry yet
In a kind of a way they meant it best
That they should change in and on account
But they must not stare when they manage
Whatever they are occasionally liable to do
(Stanzas 13)

The acuteness of the expatriate’s ear for the free indirect discourse of American
parental speech is evident from her cryptography (“we meant it for the best,”
“on no account,” “you must not stare”), especially in the encrypting of “And
then” in “And they,” which captures the formation of “second thoughts.” Stein
closes her opening nursery rhyme quatrain with a hypermetrical “yet” (“That
they were in a hurry [yet]”) that enjambs with the following line and initiates
the pentameter parental apologetics. The difference between Steins and Hejin
ian's interlinear juxtaposition may be gauged by Stein's handling of “it.” In a
stretch of five hypotactic lines — patterned concentrically with “But” “That,”
“In,” “That,” and “But” — Stein defines
“it” with a subordinate “That”
clause (“But it is all” — “That they were in a hurry”; “meant it best” — “That
they should change”). To
sure, Stein is also adept at using the dummy “it,”
as the rest of the stanza would demonstrate (not quoted here). But although
Steins line, like Hejinians, is sparsely punctuated, invariably capitalized, and
rhythmically and syntactically complete, it tends to act as a countermeasure to
her predominantly hypotactic, (un)periodic sentence — the overriding measure
of her stanzas. But though Stein’s hypotaxis entails an “undemocratic” subor
dination, it actually discontinues lines at a greater distance than Hejinians
parataxis, which discontinues adjacent fines. Stein’s and Hejinians meditations
are thus equally, but differently, discontinuous.
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Expectant Knowledge
Though the “person” of The Cell is most often neutrally gendered and consid
ered, Hejinian does pay particular attention to the female gender and its par
ticular historical circumstances. Consider the following interrogation (Cell55):

Do you patrol? outside the
self? around a body and
the follicle in which it
stands?
Or cell?
Request?
Have you reverted?
This series of questions registers current political pressures. The echo of the
pledge of allegiance reminds us that in the 1980s the flag became identified
with the Republic(ans) for which it metonymically came to stand.18 A more
crucial metonymy arises with “follicle” (which encrypts “flag”), a small cavity
open at one end, which, in the specific case of the uterus, stands in contiguity
to the fertilized single-celled egg that makes a “person.” Though Hejinian
refrains from using the word “abortion” in The Cell, the politicized philosophi
cal question of when a person becomes a person, which pits the “right to life”
against the “right to privacy” and fundamentalists (“Have you converted?”)
against feminists, hovers behind this poem and others.19
Although Hejinian is suspicious of impermeable cell walls of sexual or lin
guistic division (“No wonder there are no / single notes, no unique gender” \Cell
13]), she offers a Foucauldian speculation on the peculiar advantages offered
the contemporary woman poet: “I can imagine positing poetry, for example, as
the
of exile (or sanctuary) for suppressed discourses. ... I can also regard
poetry as highly eroticized.... I think, for example, that at the moment women
are capable of creating an entirely new opportunity
exploring the erotic,
including uses of power (withholding power, deferring power, letting power slip
away)” (Hejinian and Miller 39). Metonymy itself is fetishistic in its partial fix
ations. The poems in The Cell are sometimes
exhibitionist: “The
poem is the becoming / exhibition of its own language / It comes only in part
/ in parts / Because of what women like / In metonym” (66). At other times,
they are coyly explicit (202):

My metonymic body part stands
for solitude
It is a member of
a standing society
Constantly
Like a jelly between two
sticks, my subway li (well
not completely mine) goes in
The person entering it is
way out in its enmity
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The person writing is way
in in its attraction
In this light parody of confessional pornography, the metonymic womb-poem
attracts the “penetrating reader.”
But Hejinian knows well the heritage of making women into metonymic
part-objects. In “The Person and Description,” she notes that artistic descrip
tion has long tended to confine women within cells: “Description, whether it
is intentional or the result of
ambient ideology, bounds a persons life,
whether narrowly or broadly. In another sense it likewise bounds a person, and
this is, for example, a central (perhaps the classic) issue for feminism, which
takeshave very sel
fairin but they
es that traditionallymay
women are often described
will
dom been the describers” (169). In The Cell Hejinian exposes the historical,
cultural dimensions of these cellular descriptions. Observing women of her
mother s generation, for instance, she demonstrates how “female” behavior has
undergone distinct changes: “Women of my mother's generation / having their
hair done, submitting / as to medication” (66), “Many women shopping and
they /
watch out to know / the butcher’s name” (131).
One poem in The Cell versifies a passage from Thoreau’s The Maine Woods:
'“Think of our life in / nature —
to be encountering / matter, to come into
contact / with it — rocks, trees, wind / on our cheeks!”’ (151; cf. Thoreau 646).
The next poem echoes it: “And your cheeks! / Talk of mysteries! / Think of our
life in / a nation — daily seeing mothers” (152). The reverberation is instruc
tive. One daily “matter” that especially interests Hejinian in The Cell is the
national, natural “mother.”20 Shakespeare’s Sonnet 1 begins with a homotextual misrepresentation of motherhood, in which the
male object is urged to
reproduce himself, to make some woman “mother” him again: “From fairest
creatures we desire increase.” As a “very normal poet laborious / on a convexi
ty” {Cell 40), the postmodern serial poet is also intent upon cell reproduction.
This may be another reason why no sentence or line
The Cell is punctuated
by a full stop; Hejinian’s book of “expectant knowledge” (“Strangeness” 33) is
missing its periods.21 We
think of The Cell as a pregnant sequence, with
one poem generating the next.
Like any person, the American mother is a manufactured, national thing, a
metonymic assemblage: “A person might ask if / its mother is a natural / or a
cultural thing / A bundle or a burden / of properties” (Cell 179). This bundler
of joy is burdened by stereotypes. Synecdochically and nominally reduced, she
is made “equal to the thumping in / a bulb which is purely / reproductive named
'Mom.’” In the USA, a mother is both producer and consumer. Stevens wrote
that “Money is a kind of poetry” (Opus 191). Hejinian, who objects that
“money doesn’t give itself / to poetry” (Cell 157), nonetheless
up the chal
lenge. If “time is money,” eligible mothers are worth time and money out of
circulation in the form of maternity leave: “Mothers are given a round 7 sum
and an amount of / time” (the enjambed phrase reshuffles “lump sum,” and
“round figure”). This allotment gives them leave to pump the money back into
circulation. Hejinian thus closes this poem with a single swelling compound
(155-6):
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And so it is that
mothers because they purchase so
much — the greatest amount of
purchasing is done
mothers
—do it regularly,
and
very often, until its hardly
visible, something white behind a
green medium — spring and a
cascade of peas!

In a waste of
mothers spend their change and their body fluids.
Breast-feeding would be the immediate metonym for the mothers ubiquitous
expenditure. But their discharge, as natural as a waterfall, also resonates as a
cascade of "piss.”22
These mothers pass streams from their purses in public view without being
“self-conscious,” without embarrassment. The Cell is the record of one woman
poet unselfconsciously experiencing — seeing, knowing, describing — pub
lic. The Western myth of shameful knowledge is retold in the final two poems
of Hejinians
The closing pace is slow and measured; the next-to-iast
poem bears three dates (November 23, 29, and December 1,1988), and the last
(dated January 21, 1989) reworks an entry from July 5, 1988.23 In the penulti
mate poem, the nearing end of daylight (and of the
makes the writer
apprehensive of the end of sentences and sensations (214):

All sentences about the sense
of seeing, the sense of
embarrassment
It could all disappear — instead
it appeared
My language
My language is a genital—
lets say that
My language, in part
These appositional sentences center around the stark proposition, “My lan
guage is a genital—”. The line may be read cryptographically by tracing "gen
ital” back through “genitive” (by way of “My language”) to “Genesis.” The lat
ter locates the myth of embarrassment: “And the eyes of them both were
opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves togeth
er, and made themselves aprons” (Gen. 3:7, King James Version),
“Now I know in part” (1 Cor. 13:12, King James Version), Paul told the
Corinthians. Partial, metonymic knowledge is the fallen human condition (Cell
214):

Distinctions steering sunlight
A field of horses is
a landmark but not a
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particular horse stirring in the
terrain
Knuckles, or knocking from a
train
A thirst produced
onion
You cannot concentrate on oblivion24

"Adam was a taxonomist,” Hejinian reminds us (“Rejection” 1984, 141). The
original scientist gained knowledge not of essences but of differences. Seeing a
“field of horses,”
example, is different from
a “particular horse” a
field, hearing someone’s “Knuckles” knocking is different from hearing the
inhuman “knocking from a train,” and tasting an “onion” is different from
mouthing the oniony signifiers “on oblivion" (compare “steering” and “stirring,”
“terrain” and “train”). The discontinuous, cellular form of The Cell makes for
distinctions. We have no comprehensive field theory or field writing with
which to represent the world, but “While failing in the attempt to match the
world, we
structure, distinction, the integrity and separateness of
things” (“Rejection” 1984, 143).
The consummate distinction of Genesis is sexual difference, telling one body
part from another. Hejinian sets her scene of carnal knowledge
the clouds
(Cell 214):

The eye
a visage
to the cloud
No thought of rain tonight
though clouds of provenance
How to write
There is bas-relief
I see Marcus Aurelius and
a water buffalo
“Your American feminism is suggesting
women’s sex,” he said
The (female) speaker fancies she sees male shapes — the Roman bas-relief col
umn of Marcus Aurelius, the “horny” water buffalo — and the non-native male
speaker cited in the final line finds the “clouds of provenance” (encrypting
“God’s Providence”) equally suggestive of the female body.25 If Adam
the animals,
names — differentiates between — Adam and herself. Here
in lies her error, the story goes: her desire to reflect upon herself. So Milton’s
Eve dotes upon herself in a “Smooth Lake, that to me seem’d another Sky”
(Paradise Lost 4.459), and Stevens’ Eve (in “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction”)
“made air the mirror of herself” (Palm 209). In both poems, Eve’s self-con
sciousness is a narcissistic delusion. True knowing begins
Milton as Eve is
directed away from her reflection and toward Adam; Stevens himself directs
Eve toward “Adam” (a pun on Hebrew “earth”) as the independent reality of the
world: “But the first idea was not to shape the clouds / In imitation. The
clouds preceded us. //There was a muddy centre before we breathed” (209-10).
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Hejinian aims differently toward the real world. Reflecting back on “My
language is a genital—”, we would
Hejinian to have written something
like “My language is a fig leaf.” But for her, language doesn’t cover or hide the
naked self and world. In her Steinian realism (Stein’s title, “How to write,” is
written in her sky), the eye sees — she writes and we read — not through lan
guage but with language: “things take place inside the writing, are perceived
there, not elsewhere, outside it” (“Two Stein Talks” 133):
It’s the event of seeing
what I speak of with
someone’s eyes
The event of a carnality
covered by eye
(Cell
Description is here an “Eve-nt” “covered” by “Eve” (encrypting “eye”) — “eye
witness reporter” and carnally knowing poet. But such partial knowledge, The
Cell attests, is not simply “personal” or solipsistic. Linguistic experience is
shared, communicable experience: “It’s relevant — though a person / is impli
cated in the process / it keeps in sight” (215).
The line “My language is a genital—” is varied in the final poem’s opening:
“A person’s character is in / the realm of possibility / This means hysteria” (216;
the compound line recalls Dickinson’s “I dwell in Possibility—”).26 In the
1980s, the “wandering womb” was
into a network of American and
French feminist writing in response to Freud’s Dora: An Analysis of a Case of
Hysteria.27 Among other things, “This means hysteria” points to écriturefémi
nine. While Hejinian has expressed reservations about “the identification of
desire solely with sexuality, and the literalness of the genital model for a
woman’s language,” she has shown interest in what Elaine Marks has described
as the liberating function of language “as a passageway, and the only one, to the
unconscious, to that which has been repressed and which would, if allowed to
rise, disrupt the established symbolic order” (quoted in “Rejection” 1984, 142).
Yet Hejinian, as is clear from her deliberations, writes “a poetry of conscious
ness — a
for example, with intentional poetics” (Davidson et al. 6) —
whether her object is the conscious or the unconscious (or otherwise conscious)
person. In The Cell's last poem, she
the confinement of woman’s writ
ing to the dark cell of a prelinguistic unconscious: “For
moment this too /
means hysteria but without loss / of the lively consciousness of personality”
(216). Hejinian’s poetics of the “wandering womb” might
thought of as an
extra-vagrant, unembarrassed self-consciousness that discovers itself by
rewording the world. As Hejinian put it in “The Person and Description,” the
(male or female) person “posits its self-consciousness in consciousness of envi
ronment and detail, and
work and language” (170). Nothing perhaps,
including what has been repressed, is beyond its ken.
The Cell ends with a framing infinitive construction (217):

Might it come to the
consciousness of unconsciousness
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It is good to know
so

Whether we tie the penultimate line with the next as a worry (“it might come
to nothing”) or a
we are left with the feeling that there is no evil left in
Eve’s knowledge. The anticipatory, expectant “It” is just so good to know. It
is, moreover, good to know it “so” — a delightful parting adverb meaning “
conclusion” and “in this manner.” Hejinian writes with personality and, with
out shame: “Thus I’m completely unembarrassed” (180). The Cell is a think
ing woman’s poetry: intellectual without being disembodied, abstract without
being immaterial, philosophical without being ahistorical, formal without being
closed, objective without being detached, playful without being opaque, and
transparent without being clear. It is good for us that Hejinian keeps knowing
so.

Notes
1. My poetics of reading differs from that of Dworkin, who argues that
“the reader of My Life must not succumb to the ‘rage to know’ [Hejinian’s
phrase] that arises from a longing for the closure of perfect communication”
(78). Full knowledge and perfect communication, of the world or its poems,
may very well be impossible (not to say meaningless), but that does not relieve
poets and readers of the desire of knowing and communicating what they can.
As Spahr argues, Hejinian’s work “shows its readers how to . . . accept the
responsibility of reading actively” (155).
2. In this regard, Hejinian’s The Cell's comparison with Ashbery’s Flow
Chart, a daily written poem whose dates of composition overlap those of The
Cell. See my discussion in Outside 327-38.
3. The early version of “The Rejection of Closure” contains a transcript of
the ensuing conversation between Hejinian and her audience which was omit
ted from the later version published in Poetics Journal.
4. By contrast, Hejinian’s next book-length sonnet-like sequence, Oxota, is
studded with personal and place names: “Siberia begins again, Dima said, fif
teen minutes from Leningrad” (50).
5. Compare Jakobson: “metonymy changes the accustomed order of
things. Association by contiguity . . . transforms spatial distribution and tem
poral succession” (310).
6.
interest in Jakobson among the Language poets see, for instance,
Silliman 94-108, Watten 140-67, and Waldrop 219-22, for whom
“L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetics” involves a “shift away from the emphasis on
analogy and metaphor toward emphasis on combination” (219). On Hejinian’s
adaptation of Jakobsonian metonymy “to her own purposes” in Oxota, see
Perloff 190-1.
7. Contrast Jarraway’s assertion that Hejinian is “devoted to the demystifi
cation of realism” (323).
8. The list also includes sentences from the “The Person” (Cold 143-81).
The twenty-eight poems of this series (each section was first numbered, then

Published by eGrove,

81



Journal X, Vol. 1 [], No. 1, Art. 10

John Shoptaw

79

wryly given the same titular name, “The Person”) are slightly individualized in
form, with their capitalized, unpunctuated sentences either enjambed or
indented. Covering much the same thematic territory as The Cell, “The Per
” seems inevitably overshadowed by its larger sequential counterpart.
9. Compare Jakobson on Pasternak’s first person: “We learn [only] what
he lives on, this lyric hero outlined by metonymies, split up by synecdoches into
individual attributes, reactions, and situation; we learn to what he is related, by
what he is conditioned, and to what he is condemned” (313).
10. Hejinian attended the Leningrad conference in August of 1989, about
six months after finishing The Cell.
11. In On the Outside Looking Out and “The Music of Construction,” I call
these missing but operative words and phrases “crypt words” and “crypt phras
es,” their textual deformations “markers,” and the productive process “cryptog
raphy.” We may think of cryptography as a sort of linguistic metonymy
which an unwritten word or phrase is buried beneath one that sounds or looks
like or is otherwise associated with
We might say, paraphrasing Jakobson,
that Hejinian’s cryptography projects the principle of contiguity from the axis
of combination onto the axis of selection. Such “revisions” are common in The
Cell: “an articulate organ which / he called a lung” (31; cf. tongue); “Outside the
stars are stunning” (33; cf. shining); “the witnesses plink” (38; cf. blink); “Where
will it all preclude” (40; cf. end); “A sign on the floor / says come in” (54; cf.
door); “No less of this will / I say” (68; cf. more); “the / past is foreseeably dis
turbed” (199; cf. foreseeablefuture or visibly disturbed); “I closed
mind” (46;
cf. eyes or closed-minded); “Are you elated?” (59; cf. related); “Clog hours mea
sure” (82; cf. clocks measure hours).
12. Jakobson praised the not dissimilar ending of the Mayakovsky poem
“To Live”: “the second clause with its imperfective infinitive [‘to live’] and with
a neuter, subjectless form of the predicate [‘it is good’], represents a pure process
without any limitation or transposition and with an open place for the dative of
agent [for instance, ‘for me’]” (124). Note that in Russian “to live” is termed
“imperfective” in aspect since the act has not yet ended. Jakobson’s analysis of
Mayakovsky’s poem may have influenced the production of Hejinian’s “not
imperfect” ending, which
be reworded as a tautological grammatical truth:
the perfect infinitive “to have died” is “not imperfect.” Compare Altieri’s gram
matically informed reading (216-23).
13. The exception that proves the rule reads, “Spread and independent —
the person feeling” (43). It may be unintentional, however, since it doesn’t call
much attention to itself as over-extended.
14. The sentential line survives the line segment in Oxota, a sonnet-like
sequence modeled after Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin, and composed about a
after Hejinian finished The Cell. Each poem in Oxota is composed of fourteen
unsegmented, indented lines of any word length. As is evident from journal
publications where the printer establishes the right-hand margin breaks (see for
instance Oblek 8, 146-9), the discontinuous lines of Oxota are run-over, not
enjambed. Thus these poems differ significantly from unrhymed free-verse
sonnets, such as Robert Lowell’s, which are characterized by long enjambed
periodic sentences. Curiously, the next selection in Oblek 8 is taken from a
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Clark Coolidge poem, This Time We Are Both, which is also the first line of
Oxota.
15. Hejinians autobiographical prose poem, My Life, is also numerically
and temporally formed. Written
1978, when Hejinian was 37, My Life is
composed of thirty-seven sections of thirty-seven sentences each. Each section
thus corresponds to a calendar
and to a year of Hejinian s life. Hejinian
may have been encouraged in her project by the opening performative of Whitman’s autobiographical “Song of Myself”: “I, now thirty-seven years old in per
fect health begin, / Hoping to cease not till death.” Hejinian added 8 sections
and 8 sentences to each section in the 1987 edition of her poem, much as Whit
man revised “Song of Myself” in subsequent editions.
16. “From The Cell” for instance, contains twelve late poems (from June
26,1988, to August 9,1988), each divided into seven-word line segments. The
fall 1989 issue of the journal screens and tasted parallels contains the next entry
in The Cell, dated August 11, 1988, in which the opening seven-word com
pound is chopped into a pentaverbal segment and an enjambed remainder: “A
beautiful sea of a / chopped blue[.]” This poem, number 132 out of 150, was
apparently the first one (re)written in pentaverbal segments.
17. One instance that I noticed of enjambed compound lines stands out as
a Penelopean exception: “Its incomplete, perpetually — is being I written is
unwritten and nearing / completion, what / Do I mean enough to / stop (which
suggests a violent / metamorphosis)” (136). The break might easily have come
earlier: “completion / What do I . . .”
18. When this poem was composed, the flag had not yet become
issue
in the 1988 Presidential campaign, but the debate between George Bush and
Michael Dukakis over the pledge of allegiance may have influenced Hejinians
pentaverbal revision.
19. Ronald Reagan spoke to anti-abortion supporters on the anniversary of
Roe v. Wade in 1986 and in 1987 {The Cell ends January 21, 1989). By then,
abortion clinics were being bombed. In 1988 Pat Robertson, who helped found
the National Right to Life Committee, made a short-lived run
the Presi
dency.
20. The
spills over into Hejinians prose. Consider this dream
transcript: “Dream ofNovember 2, 1986: I am taking part in a project to mea
sure the planetary system. Other people are involved including a tall thin man
and a woman with enormous breasts. In the project to measure the planetary
system each participant slips into place between other participants to form a
... I am afraid of being smothered by the womans enormous breasts”
(“Strangeness” 34-5; ellipsis added). The fear of being “smothered” crypto
graphically identifies the
center of this system as “mother.”
21. Again, a single possible exception — aside from a poem punctuated by
ellipses (65) — is the line “Etc.” (132), in which the period punctuates an
abbreviation.
22. Compare the autobiographical
on motherhood in My Life:
“from the little laundry porch, like the other mothers, I
overlook the rec
tangular lot enclosed by the four arms of the building for tenant parking where
a group of small children were playing — or rather fighting — and it was to
enter these fights that the women shouted and cajoled from their porches at the
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children and each other” (63; the speaker is 24, the
1964). However “I”
and Hejinian are related, this first-person eye securely orients the readers point
of view.
23. See Hejinian, “From The Cell" 229. This poem was omitted from the
chronological sequence of The Cell.
24. For Hejinian, the distinctness of objects is enhanced by West Coast
sunlight: “In the Bay Area, the light, despite and even in the fog, is bright,
strong, and bounded; it separates and maintains objects, as if it were the source
of their discreteness and their finitude, and makes the contrast between an
object and its shadow definite and resolute” (Hejinian in Davidson et al. 85).
25. The male seeing and saying in non-idiomatic English may echo the
Russian poet Dragomoshchenko, who first visited Hejinian in the
in the
spring of 1988 (Hejinian and Miller 37).
26. These lines depersonalize the seventh and eighth lines of the poems
first version: “A man in a different language loves /
— for him my charac
ter is in / the
of possibilities / For one moment this too means hysteria /
but without losing the lively consciousness of / my personality” (“From The
Cell" 229).
27. For the project of “hysterical” knowledge and writing, see Auerbach
111-31, Cixous 245-65, and Kristeva 227-34.
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In their westward march across the American
continent, in the van of a higher civilization,
the native red men have, at different times,
given sad and fearful evidences of their enmi
ty to the dominant white race; ... no exhibi
tion of Indian character had so afflicted and
appalled the soul of humanity, as the fearful
and deliberate massacre perpetrated by them
in August, 1862.
—Charles S. Bryant, A History of the
Great Massacre by the Sioux Indians, in Min
nesota

Mr. Barnum has indeed found out that the
Sioux and Winnebago Indians are the most
consistent friends of the white men, for they
have consented to sacrifice still another week
of their home comforts, and the pleasures of
their happy hunting grounds to comply with
the demands of the public for their prolonged
stay. The Museum is crowded to overflow
ing, night and day, to witness their perfor
s.
—Frank Leslies Illustrated Newspaper, 24
October 1863

D—n Indians anyhow. They are a lazy, shift
less set of brutes — though they will draw.
—P. T. Barnum, letter to Moses Kimball,
26 September 1843

Four years before the Harper brothers were to launch
their highly successful Harpers Weekly, entrepreneur
P. T. Barnum recognized the financial potential of
periodical publishing. Joining forces with New York
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Sun editors H. D. and Alfred E. Beach and engaging Frank Leslie as his chief
engraver, Barnum
off his short-lived publishing experiment with the
first number of the revived Illustrated News in 1853.1 The initial editorial
address stated that “there was never a better field for such an enterprise than
New York. . . . More than
other city the world, New York is the center
of intellectual as well as industrial and commercial activity, and it is in almost
every essential the metropolis of this entire continent” (1 Jan. 1853; 6). By the
time the second number of the paper appeared, the editors had revised the focus
of their intended readership. While selecting New York as their “centre,” the
editors carefully explain that they “wish to
understood as speaking to every
part of America where the English language is spoken. We aim at a national
undertaking, and are happy that as far as time and steam have permitted us to
judge the success of an experiment, it has been nationally responded to” (8 Jan.
1853; 1). As if to concretize this emphasis on the papers nationalist project,
this number of the News includes a series of engravings illustrating the ongo
ing construction of the Capitol building and the Washington Monument.
Barnum’s attempt to create a “national undertaking” in his newspaper illus
trates the potential power these popular texts harbored, not only as money
makers for their ambitious owners and editors but as participants in the process
of configuring their readers as Americans. Overlapping institutions of popular
culture, such as Barnums version of the freak show, likewise inadvertently par
ticipated in this endeavor of identifying the definitive properties of “American ness,” concretizing in imagery an abstract ideological construction.
a pro
ject relies upon discourses of exclusion; Benedict Anderson has argued that a
nation is ideologically created by the imagining of a community that draws
clear boundaries as to who cannot claim membership in it.2 Anderson claims
that the nation consists of a community that is “imagined as both inherently
limited and sovereign” (6); a community imagined because its members will, for
the most part, never know or meet one another and one that is also limited
because even the largest nation “encompassing perhaps a billion living human
beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No
nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind” (7). The nation is “imagined
as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that
in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal com
radeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past
two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly
to die for such limited imaginings.” In the early years of the Civil War in
America, not long after the initial proliferation of popular periodicals like Bar
num’s Illustrated News and the institutionalization of Barnum’s freak show, this
imagining depended heavily, if not primarily, upon a discourse of savagery and
the primitive. How this discourse was used, however, depended largely upon
what community was being imagined. At this particular historical moment,
there was
single notion of a United States of America but several compet
ing claims to American nationality and sovereignty.
As June Namias explains, rather than one United
the Civil War and
Dakota Wars occurring in the West in the
1860s could have resulted in
“three and maybe more nations: the United States of America, the Confeder

Published by eGrove,

prevail

in

89

Such





Journal X, Vol. 1 [], No. 1, Art. 10

Linda Frost

87

ate States of America, and perhaps the Confederate Indian Lands of America”
(218). Regionally, then, the idea of the "nation” had often conflicting, if over
lapping meanings in relation to the country at large. By looking at the events
covered during 1862 and 1863 — in this case, the Civil War and the Dakota
Wars — I want to chart the mobility of this discourse of the primitive to see
how it is used in different regions to accomplish quite different national and
ideological goals. Although all remain concerned with the definition of some
kind of American identity, different regions ""primitivize” different "others” for
specific yet different national agendas. While the Sioux of the western plains
were the primary image of the ""savage” for white settlers and government offi
cials in Minnesota during the Dakota uprisings, for the New York press, pri
marily concerned with a costly, drawn out, and bloody division of the United
States, the Southern Confederate took on the attributes of savagery. And for
entrepreneur like P. T. Barnum, the community of most concern was defined
not only by race but by marketplace, a community with the risk-taking busi
nessman at its head, offering for the community’s consumption a primitive
force that only a master of the market could control.
The primitive has been and perhaps remains the most powerful and con
sistent strain in America’s imperialist discourse. The positioning of the African
American or the Native American as primitive and anthropologically stunted
plants these figures firmly at the beginning of narratives of evolution that,
according to popular myth, were already over. As Marianna Torgovnick points
out, the primitive acts as a narrative that establishes ""definable beginnings and
endings that will make what comes between them coherent narrations” (245).
Explorers’ narratives pepper the pages of weeklies like Barnum’s Illustrated
News, and stories such as those about the ""discovery” of ""missing link” tribes
relied on their white readers’ fascination with an evolutionary model that
affirmed their own racial superiority. Depicting primitives as either bestial,
cannibalistic monsters or ignorant, naive children, conveniently positioned
them at the beginning of the story of Western civilization. This use of narra
tive aided in the construction of the nation as an ideological entity and a polit
ical community. Etienne Balibar contends that ""the history of nations ... is
always already presented to us in the form of a narrative which attributes to
these entities the continuity of a subject” (338). Narratives of civilization are
foundational to the stories comprising these competing versions of America.
The narrative of Western progress in particular was a common
in the
weeklies. An 1851 image from Gleasons Pictorial Drawing Room Companion
emphasizes the familiar story of frontier
Entitled ""Progress of Civ
ilization,” the scene — which is meant to be read from left to right —
on the
left two warriors paddling a canoe underneath a Native American vil
lage. In the center, a farm and a church form the background against which two
well-dressed white men distribute books to tribal members and gesture to the
far right of the picture, where a train, factories, and steam-powered ships chug
toward a future as yet hidden from the reader beyond the right edge of the
image. The text reads as follows:
The white man meets the Indian in council, takes him by the hand . . .
and points out to him the improvements of the civilized life.... By degrees,
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the log cabin rises and takes the place of the rude tent of skin.
[G]rounds are cleared and fenced in. .. . Factories spring up .. . cities [are]
founded, and those modern accessories to civilization, and improvement in
all things, the steamboat and the railroad, bring us in our imagination to
the present time. (19 April 1851; 28)

The story of progress highlighted by this writer was likewise employed in the
projects of other cultural agents including P. T. Barnum. An 1873 'Advance
Courier” advertisement for Barnum’s “Great Traveling World’s Fair,” a portable
version of
American Museum, includes a picture of the burning of the
Museum in 1868 with Barnum rising godlike from the smoky flames, one hand
extended to offer “The World in Contribution” to the
customer. This
world includes human curiosities like those pictured throughout the image:
Siamese twins, dwarves, and cannibals as well as Native Americans. Like “civ
ilization” itself, Barnum’s progress is made possible by that technological tri
umph, the steam engine, which is appropriately pictured near the center of the
engraving.3
The primitive as a source of entertainment value and exotica was absolute
ly crucial to the discourse of the popular freak show. Freak presentation,
because of its emphasis on and exploitation of racial, ethnic, and cultural dif
ferences, reaffirmed Euro-American audience members’ notions of who
“belonged” to the “civilized” community of America and who did not. Freak
shows themselves emerged from the museum tradition that gained momentum
the nineteenth century, with displays featuring the pseudo-scientific exhibi
tion of “curiosities” that included not only such human oddities as legless men
and bearded women but artifacts of cultural and social significance as well:
paintings, inventions, stuffed exotic animals, and so forth.4 P. T. Barnum
founded the American Museum in New York in 1840, and Robert Bogdan
credits this as the start date of the freak
as an institutionalized form of
popular entertainment, thanks in part to Barnum’s central role the creation
of it (2).5 The freak as an exhibit was a construction, a figure wrapped in cul
tural myth and story. Freaks were almost always shown within the context of a
narrative; a showman typically related the story of how they came to be in the
museum and sold souvenir chapbooks that contained the freak’s “history.”
There was then no such thing as a real freak; by virtue of their carefully plotted
representation, freaks were/are always constructed.
A late-nineteenth-century article pasted into one fan’s scrapbook, that of
Nathaniel Paine of Worcester, Massachusetts, illustrates the understanding
showmen and audiences shared: “A little pot-bellied negro boy, with a pointed
head, and short, crooked arms and legs, would not draw more than a passing
glance the usual order of things. Call him the Turtle Boy, and he becomes a
freak. People
to stare at him and trace the combination of the boy and tur
tle, which the genius of the showman has suggested.”6 This description could
almost accompany another image in Paine’s text, a carte de visite of an AfricanAmerican boy labeled in handwriting (presumably Paine’s) simply “Nonde
script” — “a commonly used phrase [in the nineteenth
for animals not
yet classified or described
science” (Bogdan 136). Draped what appears
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to be a bear hide, the little boy rests his abnormally shortened arms on a rock,
the setting for the portrait simulating a meadow complete with grass, rocks, and
painted tree background (see fig. 1). Despite the child’s obvious physical defor
mity, his status as a “freak” results less from the deformity itself than from the
way in which that deformity is represented, couched in trappings of the primi
tive: the piece of fur he wears, the outdoor setting of the studio, and the “onall-fours” position that his four shortened limbs appear to necessitate. This is
even more apparent with another of Paine’s postcards, titled simply “Man With
Claws,” which shows a long-haired young man (dressed also in fur) whose long,
curled fingernails are the only things that set him physically apart from mem
bers of the audience.
In fact, not only the primitivization but the bestialization of human exhibits
was a mainstay in freak representation. “Krao, the Missing Link,” “Susie, the
elephant girl,” and “Jo-Jo, the Dog-Faced Boy” are all examples of this practice,
which “posited that certain malformations
the result of crossbreeding man
with beast” (Bogdan 106). This literalization of the animalistic quality of
primitive freak exhibits evidenced the fascination — as well as the culturally
sanctioned revulsion — that white middle-class Americans had for miscegena
tion. Such bestialization of “savage” performers also confirmed and expanded
associations already existing in the culture regarding native, non-Western peo
and their shaky or simply non-human
An 1860 Currier and Ives
political lithograph features the freak, “What Is It?” (also know as “Zip the Pin
head”) a microcephalic African-American man, William Henry Johnson,
whom Barnum began exhibiting in 860.7 In an illustrated catalog to Barnum’s
American Museum, “What Is It?” is described as a blend of ape and man:
“While his face, hands, and
are distinctly human, his head, feet and legs
are more like the Orang Outang [orangutan], indicating his
ancestry”
(108).8 The Currier and Ives cartoon uses this “nondescript” missing-link rep
resentation to satirize Republican support of African-American rights in the
1860 presidential campaign; entitled “An Heir to the Throne,” the print fea
tures New York Tribune editor and abolitionist Horace Greeley and presidential
candidate Abraham Lincoln standing behind the “What Is It?” figure, extolling
his virtues as a presidential candidate (see fig. 2). Barnum’s narrative of primi
tiveness surrounding the constructed “What It?” freak exhibit relies not only
on the color of Johnson’s
but on specific racist ideologies circulating in the
culture about the “animal” nature of the African and African-American slave.
The Currier and Ives
also shows how such an exhibit, and all its atten
dant meanings, is put to overt political use, here by Northern opponents of
Greeley/Lincoln “radicalism.” Freaks were often popular — and therefore prof
itable — because their representation both reinforced racist attitudes and eth
nocentric distinctions upheld by white Americans and underscored the narra
tive of
and progress that maintained their position of privileged
membership in that community. That representation, as always potentially
dangerous and frequently sexualized, simultaneously served to titillate the
white viewer.
About ten years after Barnum started the American Museum, a mid-cen
tury publishing boom catapulted the production and circulation of periodicals
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like the Illustrated Nezus. Historian Frank Luther Mott associates both the
Compromise of 1850, which included a series of measures passed to appease
both proslavery and antislavery proponents, thus causing the intensification of
the debate over slavery overall, and the 1852 Post Office Act, which reduced
postal rates and revised the relationship between subscriber and publisher, with
this beginning of a new era in the history of American magazines” (3).
Throughout the mid-century, periodical types and titles proliferated as they
never had
Womens magazines like Godey's Lady Book, abolitionist
papers like William Lloyd Garrisons Liberator, story papers like Robert Bon
ner s enormously successful New York Ledger, family-oriented weeklies and mis
cellanies
Harper's Weekly and Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, true-crime
papers like the National Police Gazette, and even pornographic periodicals such
as the scandalous Venus Miscellany provided Americans with a wide range of
reading material. While varying markedly in content and quality, all of these
publications shared one major aim: to reach the widest group of readers possi
ble. And although they accomplished it different ways, these texts likewise
served an important ideological function: to create a community of readers
described
ambitious editors like Barnum as national.
Ronald Zboray uses the term “fictive people” to refer to this kind of con
structed community, indicating a trend toward “cultural coherence” reflected
the print culture of nineteenth-century America that was both a force in and
product of the periods rapid increase in industrialization.9 Technological
improvements in the printing process and supporting industries (like the rail
road) that were responsible for dramatically propelling the distribution of print
matter increased both the mass of printed materials and the possibility that they
might find readers. These readers, inundated with reading material and geo
graphically scattered due to the increased movement of Americans away from
their home communities, found their experiences reflected in a somewhat hitor-miss fashion in the variety of texts that lay
them. Zboray argues that
while “these somewhat experimental practices of the reading public mitigated
against the creation of a national literature . . . readers had to find their com
monalities in literature that would sell the most copies” (189, 191). And while
this search for self in the popular press may in part explain the rise in formula
ic fiction that dominated the periodicals at this time, it does not explain the dif
fering depictions of news events that varied from regional paper to regional
paper; both the availability of information regarding an event and its relevance
to that region's audience determined its reportage.
How the papers
read and distributed also affected their roles as pro
ducers of national ideologies. Benedict Anderson argues that the newspaper
was the primary vehicle of nation-building in the nineteenth century, given that
newspapers contribute to an imagining of community via an imaginary and
doubled sense of simultaneity. Anderson argues that newspaper readers are
informed about the same set of events and circumstances, each at the same time
— “each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs [of reading
the paper] is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of oth
ers of whose
is confident, yet of whose identity
has not the
slightest notion” — and that these events themselves share a simultaneity of
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existence due to their juxtaposed presentation on the page (35). It is this appar
ently random, yet typically meaningful juxtaposition that causes Anderson to
liken reading a newspaper to reading a novel whose author has abandoned any
thought of a coherent plot” (33). But what Anderson describes as a joint and
comprehensive attempt to create an imagined nationalized body of readers is a
complicated by the historical context of mid-century America, where
different
were attempting to conceive of themselves as different kinds
of Americas. Readers at this time were not necessarily reading the same mate
rials at the same times, but they were often reading regional versions of events
that placed emphasis on those accounts that had particular relevance for that
area.10
The nation-building narrative of "progress” as
evolutionary path taken
by humanity from primitiveness to civilization varied between regions; these
varying narratives are highlighted in the mastheads of the periodicals catering
to different regions. The New York-based Harpers Weekly masthead establish
es a sense of an intellectual, upper-class environment to which the reader is
assumed to belong or at least aspire. A painting palette, an inkwell, and a lyre
illustrate the refined, artistic nature of the paper while a telescope, a globe, a
and scientific dimensions.
s, and an open book indicate its 'scholarly hole
Between the words Harpers and Weekly, one hand passes the light of knowledge
to another while the words Journal of Civilization form a gently curving arc
bridging the two collections of images. As Harpers Weekly's masthead profess
es the journal to be an organ of civilization, so its lead article in the inaugural
issue argues that the Union itself (which should, according to the article, be
maintained at almost any cost and certainly the cost of compromise over slav
ery) is a manifestation of the same, "only another name for freedom, progress,
and civilization” (3 Jan. 1857; 1). Anything outside the boundaries and mar
gins of that Union consequently belongs to that which is not civilized — to the
primitive and savage. What we see here is the most common form of othering
during this mid-century period: those who belong are civilized and those who
do not are primitive, inferior to the “active, intelligent, free citizens” who have
voted for a continued compromise in the organization of the American states.
In quite a different vein but still relying on the primitive, the masthead of the
flagship Western publication, the St. Paul Pioneer and Democrat, shows an
industrious, smoke-pumping town in the middle of the wilderness as seen by a
voyeuristic (and clearly covetous) Indian through a
in the forest foliage.
Other periodicals use their mastheads directly to emphasize the nationalis
tic interests they represent. New Yorks Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper
highlights its Yankee status, the letters of its masthead running over, under, and
through a precisely centered, majestic drawing of the country’s Capitol Build
ing.11 The Southern Illustrated News, a Confederate organ commencing in Sep
tember 1862 in Richmond, arches the letters of its title, dripping with Spanish
moss, over a scene of Confederate tranquility: a war memorial with a mount
ed soldier on the upper pedestal occupies the images center while a riverboat
pumps steam over a marshy Southern river lined by plantation mansions. The
war memorial functions in several ways. While paying tribute to the war cur
rently being fought, it permits itself to be read as a memorial, indicating to the
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Southern reader the paper’s optimism that the war will soon be over and the
Confederacy openly recognized. It also draws attention to the part that the
very act of making war played in the Confederacy’s process of building its own
national image, the war itself being, as
writer for the Southern Illustrated
News emphasizes elsewhere, what will literally and figuratively consolidate the
Confederacy as a separate nation.12 These images indicate a variety of nation
al scenes with which these American publications struggled: a nation that had
come into being not yet a hundred years before, a nation striving for autonomy
and sovereignty, and a nation that was transporting itself into the so-called
western frontier. The mastheads illustrate the tensions at work in the potential
or — in the case of the South at least — attempted division of the United
States at large.
In the middle of the Civil War, in August of 1862, war broke out on anoth
er front, in the newly admitted western state of Minnesota. The tribes of the
Dakota, having been systematically cheated by Indian agents and traders out of
their tribal annuities and subsequently starved, rose up against the white settlers
whom they recognized as largely responsible
their misery. The tribe was
by Little Crow, a generally conciliatory leader who favored peace and compli
ance with white ways and laws but who, when approached by the younger war
riors of the Dakota, agreed to lead his people into battle. The conflict began
when
brave seeking food dared another to steal eggs from a white farmer;
his companion claimed he would show
courage by shooting the whites of
the
Fighting continued throughout the summer, leading to the deaths of
hundreds of whites and Dakota, the imprisonment of some three hundred war
riors, and the largest formal execution in US history when thirty-eight Dakota
men were hanged the day after Christmas in 1862.13
Coverage of this conflict varied between regions. The sensational nature of
the uprising certainly caught the attention of many northeastern papers, but it
also provided an opportunity for affirming the white, Euro-American identity
of the periodical’s readership. Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper ran a half
page engraving on the cover of its October 25, 1862 edition depicting a mur
dered family: two women and one man lie on the ground, victims of what the
caption calls the “Indian Outrages in the North-West,” with the most grue
some detail being a naked infant skewered to a tree (1). The caption reads, “An
American Family Murdered by the Sioux Indians, a Grove Near New Ulm,
Minnesota,” highlighting the need for readers to identify with the victims and
to perceive the attack as an act of war against the entire American community,
not only those living the West. In this instance, then, the presentation of the
primitive serves to strengthen the national ties between northeastern and west
ern readers and to eclipse the national otherness of the citizens of New Ulm —
a primarily German settlement — with the racial difference of the Sioux.
Despite such “sympathetic” reports, though, the western press generally
believed that its eastern counterpart was much too forgiving of the Dakota’s
actions (this stemmed mostly from the eastern press’s attempts to open up the
question of possible white wrongdoing as an origin for the trouble). In fact,
1864, Charles S. Bryant and Abel B. Murch co-authored their History of the
Great Massacre by the Sioux Indians, in Minnesota, Including the Personal Narra
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tives ofMany Who Escaped in part as an attempt to counter the calls for sympa
thy the Dakota had supposedly received in the eastern press. Bryant and
Murch discount that any of the Sioux-sympathetic causes proposed for the con
flict are correct; the “antecedent exciting causes of this massacre” are listed, but
according to Bryant and Murch, each theorist is “satisfied that the great mas
sacre of August 1862 had its origin in some way intimately connected with his
favorite theory, and were the question raised, What was the cause of the great
Southern rebellion? the answers would be perhaps quite as various” (46). By
begging the question, Bryant and Murch draw attention to the different wars
being fought in America at the time and to the different nations fighting to win
them. Nevertheless,
war, unlike that going on between the North and
South, does contain a primary cause which the authors then reveal:
Let us, for a moment, look at the facts in relation to the two races who have
come into close contact with each other,
in the light of these facts,
judge of the probable cause of this fearful collision.... The white race stood
upon this undeveloped continent ready and willing to execute the Divine
injunction, to replenish the earth and SUBDUE
The savage races in
possession, either refused or imperfectly obeyed this first law of the Cre
ator. On the one side stood the white race in the command of God, armed
with his law; on the other, the savage, resisting the execution of that law.
The result could not be evaded by any human device. God’s laws will ever
triumph, even through the imperfect instrumentality of human agency. In
the case before us, the Indian races were in the wrongful possession of a
continent required by the superior right of the white man. This right,
founded in the wisdom of God, eliminated by the ever-operative law of
progress, will continue to assert its dominion, with varying success, contin
gent on the use of means employed, until all opposition is hushed in the
perfect reign of the superior aggressive principle. (48-9)

The quotation on the text’s cover page is thus fitting
its authors’ purpose:
“For that which is unclean
nature thou canst entertain no hope; no washing
will turn the Gipsy white” (1). Bryant and Murch rehearse the prevailing racist
belief that, given the dictates of Manifest Destiny, only God can or should alter
the movement of white Euro-Americans into the western territories and home
lands of the native tribes. In the end, then, for these writers, there is no anal
ogy between the war in the South and the war in the West, for the western war
is propelled by an act of God, a divinely sanctioned process reliant upon skin
color — “on the one side stood the white race the command of God, armed
with his law [to replenish the earth and SUBDUE it]; on the other, the savage,
resisting the execution of that law” (48-9).
The weekly St. Paul Pioneer and Democrat covered the Dakota Wars with
in it highlighted the Sioux threat to future white settlement of Min
r intent:
nesota order to reclaim those men called to fight in the war with the Con
federacy, and thus to replenish the state’s dwindling reserve of white fighters.
The press, in order to affirm that there was as great a need for an American
military presence in the West as there was in the South, emphasized the dan-
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ger posed by the Sioux not only to the settlers of the region but to the idea of
America overall; this was effected largely by feminizing America “herself,” a
common move in nationalist rhetoric. The western press drew a portrait of
Dakota “savagery” that linked the vulnerability of the region with the vulnera
bility of its white women, who were depicted as representatives of American
morality and purity.14 Over three hundred Sioux warriors were taken captive
after the August battles, and the Minnesota press registered the locals’ desire to
hang them all. In the rhetorical
between Minnesota legislators and
the White House regarding the fate of the Sioux prisoners, allegations of rape
— murderous gang
— of white women emerged as the most common “evi
dence” of the Sioux’s savagery. Governor Alexander Ramsey in a September
speech to the Minnesota House and Senate detailed the destruction in terms of
“infants hewn into bloody chips of flesh, or nailed alive to door posts” as well
as of “
joined to murder in one awful tragedy, young girls, even children of
tender years, outraged by their brutal ravishers till death ended their shame” (12
1862; 5). In its December 20, 1862 edition, Harpers printed a woodcut
that was captioned, “Identification of Indian Murderers in Minnesota by a Boy
Survivor of the Massacre”; in it a small white boy points his finger at a hulking
darkened warrior whom the boy accuses of “the murder and outrage” of
mother and
(801). Despite the heightened emotional quality of this rape
rhetoric, President Lincoln noted
his pardon of all but thirty-nine of the
warriors that after “
examination of the records of the trials,” he could
find only two seemingly valid accounts of rape (New York Tribune 20 Dec. 1862;
3).
Nevertheless, the Euro-American settlers and government of Minnesota
wanted brutal retribution. Lieutenant Governor Ignatius Donnelly wrote that
“with prompt action [the Sioux] can be exterminated or driven beyond the
State line, and the State once more placed on such a footing that she can, with
some prospect of success,
immigration . . . There should be no restoring
of the Sioux to their old status .... [T]hey must disappear or be exterminated"
(St. Paul Pioneer 5
1862; 1). In his speech to a joint Minnesota House
and Senate meeting, Governor Ramsey described the “outrages” of the war,
highlighting the need to establish definitive boundaries for the nation that was
being
out of the region — social as well as geographic boundaries — and
reinforcing the lack of boundaries observed by the Dakota, a lack that here
nals a missing morality on which the idea of a “civilized” America depends:

Our course then is plain. The Sioux Indians of Minnesota must be exter
minated or driven forever beyond the borders of the state. . . . They have
themselves made their annihilation an imperative social necessity. Faithless
to solemn treaty obligations, to old friendships, to the ties of blood, regard
less even of self interest when it conflicts with their savage passions, inca
pable of honor or of truth or gratitude; amenable to no law; bound by
moral or social restraints — they have already destroyed in one monstrous
act of perfidy every pledge on which it was possible to found a hope of
mutual reconciliation. (St. Paul Pioneer 14.13, 12 September 1862, 5;
emphasis added)
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No mention is made, of course, of the agents’ thieving of the Dakota’s promised
annuities for the land they "sold” to the United States government, just as no
mention is made of the government’s attempts to destroy tribal unity by eco
nomically and ideologically undermining their
and cultural beliefs and
practices. The political rhetoric of Minnesota’s white government relies on
nineteenth-century conceptions of the primitive and the savage to outline the
limits of national membership. While it is, according to Governor Ramsey, the
Dakota’s “savage passions” that make it impossible “to found a hope of mutual
reconciliation,” it is in fact the representation of those same “passions” that
make possible the definition of a group to whom the Dakota would finally be
forced to submit.
White western officials needed to keep the fires of the Indian
burning
in order to insure continued financial and material support from the federal
government. One October St. Paul Pioneer editorial reads, “We are surprised,
pained, even alarmed, to find the idea gaining ground in many circles that this
war is over. . . . This war is not alone with the Sioux of the Mississippi; it is a
war of the white race against the brutal, inhuman savages that infest the coun
try between the Mississippi and the Pacific” (31 Oct. 1862; 6). But the fact that
writers and legislators had to assert, in such powerful terms, the ongoing threat
posed
this “infestation” of native peoples may indicate the perceived fragili
ty of and ambivalence toward that threat in the minds of the American public
at large. Reports of the execution invariably included this emotionally charged
and even sympathetic description: “The most touching scene on the drop was
their attempts to grasp each other’s hands, fettered as they were. . . . We were
informed by those who understand the language, that their singing and shout
ing was only to sustain
other — that there was nothing defiant in their last
moments, and that no 'death-song,’ strictly speaking, was chanted on the gal
lows. Each one shouted
own name, and called on the name of his friend,
saying, in substance, "I’m here! I’m here!”’ (Bryant and Murch 477). The exe
cution was itself pictorially depicted in both Harpers Weekly and Leslie's Illus
trated (see fig. 3). The representation literalizes the containment of the Dako
ta favored by the whites of Minnesota: perfect squares of militia and towns
people surround the central structure, indicating not only the vastly more
numerous representatives of the white race in this space of supposedly endan
gered whiteness but their apparent ability to surround and strike down those
who threaten them. The city buildings of Mankato, Minnesota, site of the exe
cution, form the scene’s background, and it is a significantly more “civilized”
scene than one might expect, given the sensational descriptions of the West that
have preceded its appearance.
In the periodicals of the Northeast, though, the savage as a rhetorical cate
gory extends beyond the warring Dakota to include the Confederate, even
while it continues to draw on popular ideas regarding the Indians themselves.
When it received coverage in Harpers Weekly, the Dakota uprising was pre
sented in such a
as to link the western drama with that of the war being
played out in the South. The first mention of the uprising occurred on Sep
tember 6,1862, and
September 13,1862, a cartoon (fig. 4) showing Indians
fighting alongside Confederates appeared with a caption described as extracted
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from "JEFF DAVIS’s last message” that will supposedly “serve to explain the
News from Minnesota”: “I am happy to inform you that, in spite . . . of. . .
threats, used in profusion by the agents of the government of the United States,
the Indian nations within the confederacy have remained firm in their loyalty
and steadfast in the
of their treaty engagements with this govern
ment” (13 Sept. 1862; 592). The connection between Confederate savage and
Indian savage is here brought powerfully to the fore as the Confederacy’s pres
ident supposedly affirms the tribal allegiance to the Southern nation-in-wait
ing, an allegiance underscored by an illustration of the most recent acts of “bar
barism” committed by the most savage of American savages, the Sioux. In these
instances, Harpers reiterates the theme that those who contest the Union
(which, as I noted above, was described in the Weekly's first issue as
another name for civilization itself) must be savages, primitives opposed to the
construction of a higher
order.
During the years 1862 and 1863, the primitive was the discourse of choice
for northeastern periodicals representing the Confederates; in one specific
instance, it also served to represent those who supported the Confederacy.15 A
woodcut appearing in the February 15, 1862 issue of Harpers Weekly bears the
intentionally ironic title, “‘BRITISH CIVILIZATION’ — HOWTHE ENG
LISH TREAT PRISONERS OF WAR — BLOWING SEPOYS FROM
GUNS IN INDIA, 1857.” Four prisoners, their arms tied to the sides of can
nons, are about to be executed as rows of British soldiers fill the surrounding
hillside and background. The description explains that
the execution was a dreadful sight. . . . [A] prisoner was bound to
gun
— his back placed against the muzzle, and his arms fastened firmly to the
wheels. . . . The discharge, of course, cuts the body in two; and human
trunks, heads, legs, and arms
be seen for
instant flying about in all
directions. As there were only 10
used on this occasion [and forty
prisoners to execute], the mutilated remains had to be removed four times.
(109)
The editors note that the illustration originally appeared in 1857 but that, since
“the circumstances of the case bear some analogy to those which are recurring
at the present time in our Southern States,” the image has been reprinted. Of
course, the two situations differ — “the natives of British India[,] whose
grounds of discontent with their Government, unlike those of the Southern
rebels,
substantial and grievous, rose in arms to strike for their freedom”
(109) — so while the situations seem to be analogous, the writer makes it clear
that the claims of the Southerners are not justifiable, unlike those of their rebel
counterparts in the East. The real attack here, however, is aimed at the
British, who by way of this ghastly image are portrayed as barbarians, effectively
neutralizing Britain’s protest of the Union’s blockade against the Confederacy:
“In connection with the British protests against the stone blockade, on the
ground of humanity, these reminiscences are instructive” (110). Calling the
British barbaric in war serves to counter British assertions that the Yankee
blockade of the South was barbaric. The image is further juxtaposed with that
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of a recaptured runaway slave, his neck locked into a collar with three foot-long
prongs extending from it. The engraving bears the title, “Instrument of Torture
Used by Slaveholders,” again literalizing by way of illustration who is calling
whom “uncivilized.”
The theme of the savage Confederate is developed further other issues
of Harpers Weekly. John Morgans Raiders merit two large woodcuts in the
same months that the Euro-American settlers of Minnesota were fighting the
Dakota in the West. This simultaneity allows
a kind of rhetorical exchange
or borrowing of imagery; the depictions of Morgans “Highwaymen” in Harp
ers Weekly utilize a range of images most commonly found in captivity narra
tives. In these engravings, the men riding with Morgan swing Yankee infants
by their feet to crush their skulls against trees and buildings; similarly, Mary
Rowlandson had described Native American braves murdering infants by
“knocking” them on the head in her prototypical captivity
Confed
erate guerrillas torture and brutalize children and animals by shooting at or
around them, and lascivious Raiders lead women with downturned faces sug
gestively away. One description accompanying an engraving appearing
August 30, 1862, entitled, “John Morgan’s Highwaymen Sacking a Peaceful
Village in the West,” states the following:
The bond which unites members of a guerrilla band together is love of
plunder, lust, and violence. War, as carried on by civilized armies, has
attractions for them.... Such God forsaken wretches can not found any
where in the world out of the Feejee Islands and the Southern Slave States.
(555; emphasis added).

This writer calls upon the reader’s popular conception of the inhabitant of the
“Feejee Islands” to complete this image of the savage Confederate; in the pop
ular imagination of the period, the Fiji Islands constitute the primary global
e of cannibal activity — cannibals being,
points out, a main 
regrets
fewas Torgovnick
stay of primitive and savage representation.16 In 1872, thirty years after Bar 
num had exhibited his first “Cannibal Chief” at the American Museum and
more than forty years after the first South Pacific cannibal had appeared any
where on display in the American museum circuit, four “Fiji Cannibals”
appeared in Barnum’s Great Traveling Exhibition, “savages” supposedly cap
tured during a raid by a Christianized Fiji king (Bogdan 179-80).
The savagery associated with cannibalism appears in other forms in North
ern depictions of the Confederate. A
months earlier,
had pub
lished a report in its “Domestic Intelligence” column titled, “Our Wounded and
Dead Scalped and Mangled.” Drawing on a letter written by S. R. Curtis,
Brigadier-General, the report states that “the General
that we find
the battle-field, contrary to civilized warfare, many of the Federal dead who
were tomahawked, scalped, and their bodies shamefully mangled, and expressed
a hope that this important struggle may not degenerate to a savage warfare” (29
March 1862; 195; emphasis added). While such a letter points to Confeder
ate-Native American alliances and conflates the “savagery” of Indians with the
“savagery” of Rebel soldiers, reports of more shocking Confederate behavior are
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reflected in cartoons like one that appeared in Harpers: products of “Secesh
Industry” cover the page like artifacts in museum cases, items such as a goblet
made from a “Yankee’s skull,” paperweights made out of Northern soldiers’jaw
bones, furs stitched from scalps and beards, hair-pieces and necklaces made out
of Union teeth, and a doorbell handle constructed from the skeleton of a Union
soldier’s hand (7 June 1862; 368). Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper ran a sim
ilar cartoon a month earlier called “The Rebel Lady’s Boudoir” (see fig. 5). The
featured room is a study in Yankee skulls,
resting under a bell jar
a table
built out of the leg bones of a dead Union soldier, another fashioning a teaket
tle and matching cup, and yet another lending authenticity to a skull-andcrossbones wall hanging. The ironically demure “Rebel Lady” placidly reads a
letter as her baby plays with his very own Yankee skull. The caption, suppos
edly taken from the “Report of the Congressional Committee on the Conduct
of the War,” is

The outrages upon the dead
revive the recollections of the cruelties to
which savage tribes subject their prisoners. They
buried many cases
naked, with their faces downward. They were left to decay in the open air,
their bones being carried off as trophies, sometimes, as the testimony proves,
to be used as personal adornments, and one witness deliberately avers that the
head of one of our most gallant officers was cut offby a Secessionist, to be turned
into a drinking-cup on the occasion ofhis marriage. (17 May 1862; 64)
Here the Northern press writer grafts the popular conception of Indian sav
agery and primitivism onto the figure of the Confederate soldier; just as the
“savage tribes” have used their enemies’ body parts
trophies or left them “
decay in the open air,” so the Southern male — a white male at that — has sim
ilarly used those of his Yankee opponent. In his letter to “my dearest wife,” the
Confederate soldier responsible for furnishing the Rebel boudoir says that he is
“about to add ... to your collection ... a baby-rattle for our little pet, made out
of the ribs of a Yankee drummer-boy” (64).
The northeastern popular press did not neglect to point out the so-called
primitive nature of other, more commonly primitivized
(Native Ameri
cans, Africans, African Americans, and so on). Rather, it extended this classi
fication, primitivizing the figure who most immediately — and dangerously —
threatened the definition of nationality most relevant to its
Even with
out the visible markers of race and pronounced cultural difference, the north
eastern press managed to “other” the Confederate by way of primitivizing dis
course. A
threat to those living the Northern states, the Confeder
ate was depicted as threatening the very concept of civilized humanity, a con
cept for which, as Harper's had already proclaimed, the Union undeniably and
singly stood. Although the African-American slave was often represented as
infantile and primitive, the Confederate soldier was thought to endanger the
civilized boundaries of American citizenry as only the “savage” Sioux of the
western plains could. What is most ironic about these representations, howev
er, is how little they rely
the barbarism of the Southern slavery system to
prove the barbarism of the Southern slaveholder. Confederates were usually
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seen as savage not because they perpetuated the enslavement and debasement of
other human beings but because they threatened the physical well-being and
the national identity of the Union soldier.
The savage as a rhetorical strategy, as I have shown, was used by a
of
communities to benefit their individual causes and strengthen the sense of
community’s borders overall. The western press highlighted the savage nature
of the Dakota in order to
military, financial, and public support for the
ongoing and increasingly hostile movement of Euro-Americans into native
lands. The Northern press used the savage in part to echo these conclusions —
conclusions that had a more immediate effect and relevance in the West than
they did in the East — but moreover extended the domain of the savage to
include the Confederate him- and herself. But the savage for the likes of P. T.
Barnum was valuable in an even more local and individualized way. Savage dis
course as Barnum used it made him a monetary profit; it did so because he
showed not only how “truly” savage the Indian was but how effectively that
“savagery” could be contained by the skillful and courageous white showman.
Barnum relied upon this rhetoric to build a sense of intrigue and danger that,
in turn, created a spectacle worth paying for. Like the writers, illustrators, and
editors responsible for the depiction of the “savage” Indian in the popular press,
Barnum commodified Native Americans to effect his own purpose. Using the
racist rhetoric available to him, Barnum appropriated primitive and savage dis
courses to construct a community over which he represented himself as
singular control. Rather than a national or regionalized community, however,
Barnum constructed a capitalist hierarchy in his freak exhibitions of Native
Americans, a paternalistic and economic relationship that positioned him as the
leader of a group he further defined by using the primitive and savage dis
courses already in
as
of national identity.
In 1843, almost twenty years before the Dakota uprising, Barnum brought
what he called simply a band of Indians from Iowa” to perform war dances in
the American Museum’s Lecture Room. In his autobiography, he notes that
the dances seem to be considered by the Native Americans as “realities” rather
than entertainments and claims that "when they gave a real War Dance, it was
dangerous for
parties,
their manager and interpreter, to be on the
stage” (Barnums Own 126).
Maria Child, who attended one such per
formance at the Museum, described it as “terrific to both eye and ear,” saying
that she “looked at the door, to see if escape were easy” (189). She claims that
she “was never before so much struck with the animalism of Indian character,”
and
her observations with appropriate metaphors: “Their gestures
as furious as wildcats, they howled like wolves, screamed like prairie dogs,
and tramped
buffaloes” (189).17
Beyond emphasizing the reality of the performance itself, Barnum’s strate
gy for showing the Indians was simultaneously to heighten and to contain the
“danger” they posed. He used a rope to draw a physical barrier between the
dancing warriors and audience members, and interpreters and managers to
“handle” the natives much as a circus tamer handles big cats. In all cases, Bar
num represented himself, the white show man, as completely in control of the
Native Americans’ movement. Twenty years after Child visited the Museum,
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Barnum again exhibited a group of ten or so chiefs there. In his autobiography
he recounted his introduction of Yellow Bear from the Kiowas, saying that he
called the chief “probably the meanest, black-hearted rascal that lives in the far
West. . . . He has tortured to death poor, unprotected women, murdered their
husbands, brained their helpless little ones; and he would gladly do the same to
you or to me, if he thought he could escape punishment” (Barnums Own 3345). During this introduction, however, Barnum would pat Yellow Bear “famil
iarly upon the shoulder, which always caused him to look up to
with a pleas
ant smile, while he softly stroked down my arm with his right hand in the most
loving manner” (334). Barnum here depicts himself as shaping the audiences
experience of Yellow Bear by positioning him within a specific narrative and by
maintaining control of that narrative, speaking a language to which Yellow
does not apparently have access. Barnum therefore emphasizes his control of
this “black-hearted rascal” by exploiting both halves of the monster/child bina
ry, telling the story of Yellow Bears barbarism while making him look like a
docile, not-very-bright child. But not only the Native Americans are rhetori
cally contained in Barnums exhibition of them; his audience as well sits with
in his theater, passively consuming the commodified oddities Barnum feeds
them.
Barnum featured Sioux chiefs and their songs and dances again at the
Museum during the winter of 1863, following the execution of the thirty-eight
Sioux warriors in Mankato. During this several-month period, Frank Leslie's
Illustrated Newspaper ran news accounts of ongoing Sioux attacks in Minneso
ta simultaneously with informal advertisements for Barnums shows in entertainment/gossip column called “The Idler About Town.” While
the one
hand highlighting the danger that the Sioux continued to pose to white west
ern settlers — “Towns are still building stockades and block houses for refuge,
and prowling bands of Indians steal and murder constantly” (5 Sept. 1863; 373)
— Leslie's “Idler” column also depicted the chiefs in Barnums employ as “wild
children of Nature” whose “songs and dances are among the most curious
bitions we ever witnessed” (12
1863; 399), and who again according to the
“Idler” deserve to
“the most consistent friends of the white men”
they decided to extend their museum stay (24 Oct. 1863; 67). In an
explanation of a November 14 woodcut, “Sioux Dancing the Scalp Dance,” a
Leslie's reporter remarked that having “a scene like this sent to
illustrated
newspaper in the middle of the nineteenth century seems strange and more
strange when it comes from within the borders of one of the States, and not
from the yet unbroken wilderness. But the Sioux war is still raging” (125).
Such coverage served not only to identify the nation emerging from the “yet
unbroken wilderness” but also to amplify the fascinated fear that Barnum
counted on to fill the seats of his lecture hall in the American Museum. This
fear, of course, was not Barnums own. In fact, what Barnum thought and felt
about the “savages” he displayed was apparently motivated by quite different
forces than those brought out by Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper.
In a letter to Moses
proprietor of Boston's version of the Ameri
can Museum and a close friend, Barnum complained about the Native Ameri
cans who performed at the American Museum in 1843, “5 Indians, 2 squaws,
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and a little [?papoose] five or s[i]x years old” (Selected Letters
Given that
Kimball was to be the next to show this group (“You may as [well] get your
puffs preliminary in the papers,” Barnum told him; “I [?think] that I can let
them leave here Saturday after [noon]”), Barnum related his own experiences
with these supposedly savage “curiosities”:

The lazy devils want to
lying down nearly all the time, and as it looks so
bad for them to be lying about the Museum, I have them stretched out in
the workshop all day, some of them occasionally strolling about the Muse
um. D—n Indians anyhow. They are a lazy, shiftless set of brutes —
though they will draw, (Selected Letters 22)

Despite his “insider” position, Barnum clearly agreed with the general popular
consensus that Native Americans are, as he put it, “brutes.” But for Barnum,
this was not a distinction that helped to separate Northerner from Southerner
or even American pioneer from Indian savage; it was, rather, a distinction
between a cooperative employee who works in tandem with his or her employ
er to attain market-driven goals, and a less complicitous worker who does not
accept the markets — and therefore
capitalist employers — goals as his or
her own. It is, to say the least, ironic that for Barnum, conqueror and controller
of these dangerous warriors, the biggest problem with Indians is that they
“want to be lying down nearly all the time.”
Whether the Sioux war was still raging or not, clearly it was in the best
interests of a number of different groups to believe that it was. For the west
ern press, continuation of the war meant maintaining public support for an
organized move into Dakota lands that necessitated removal of the Dakota
themselves to insure continuing white domination of the area; perpetuating the
idea of
Indian threat to white settlers was the best argument western
cials could make for increasing their share of military resources at a time when
such resources
scarce indeed. In the northeast, however, where concen
trated populations of potential soldiers
greater and the decisions regard
ing the war in the South were primarily being made, the Dakota conflict sup
plied the press with a fresh supply of imagery to delineate further whom and
what Northerners
dying for in the South. If the Union was itself an actu
alization of civilization, then those who had taken a stand against it could only
be uncivilized; to emphasize the threat of secession — in this scheme, literally
a move away from civilization — it made sense to
the Confederate soldier
imagistically with the raping-and-killing savage currently being recirculated as
a result of the renewed conflict in Minnesota. For P. T. Barnum, savagery sold,
as did the self-congratulatory sense of superiority that his largely white urban
audience members saw reaffirmed on the stages of the American Museum.
Behind the scenes, Barnums creation of a community was less driven by
nation-building — itself an economic issue driven by the rush to claim
resources — than propelled by personal gain, but Barnums appropriation of the
rhetoric of nation-building tells us
thing very clearly: in order to be con
structed, America had to be sold.
Americas capitalist economy was begin
ning to take shape and companies competed for patrons, so the image of the
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nation itself was appropriated by competing
each attempting to present
a version of America that would bring its members the most resources, the most
power, and the most legitimate claim to national membership.
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Fig. 1. Courtesy, American Antiquarian Society
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“ The out rages upon the dead will revive the recollections of the cruelties to which savage tribes subject their prisoners. They were buried ia many
cases naked, with their faces downward. They were left to decay in the open air, their bones being earned off as trophies, sometimes, as the testimony
proves, to
used as personal adornments, and one. witness deliberately avers that the head of one of our most gallant officers was cut off by a Secessionist,
to be turned into a drinking-cup on the occasion of his marriage.
“ Monstrous as this revelation may appear to be, your Committee have been informed that during the last two weeks the skull of Union soldier ha«
been exhibited in the office of the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives which had been converted to such a purpose, and which had been
found n the person of one of the rebel prisoners taken in a recent conflict.”—Report of the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War.

THE REBEL LADY’S BOUDOIR.
Lady (reads)-“ My dearest wife, I hope you hare received all the little relics have sent you from time to time. 1 am about to add
something to your collection which I feel sure wil please you-a baby-rattle for our little pet made out of theribs of a Yankee drummerboy.

Fig. 5 Courtesy, American Antiquarian Society
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Notes
An early version of this essay was presented at the American Studies Associa
tion meeting Boston, Massachusetts in November of 1993. The
for
this project was funded
part by a
Development Grant from the
Pennsylvania State University, Wilkes-Barre and in part by Journal x. Thanks
go to Marilyn Grush
Eddie Luster of the Mervyn H. Sterne Library at the
University of Alabama, Birmingham, the staffs of the American Antiquarian
Society — especially Georgia Barnhill, Joanne Chaison, Marie Lamoureux, and
Eileen Rogers — and of the William Stanley Hoole Special Collections
Library at the University of Alabama,
those colleagues and friends who
offered both their criticism
support at various stages of this essay’s compo
sition: Deanna Calvert, Theresa Kemp, and the trusty members of the UAB
Faculty Reading Group — Rebecca Bach, David Basilico, Amy Elias, Mark Jef
freys, and Scott and Nancy
1. Born Robert Carter, Leslie supervised the engraving department of the
London Illustrated News, the model for most American illustrated newspapers,
before coming to America. Leslie then worked for Frederick Gleason on one
of the first illustrated weeklies in America, the Boston-based family miscellany
Gleasons Pictorial Drawing Room Companion. After Barnum sold the Illustrat
ed News to Gleason, Leslie went on to make his own publishing history with
Frank Leslie's Lady's Gazette of Fashion, the first of what would be some fifty
Frank Leslie titles. For more on Leslie, see Stern 180-9, and Mott 452-65.
2. See Balibar; Smith-Rosenberg; and B. Anderson for more on these
ideas.
3.
Courtesy, American Antiquarian Society.
4. For an overview of the freak show’s birth and
as an American
institution of popular entertainment, see Bogdan’s landmark text, especially 2568. See also Fiedler, and Thomson.
5. Barnum’s success as a “humbug showman” of course skyrocketed with his
management of the career of “General Tom Thumb.” While Barnum
entertained himself with periodical publishing, his ties
the publishing com
munity extended beyond his work with the Illustrated News. His hiring of
Frank Leslie as chief engraver for the News and for the American Museum’s
catalog provided
with a stepping stone to his own editorship of the suc
cessful and numerous Frank Leslie titles
probably accounts for the fairly
frequent mention of current shows at Barnum’s Museum Frank Leslie's Illus
trated Newspaper.
6.
Courtesy, American Antiquarian Society.
7.
Courtesy, American Antiquarian Society.
8.
Courtesy, American Antiquarian Society.
9. Zboray argues that as publishers attempted to reach the widest group of
readers possible, particularly in their publication
circulation of a fiction that
was largely formulaic, readers “took on the role of creators themselves, adjust
ing and adapting the meanings of these new commodities, these books, to their
own lives, at first in a very personal
local way,
later in partial confor
mance to the emergent national fictive identity. . . . These readers helped to
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devise the symbolic forms and cultural practices that would allow for the con
struction of a national identity applicable to a diverse people scattered over an
immense and varied landscape” (193, 194). By “fictive people,” then, Zboray
refers to both the fiction-reading public and the identity that emerged from
that practice.
10. Moreover, while a reader in, say, Ohio may in fact have been reading
the New York periodical Frank Leslies Illustrated Newspaper, s/he may not have
been doing so at the same time her or his New York counterpart would have
been; often periodicals
circulated through the mail among family and
friends, a practice that extended a periodical's network of readership and the
time frame in which it might be consumed.
11. Leslie was not always a good Union man. Waiting to take a political
stand in the North/South conflict until 1861, Leslie attempted to work both
sides of the issue until it became impossible for him to continue to
so. See
Mott 459.
12. In
extract reprinted from the London Times, it is noted that the
British find the condition of the South "perilous” but that they remain “
of
hope for the Southern people. Unrecognized, as it is, it has succeeded in mak
ing itself a nation” (Southern Illustrated News, 18 October 1862; 3). The Con
federate writer of the
expresses his or her pleasure that this supportive
remark indicates that “whatever may be the issue to us, each and all, individu
ally, of this unhappy war, we shall come out of it, as a people, if we are true to
ourselves, with the respect of mankind” (4; emphasis added).
13. For a very general introduction to the Dakota Wars, see Schultz. Other
sources include G. Anderson; Anderson and Woolworth; Brown; Bryant and
Murch; Carley; Heard; Namias; Oehler; and Wakefield.
14. Smith-Rosenberg in her treatment of the Republican subject of the
eighteenth century notes that “formal iconographic tradition . . . represented
nations as women” (“Dis-Covering” 869); America was typically represented in
European discourse as a naked Indian woman.
15. Oddly, the Confederate press does not seem to turn the primitive gaze
back on its Northern opponents. Rather, relatively little mention is made of
Northern activities outside of published Northern commentary about the
South, its people and the Southern press; the “Yankee” principles by which
Confederate children may be infected if they continue to consume Northern
texts and philosophy; and, of course, limited reports
the war itself. More
effort seems to go into an overt pronouncement of the ideals of the Confeder
acy
a construction that appears to stem as much from the proclamation
of war as from a set of cultural assumptions regarding what constitutes Con
federate nationality.
16. See Torgovnick 22 regarding cannibalisms role in primitivism, and
Bogdan 179-87 for more
the “Fiji cannibals.”
17. Karcher in her introduction to Childs novel Hobomok notes that,
despite her
ignorance of American injustice to Native American peoples,
Child’s 1828 The First Settlers of New-England “launched a career of cam
paigning against Indian dispossession, crowned forty years later by her eloquent
Appealfor the Indians (1868)” (xxxiii). Child disparages the spectacle that Bar
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num made of the Indians she saw at the Museum and in Letter 36 of Letters
from New-York claims that

it always fills me with sadness to see Indians surrounded by the false envi
ronment of civilized life; but I never felt so deep a sadness, as I did in look
ing upon these western warriors; for they were evidently the noblest of their
dwindling race, unused to restraint, accustomed to sleep beneath the stars.
And here they were, set
for a two-shilling show, with monkeys, flamin
goes, dancers, and buffoons! If they understood our modes of
well
enough to be aware of their degraded position, they would doubtless quit
it, with burning indignation at the insult. (187)
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A careless shoestring, in whose tie I see a
wild civility.
—Robert Herrick

STARTING ON A SHOESTRING
Exhibit One: Andre Jones1

At 4:10 a.m. on Saturday, August 22, 1992, police
bring Andre Jones, 18, to the Simpson County Jail.
He is detained on a series of charges including carry
ing a concealed weapon, violating the city beer ordi
nance, possessing a stolen 1991 Chevrolet extended
cab S-10 pickup, and altering the
identifica
tion number. Early Saturday evening, Jones express
es his concern to one of his eleven cell mates, Garri
son Spann, that he might have to serve time in prison
if convicted. Spann says he doubts it, that probation
is a more likely punishment. At 11:15 p.m., Spann
and another inmate spy Jones’s half-clothed body in a
corner stall of the shower, his hands down by his side.
Spann says to Jones, “Hey dude, you can’t take a
shower with your pants on.” Spann touches him.
“He kind of pulled back,” Spann remembers. “Felt to
me like he had moved.” Spann leaves. He returns
when Jones still has not come out of the shower.
Then it dawns on Spann that something isn’t right.
In the short time of twenty hours, on the same Sat
urday in the same cell in which he was first placed,
Andre Jones is discovered dead. Simpson County
Sheriff Lloyd Jones announces to the press that
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Andre Jones hanged himself with a black shoestring from one of his Nike hightop sneakers. According to preliminary reports, Jones tied one part of the shoe
string to the chrome shower bar, the other part to his neck. He squatted so as
not to break the tension, cut off his circulation, and suffocated himself to death.
Spann, who slept beside the shower door, says no one else passed by him, and
he discerned no struggle. The sheriff also reports that no evidence indicates
that Jones was slain. Early results from the autopsy reveal death by asphyxia
tion, showing no bruises other than the mark around Joness neck. It seems an
open-and-shut case of suicide, starkly consisting of fiber, metal, flesh, and will.
Yet Andre Jones’s family members question the shape and nature of Jones’s
sudden death. “We’re in disbelief that this has happened to our son,” says his
mother, Ester Jones-Quinn. “We are very much angry at the injustice he has
received.” Jones’s mother and stepfather, Charles X Quinn, order a second
autopsy performed. Mrs. Jones-Quinn says her son was not despairing when
she spoke to him during the brief time he was in jail. At a news conference,
their attorneys, Chokwe Lumumba and Barry Howard, contend that Andre
Jones was murdered. Lumumba declares that "authorities at the Simpson
County Jail” are the primary suspects. Lumumba says that Jones was murdered
for two reasons: his race, and the prominence of his parents within the black
community of Mississippi. Jones’s mother is president of the Jackson branch of
the NAACP, his stepfather the minister of the local Nation of Islam mosque.
Lumumba says that Jones’s parents are “not liked by racist authorities of the
state and they are not liked by racist authorities who work for the state.” Nei
ther the parents nor the attorneys trust in the ability of the local officials to
administer justice. An FBI spokesman reports that the bureau will conduct “a
preliminary inquiry into the events surrounding Jones’s death.” This inquiry
later backs up the local authorities’ ruling of Jones’s death as a suicide. Yet the
family persists, hoping for answers that will conform to their expectations.
They find them in the report of Dr. James Bryant of Chicago. Hired by the
Nation of Islam, Bryant performs a second autopsy. He concludes that Andre
Jones’s hanging was not a suicide but a “classic textbook case of murder,” part
of a canon of race murder in Mississippi with which it is in historical continu
ity.

The Sublime Skein of Pain
Your pain is the breaking of the shell that encloses your understanding.
—Kahlil Gibran

The dispute over Jones’s body can best
described by terms introduced by
Elaine Scarry in The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. In
vivid, well-documented accounts, Scarry describes how the infliction and
avoidance of pain respectively destroys and creates human reality. The deconstructive force Scarry calls “unmaking” is a disintegration of human
achieved
both the infliction of physical pain and the fragmentary, unstable,
and manipulable means of describing such inflictions. It is the process by
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which reality becomes completely embodied, both by intense pain and by the
accompanying destruction of language. The political consequence of pains
problematic expressibility is that the body becomes not only the target of ide
ology but also the limit.
If Andre Jones
lynched, then the hanging would conform to Scarry’s
notion of unmaking. His death by hanging would conflate pain with power in
a way that is crucial to the concept of unmaking: language would fail to artic
ulate or represent either pain’s subject or its referent. What Andre Jones’s pain
expressed, or whether it ever even
at all, is a mystery, part of the legacy
of doubt engendered by any account of pain. For Andre Jones, jail hanging may
have been a somatic form of cultural criticism, attesting to the incontestable
reality of the pain and torture of Mississippi jails. But as Scarry would predict,
the “language” of this hanging event is not entirely clear. You cannot be sure
what the hanging is “saying” about the pain of the inmate. This linguistic prob
lem calls into question the source and
of Jones’s unmaking.
Scarry’s work emphasizes the importance of reading the body as a text, a
valuable approach to the story of Jones’s death. The posture of Andre Jones
emphasizes the body in a way that cancels the contents of the world: the sus
pension of a body from the shower bar, dangling like fruit, fleshy, pulpy, a liq
uefying solid. The human involved is reduced from a sentient being into a mere
body, matter, the object of gravity’s pull. In the case of Jones, a single shoe
string unmakes the made, for in his world shoes were both a possession of sta
tus and a position of plight, as in “I wouldn’t want to
in your shoes.” His
hanging synthesizes each connotation so that the plight of pain becomes objec
tified and he becomes, like a shoe, something that dangles from a string. Andre
Jones the sentient being disappears and is represented by a black Nike hightop
sneaker, the kind young urban blacks sometimes kill for.2 Because of shoes,
some urban teenagers kill others; by means of shoes, do some jailed urban
teenagers kill themselves? Andre Jones did not kill for shoes but instead died
by means of them, his Mississippi-made body transformed into both a shoe and
a field of crisis. Unfortunately for Mississippi, however, the hanging of Andre
Jones has the appearance of bearing the antecedent state insignia of lynching.
“Making” is a more diffuse term in Scarry’s lexicon than unmaking.
According to Scarry, pain is the prima materia, the first matter, the psycho
physiological substance out of which all expressive efforts are born. In the
nature of pain lies the key to understanding both human creativity and human
destructiveness. All forms of human creativity arise from the initial problem of
articulating physical pain. The body finds signs and signifiers to represent, sub
stitute, alleviate, or preempt its pain. Scarry labels such solutions as makings.
According to Scarry, the interconnectedness of pain and creation is as present
in a pencil, a chair, or an artificial heart as it is in the Federalist Papers, the Mar
shall Plan, or the Old Testament.
Could this same interconnectedness also be seen in a jail hanging? Scarry
does not say. Puzzlingly, the deliberate assumption of pain through martyrdom,
masochism, flagellation, or suicide is excluded from her
Yet throughout
human history, suicide has been variously described in terms of both making
and unmaking. While “unmaking” explanations for
far exceed those of
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making, writers such as French drama theorist Antonin Artaud have described
the creative potential of suicide: “If I commit suicide it will not be to destroy
myself but to put myself back together again. By suicide, I reintroduce my
design in nature, I shall for the first time give things the shape of my will” (57).
Scarry views violence mainly as a matter of wounding the body or bodies of an
actual or perceived human enemy. By contrast, suicides do not fit neatly into
the category of either victim or interrogator but instead house them simultane
ously in one body. Scarry excludes this possibility of enemy and victim being
one and the same. Because of its strange conflation of the experiences of injur
ing and being injured, suicide marks an exception to Scarrys definition of
unmaking. Though the result of suicide inevitably involves modification of the
body, the fundamental goal of suicide
not be to wound at all. In fact, a sui
cide may be more significant in its alleviation of spiritual pain than in its cre
ation or expression of physical pain. Thus,
does not completely fit the
“unmaking” models of war and torture that Scarry provides in her book.
According to Scarry, pain is alleviated by means of making, and suicide may
be one of the few acts of creativity available to jail inmates. The meaning lies
in the making. The interpretive challenge of jail suicide is this: given that
makes pain the point of departure for acts of making and unmaking
alike, and given that a jail hanging is a departure achieved through pain, should
we see that departure as an unmaking? A making? Both? Neither? Does the
significance of a jail suicide lie mainly in what is unmade or what is made?
Before these questions can be answered, however, you must decide who was
responsible for the hanging itself, a determination of “authorship” that has
political as well as narrative implications.
The uncertainty of Andre Jones’s death produces radically different ramifi
cations depending upon whether you interpret Jones’s hanging as a lynching or
a suicide. Whatever you believe his end to changes the way in which you see
his world, and yours. If Jones
lynched, his Mississippi incarceration can
be read as
act of revenge performed by and before the scrutinizing eyes of
modern surveillance. If Andre Jones committed suicide, he did so without
either a dramatic rhetorical moment or a suicide note, thus forcing you to make
sense of his death, drawing you into
world,
cell. If Jones’s hanging is a
suicide, then it is a strange and extrinsic interstice between making and unmak
ing, as all suicides are.3 By resisting the urge to determine and dictate the
meaning of his death, Jones has insured that he will be heard. He imposes no
meaning, but still “imprisons” you within a text, a world of his own (unmak
ing, a world which soon
peopled with the texts of other hanging bod
ies.
Using the shoestring of Andre Jones as an Ariadne’s thread,
reporters from the Jackson Clarion Ledger revealed forty-three more hangings
in the labyrinth of Mississippi’s city and county jail system from 1987 to 1992.
During this period, the suicide rate for Mississippi jails alarmingly doubled,
from 3.5 to nearly seven per year. They occurred in thirty-five counties, with
an almost even distribution of black and white males, an equal number of black
and white females, and ages ranging from 14 to 58. In part because of the bit
ter dueling over the reading of the Andre Jones hanging, the authorities’ solid
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consensus that all forty-four jail deaths were open-and-shut cases of suicide
came completely unhinged. On April 13, 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno
announced that the Justice Department would make a thorough inquiry into all
Mississippi jail hangings. After stating that the number of deaths was unac
ceptable, and that the investigation would get to the bottom of the question,
asked with obvious incredulity, “How could that many people die?” By the
end of 1993, the number of hangings in the states jails reached forty-nine.
Before issues of authorship could be resolved, the national media immedi
ately tied these hangings to other twentieth-century episodes of violence that
became symbols of the state. The media-imposed prehistory of the recent
hangings begins with the lynching of Emmett Till in 1955 and is followed by
the bloody 1962 riots when James Meredith entered Ole Miss, the 1963 mur
der of Medgar Evers, the 1964 murders of Michael Schwerner, James Chaney,
and Andrew Goodman in Neshoba County, the shooting of James Meredith
during his 1966 walk from Memphis to Jackson, and the student killings at
Jackson State in 1970
highway patrollers and city police. Certain Mississippians and many of those who follow stories from the state read the jail hang
ings typologically, as revisitations of evils previously witnessed, previously
fought. The suspicion that unconstitutional conditions of confinement may
have
a major role in the latest violence sounds a theme of the injustice
of
and the discrimination against people common to all of these critical
Mississippi texts.
But the truth of the recent rash of jail hangings is not self-evident, because
the disputed source of their power makes the ritualization of truth impossible.
These hangings do not exhibit continuity with the historical narrative in sever
al important ways. First, in none of the other violent actions was self-immola
tion even a possibility; the civil-rights-era individuals who died in Mississippi
were almost all murdered. The jail locations themselves also differ from the
other prominent sites of Mississippi violence: most of the civil-rights-era riots
and murders occurred in open, outdoor places such as public roads or publicly
funded college campuses, whereas the recent rash of hangings all took place
inside the cramped and secluded confines of jail cells. Because jails are also
publicly funded extensions of the Mississippi judicial system, the recent vio
has in some sense again been underwritten by the states taxpayers. But
the jail hangings seem perhaps even more incriminating, because they imply an
even greater systematic suffocation of human rights, perpetrated upon individ
uals more at the mercy of the state than most poor
of the Delta
ever were. The jail hangings have violently terminated the due process of law
in which an inmate's arrest would normally lead to his
or exonera
tion. Arrests typically
against the will of the individuals, who are tem
porarily detained by coercive means that are at least implicitly painful. Jail
hangings, then, irrespective of their cause, can also be
as
a shift
from temporary to permanent detention. As such they are the ultimate betray
al of habeas corpus, upon which the hangings punningly signify. All in all, the
story, regardless of the ending you provide, is unique in Mississippi history.
Deaths in penal institutions can be of extraordinary significance.
of
prison conditions and prison death helped
Mississippi and much of the
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lower South. The death of Robert Castell in Fleet Prison inspired James
Edward Oglethorpe to attempt to reform the English prison system and later
to provide a haven for the deserving poor in the colony of Georgia (see Baine),
which included the land mass of what is now the state of Mississippi. While
the recent Mississippi jail hangings may not inspire so grand a design as the
creation of a new colony, they do reveal a great deal about the shape and nature
of jails in Mississippi as well as the concessions a subject makes, and does not
make, when placed inside a jail.

Deconstruction of the Fables

Stories with uncertainties can be read and even resolved without devolving into
stalemated rancor. Truth must be pursued circuitously, beyond the rigid realm
of historical objectivity. This suggests that the task of reconstructing and eval
uating the critical moments in the history of the jail hangings
demand an
imagination open to both literary and historical insight. Three particular jail
hangings offer a breadth of interpretive
Andre Jones, David Scott
Campbell, and Ronald B. Berryhill. While these three narratives cannot be
considered to offer unmediated reality (as represented here they depend heavi
ly on newspaper reporting), they are nonetheless a powerful reminder that the
facts of the story are grounded in the actual hanging deaths of forty-nine jailed
men and women. By exploring three prototypical hangings, you may be able to
see certain patterns emerge about the subject and significance of jail hangings
in Mississippi.
The only common denominator you are provided with at the outset is the
repeated deed of hanging inside Mississippi jails. Along with “Mississippi,”
which will receive explicit attention later, the two words of paramount impor
tance here are “jail” and “hanging.” Both are commonly used as nouns and
verbs, which is significant. A jail is “a facility under local jurisdiction of coun
ties or municipalities which lawfully detains inmates awaiting trial or sentenc
ing, or serving terms of typically less than
year” (Deheer 71). The focus
here will
exclusively on jails rather than prisons. The basic distinction
between the two is that jails almost never have reformatory goals. Their pur
pose is purely to incarcerate those who have committed or have been accused of
committing crimes. A jailing demands a mutual acquiescence to a specific
hegemonic order. Concessions are made but are limited. There is a locking, lit
erally and ideologically, into conditions both defined and indulged by the jail
er.
A hanging is the act and result of killing
a suspending by the neck.
There is a sense of perpetuity contained within the concept of hanging derived
from the quality of suspending, which connotes physical movement and a lack
of movement as well as uncertainty. Hanging strictly implies neither murder
nor accident nor suicide but includes all three judgments, since the subjects,
whether voluntarily or not, are made complicit in their deaths by their own
weight, the mass of their bodies feeling gravity’s pull. As a jail hanging, you are
held up and strung up indefinitely. You simultaneously evoke a bringing into
and a nullification of your existence.
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The suspensory and therefore contingent nature of hanging suggests that mul
tiple readings of the hangings should be discerned and scrutinized for their
plausibility. Because every aspect of a prisoner’s life in jail is regulated and con
trolled by jailhouse authorities, it is not surprising that “unmaking” interpreta
tions have permeated every aspect of this Mississippi story. But by far the most
sensational and widely explored of these unmaking-oriented explanations are
the theories of lynching.
Billie Holiday once sang in haunting protest to lynching, “Southern trees
bear strange fruit.” She sang out against those who shed the blood of their
neighbors. The recent Mississippi hangings occur in the forbidding metal
wood of the state penal system. The new southern trees are jails, their limbs
and branches shower bars and bunk beds, their fruit
equal distribution of
black and white bodies. In the context of these jail hangings, a lynching inter
pretation can
loosely defined as a conspiracy theory that claims that direct
or indirect actions of Mississippi law enforcement officials resulted in the hang
of the detainees. Lynching has one great narrative advantage over all rival
interpretations: it can exploit a ready-made paradigm by constructing these jail
deaths as an historical and symbolic continuation of past regional injustices,
including slavery. From the South Carolina Regulators to John Lynch’s Pittsylvanians to the present, lynchings have been an accepted and characteristic
part of the criminal justice system in the South (Bodenhamer 22). The invo
cation of lynch
was a vigilante form of law enforcement which usually
usurped the role of the formal authorities and often resulted in the hanging of
the individual or group considered lawless. Many of the victims of lynching
kidnapped from jail cells where they were awaiting legal arraignment
and/or prosecution; black prisoners especially have served in this way as cheap
signifiers of white southern power and authority. Mississippi earned a reputa
tion as a setting of domination for the tide of savagery unleashed upon the
black population there. In southwest Mississippi in the 1890s, Whitecappers
terrorized blacks and merchants as a result of agricultural depression. Accord
ing to the NAACP’s Thirty Years of Lynching In the United States, 1889-1918,
Mississippi ranked second over this period in terms of the number of lynchings
with 373 victims, 94 percent of whom were of African origin.4
Since prisoners are citizens, and since citizens are ostensibly the beneficia
ries of the guardianship provided by the state penal system (by jailers and their
when anyone dies in a prison or jail by
other than natural causes,
the state has
to perform a basic custodial function. This failure is per
fectly summarized by Dr. Bryant, who performed the second autopsy on Andre
Jones at the request of his family. Bryant said that regardless of whether the
death of Andre Jones was a homicide, “the guy goes into jail not convicted of
anything and winds
dead” (Clarion Ledger, 17 March 1993). Once you
admit that governments are responsible for their inmates, you can begin to
challenge jail deaths, not only as failures of the system but sometimes as per
mitted, desired, and/or deliberately engineered failures. This conclusion
becomes more credible when the frequency of jail deaths increases to many
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times the norm. Injustice is a social offense of the powerful, and a plethora of
prisoner hangings occurring in state, county, and city penal institutions does
indeed appear as an injustice for which sheriffs and other jail overseers are cul
pable.
Lynching theory’s major flaw is less its factual plausibility than its tenden
cy to answer the questions surrounding the jail deaths a priori and in a manner
that
only a small amount of the overarching text
Lynching
theorists advance as the ur-text of the recent hangings the 1964 deaths of
Schwerner,
and Goodman, which as
have seen have glaring differ
ences from the forty-nine jail hangings. As an explanation for the jail hang
ings, lynching theory is a contemporary misapplication of Mississippi civilrights history.
Lynching theorists deny all the inmates in question the capacity for selfassertion, assuming their complete innocence, robbing them of the potential
authorship of their own “texts,” both their own bodies and the narratives that
follow the actions on and of these bodies. Lynching theorists discount the pos
sibility of suicide because they believe that the act of suicide, both inside and
outside of jail, indicates a submission to (white) power. Dr. Bryant, for
instance, was reading Andre Jones’s body not for the victim’s story but for a
story of victimization. If Jones were a suicide, then the reading of his hanging
as a lynching would amount to a theft of authorship, a near cousin to Roland
Barthes’s famous “death of the author.”
thefts occur when control over
meaning is stripped away from the text’s actual author and conferred upon
another human source. In the specific case of the jail hangings, such an inter
pretive move would take advantage of the fact that hanging is part of the clas
sic structure of lynching. Lynching interpreters may recapitulate this theft of
authorship by reading the hangings in the light of their own subjective concerns
and then putting their reading to their own personal uses. An overemphasis on
civil-rights events of the past creates the probability of a misreading of present
events that may only have similar surface appearances.
But the single greatest problem posed by a theory of lynching is the lack of
mobs. Most of the forty-nine hangings occurred in the deep of night, between
watches, away from the probing, accusing eyes of guards, some of whom were
too afraid even to walk down jail halls after “lights out.”5 At least in the larg
er urban jails of Mississippi, the jail cell is an unlikely site for an inmate lynch
ing by jail authorities. In the present Mississippi jail story, you have a con
stituency considered “lawless” (irrespective of their criminal status) in the fortynine inmates, a constituency that indeed winds up hanged, but you do not have
either the vigilantes or the justification for vigilantism as a
of commu
nity values. This is a crucial absence.
With the investigation of Andre Jones and the other black inmate hang
ings, perhaps the would-be reformers of Mississippi hoped that the ghosts of
the past would be forever exorcised. But a conspiracy theory that ignores or
distorts factual data is less a hypothesis than a form of rage, an emotional
method of explaining the sources of the author’s own misery. This theory has
abstracted the villains, so that all of white Mississippi is implicated as a mob.
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Deficiencies
If a soul is left in darkness, sins will be committed. The guilty one is not he
who commits the sin, but he who causes the darkness.
—Martin Luther King, Jr., quoting Victor Hugo

For the vast majority of prison inmates, opportunities to criticize or even
change the system are beyond reach. This may even more true ofjails, which
have less structural and cultural cohesion than prisons, due largely to smaller
populations, higher inmate turnover rates, and architectural differences such as
smaller cells and enclosed cell blocks with long halls. Two major revelations
these jail hangings produced were the insufficient suicide-prevention proce
dures and the gross physical inadequacies of Mississippi’s city and county jails.
These two
form a second category of other-inflicted deaths, one that
overlays suicide: deaths by deficiencies. Deficiencies can broadly divided into
those of place and those of procedure. Deficiencies of place include architec
tural problems such as poorly designed cell blocks or structural flaws such as
hooks, and vent pipes from which a person can easily hang himself or her
self. Deficiencies of procedure include errors such as the single celling of sui
cidal inmates, the lack of mental health training for jailers, and the lack of sui
cide-prevention standards. Not surprisingly, Mississippi was found to be terri
bly deficient in both place and procedure.
In May of 1993, the Justice Department launched a formal investigation of
the eighteen Mississippi city and county jails alleged to have the worst facili
ties. The investigation, conducted through July, included “on-site inspections
of each facility, a critique of jail procedures, review of suicide incident reports,
and interviews with both staff and inmates” (Hayes 2). The conditions in all
eighteen facilities
found to be substandard and in violation of the US
Constitution. In Jones County, the inspection team called the county’s 56year-old facility “unfit for human habitation
to its pervasive filth, serious
state of longstanding neglect and significant deterioration” (Clarion Ledger, 20
October 1993). According to a New York Times article, the Justice Department
found that plumbing flooded waste into cell blocks in some
The same
article reported that inspectors at the Sunflower County Jail found “
stalls crawling with roaches and insects,’ maggots around toilets and wash
basins, and rodent and roach droppings in stored food” (New York Times, 10
December 1993). Inadequacies at other jails ranged from racially segregated
drunk tanks to life-threatening fire hazards. All eighteen facilities were cited
as having grossly inadequate
prevention procedures. The overriding
consensus of this unprecedented investigation was that the jail conditions in
Mississippi were utterly deplorable: the Mississippi government had not only
theoretically posited that even alleged criminals were the detritus of society, they
had reinforced their belief system literalistically: with jails cells that flooded
with human excrement and crawled with vermin. Investigators blamed much
of the problem on a lack of state jail standards and inspection programs, for the
only state-wide oversight for jails in Mississippi is the fire safety inspections.
Currently, the only local mechanism for reviewing jails is the county grand jury.
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But did any of the deficient entities — guards or jails — actually kill the
prisoners? If the implied message to prisoners housed in cells infested with
maggots is, “You are already dead in the eyes of society,” then does this message
release these inmates of all responsibility for their own actions? If you hang
yourself in a jail that is not “suicide-proof,” are you absolved and is the jail at
fault? Returning briefly to the case of Andre Jones, the height of the shower
bar from which Jones’s body was found was measured at 7 1/2 feet, not the eight
or nine feet reported by Dr. James Bryant. This would eliminate the need for
a chair or step stool (Jones had access to neither) and thus increase the proba
bility that his death was due to his
alone rather than to the will of others.
his
jailsused could
by
in
lynchings,
o, Bryant maintained that the wis
shoelaceyour
Jones
not support his
estimated weight of 160 pounds. According to Nike officials quoted in the
Jackson Clarion Ledger, the minimum tensile strength of their shoelace is 150
pounds and the maximum 175 pounds. If Jones’s feet were on the ground, as
has been argued
Dr. Steven Hayne, the Brandon pathologist who first ruled
that Jones committed suicide, the shoelace would be supporting significantly
less than
entire body weight. According to medical examiners at the Wayne
County Jail, “It’s not necessary to have complete obstruction of a victim’s air
way for death to occur. Two kilograms of pressure is required to stop the flow
of blood to the brain. An adult’s head equals three kilograms. So, enough pres
sure is exerted if the victim simply stands, sits, or lies down” (Charle 52). The
Simpson County district attorney, a grand jury, the US Department of Justice,
the state attorney general, and the US Armed Forces Institute of Pathology6
have all concluded that Jones committed suicide.
No factual data has been presented by a credible body that supports the
argument that any of the forty-nine jail hangings were
or that the
environmental or procedural deficiencies of the
were primarily responsible
for the deaths of these inmates. Yet these theories have thrived in the fecund
fields of injustice and unmaking in Mississippi history. Though prisoners hang
in jails all across this country, illusory theories of conspiratorial unmaking
needed Mississippi to take root and flourish.
The elemental ability of the body to negate itself through suicide renders to
the marginalized not only access to external trappings of physical power but
primal power over internalities, physical and psychological authority over their
very bodies and minds. In this respect it is like other basic civil rights defined
in bodily terms: eating restaurants, drinking from water fountains, excreting
in rest rooms, kissing, and copulating. If all the jail hangings are not coerced
deaths, then they reiterate what most people, both black and white, do not want
to hear: you cradle the power to unmake
life almost any time that you
h.



Exhibit Two: David Scott Campbell

Late on the night of October 9, 1990, Philadelphia, Mississippi, police officer
Richard Sistrunk and his partner, Greg Donald, respond to a call from the
Philadelphia Apartments requesting an investigation of gang activities there.
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They find an African-American male, David Scott Campbell, 21, crouching in
the bushes behind the complex in an area with the inimitable name of Shakey
Ground. When Sistrunk and Donald run their routine check, they discover
that Campbell has two outstanding arrest warrants, including a felony assault
charge stemming from an incident in Meridian. They arrest him and bring him
in to the Neshoba County Detention Center just before midnight. Because
Campbell has been drinking and is behaving aggressively, Sistrunk places him
in the holding cell known as the drunk tank. Before leaving, Sistrunk promis
es to let Campbell use the telephone if he calms down. Sistrunk then spends
an hour with Donald patrolling businesses where a blown transformer has left
much of the downtown area, including the jail, buried in prophetic darkness.
At one a.m. on October 10, Sistrunk returns to the drunk tank to fulfill his
promise. There he finds Campbell, one hour after he was locked up, dangling
by his blue jeans from a cell bar approximately six feet off the ground, his life
less head leaning forward into the crude noose. In a sworn affidavit, Neshoba
County jailer Richard Jones says that he saw “Campbell’s pants were off and
had tied one pants leg around a cell bar and the other around his neck. Camp
bell’s belt was laying [sic] across his shoulder and did not appear to have been
used
Campbell to hang himself.” Dr. Steven Hayne, former state medical
examiner, performs the autopsy, finding no cuts or bruises on Campbell’s body.
He rules the cause of death as strangulation, the type of death a suicide.
Street talk quickly pounces on the news of the hanging. Campbell was cas
trated, his tongue was cut out, his body was riddled with welts from beatings.
say he was killed in the darkness of his cell. Others say it must have hap
pened before he was brought to jail.
Campbell’s friends and family refuse to believe the medical examiner’s find
ings. David’s aunt, Edna, claims that the autopsy failed to report a large bruise
on Campbell’s head and a split lip. Campbell’s father, M. C., says he will go his
grave believing
son didn’t kill himself. Calling the Philadelphia police,
grand
and FBI investigations a big charade, M. C. Campbell files a $1.5
million lawsuit against both the Neshoba County sheriff and jailer Richard
Jones, claiming his son’s death was not a suicide. He says his son had no rea
son to
He was never lonely. He had a lot of girlfriends. One of
them, his father believes, was his undoing. “He was
the police depart
ment for dating a white girl,” M. C. testifies at a hearing organized by nation
al civil rights groups.
David Scott Campbell was apparently dating a white Philadelphia woman
named Nikki Griffin at the time of his death. Griffin is the daughter of Union,
Mississippi, patrolman Dwight Griffin. The father claims
to have
inquired into the nature of Campbell’s friendship with Nikki.

Crouching on Shakey Ground
More than most of the Mississippi jail hangings, Campbell’s text contains a
motive for murder (alleged miscegenation), a historically regarded scene of
unmaking (Neshoba County), an imbalance of power favoring the regime of
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law enforcement, and an antagonistic relationship between the deceased and
local law authorities. The tragic death of David Campbell indeed appears
for a verdict of umaking, murder. On the other hand, every law-enforcement
and independent agency that has studied Campbell’s case has ruled that suicide
was the cause of death.
But is it
that at least one of the forty-nine subjects who
via hanging came to
or her end incidentally rather than intentionally? In
other words,
one of the inmates have known very clearly that he or she
was going to die but have been pursuing the annihilation of something other
than the self? Remember that the word “hanging” can imply an accident as eas
ily as it can an execution, a lynching, or a suicide. Jails are sites
complex and
plural readings, especially where contested hangings occur. The incidental
death category marks the first opportunity to explore a more imaginative or cre
ative interpretation of the jail hanging as a mythic and literary act of inciden
tal annihilation through intentional civil disobedience.
Southern Samsons
"If I had my way, I would tear this old building down.”
—Blind Willie Johnson, "Samson and Delilah”

Perhaps the most relevant paradigm for such a performance is the death of
Samson. In the biblical version, located in the book of Judges (ch. 13-16),
Samsons story is a myth about a young Israelite of extraordinary physical
strength who breaks the prohibition against intermarriage and marries a daugh
ter of the enemy Philistines. A felon in the eyes of both his own people and his
inimical in-laws, the warrior Samson is captured by
of
loses his
source of strength, is blinded and finally jailed. While incarcerated, Samson’s
strength of faith and physique returns, but the curse of sin upon him remains.
He recovers his subjecthood in jail but can triumph over his keepers only
through his own death. In the biblical version of the story, the tragedy lies in
the doubleness of Samson’s death: Samson is rewarded for his final pledge of
revenge
ty and
for obedience to God by a return of his
strength sufficient to slay his
enemies, but while vanquishing the Philistines he is also punished with death
by God
betrayal and infidelity. The biblical story is a beautiful allegory
of lost honor and pride, and the extremity of
permitted an avenger of
God for the restoration of spiritual as well as personal stature.
The Samson story forces you to confront definitions of suicide. On one
hand, you can argue that Samson’s remark “I shall fall into the hands of the
uncircumcized” anticipates his own incarceration at the hands of his enemies
(Judges 15:18, Revised Standard Version). His famous demand, “Let me die
with the Philistines,” is alternately described as a form of resignation and as a
prayer. John Donne persuasively argues in Biathanatos for a reading of Samson
as a suicide. Both Augustine and Thomas Aquinas rebuke Samsonic suicides
as theologically unjustified (Pojman 44). But many scholars and writers have
argued that Samson is driven not by a wish to die but by a motive of revenge.
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His death is incidental, even accidental. The most persuasive of these voices is
John Milton, whose Samson Agonistes poses “questions of the distinction
between inadvertent self-destruction and suicide” (Radzinowicz 102).
One of the better readings of Samson Agonistes proposes that Samson is
unwillingly self-killed. Though ignorant of the exact outcome of his actions,
he maintains freedom of choice even as he pulls down the temple. The fault of
the tragedy lies within Samson; responsibility is not ceded to the Philistines. In
marrying Dalila, Samson has betrayed not only God but also himself. Deliver
ance is a major theme of Samson Agonistes, not merely Gods delivery of Sam
son from slavery by death but Samsons delivery of himself. During the play,
Samson transforms himself from a blind, diseased, and irrational man into a
man of mental clarity and inner peace. Jail becomes his “
of Liberty”
(949); the power and glory he achieves in his moment of greatest weakness and
shame is the last in a series of ironic reversals that Milton employs throughout
the play.
Samson knows that in some profound way he has been made into a scape
goat, a sacrifice. The turning point of the play, and the scene most relevant to
the Mississippi hangings story, occurs when the Public Officer comes to
retrieve Samson to perform at the feast of the Philistine Lords. Samson refus
es the summons:
Where outward force constrains, the sentence
But who constrains me to the Temple of Dagon,
Not dragging? The Philistian Lords command.
Commands are not constraints. (1369-72)

The officer, as an instrument of the states force, is unaccustomed to such
tance. Samson eloquently declares to the officer that while the Philistine state
possesses force, it does not possess authority.
later dupes the officer
into believing he has changed his mind and is willing to obey the commands of
the Philistine state. At their temple, with everyone believing he
entertain,
Samson defeats his oppressors with
weapons other than his bare
hands. With a heroism at once stark and swift, he prevails through divinely
inspired strength of
and becomes himself again: “Samson hath quit himself
/ Like Samson (1709-10).
The Campbell hanging can be understood as an example of an emerging
psychology in which the dominant myth is the Samson story. What makes the
myth and the Mississippi reality so compatible is that each is open to readings
of intentional and unintentional self-killing; nor does the ambiguity of either
displace its underlying political implications. Certain of these Mississippi jail
hangings have a Samsonic quality about them — where a kamikaze attack on
(the architecture of) the enemy comes at the sacrifice of self, where death is not
a violation but rather a fulfillment of the Samson code. The image of a body
suspended from the ceiling — as if acting in concert with gravity to pull down
the structure itself— suggests that the technique
function as a way to “take
down” or assault the architectural and institutional structure of jail. If so, then,
as with Samson, the individual power of the oppressed and incarcerated not
only endures, it may even triumph.
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The hanging of David Scott Campbell is the most Samsonic death of the
forty-nine, and the unexpected reversal in his
is quintessentially Mil
tonic. Like Samson, Campbell was a criminal. His feats of strength consisted
mostly of a series of felonious acts. As an African American from rural Mis
sissippi, he was breaking a long-standing taboo on interracial dating by seeing
Nikki Griffin, his Dalila (sleeping with the enemy may have been a significant
contributing factor to his downfall). Campbell was handcuffed and taken into
custody by Griffins people (here the jailers-as-Philistines theme resonates par
ticularly well because the prisoner was African-American and the state repre
sentatives were European-American). Even Campbells intoxication may
seen as an experience on the order of Samsons blinding, as the idiomatic
expression “blind drunk” might suggest. If so, the hour in which Campbell was
incarcerated proved to be the hour in which he led himself out of his dark, dun
geon-like state. The police found Campbell in darkness, crouching on Shakey
Ground. They arrested him, a man who had been a thorn in their side for sev
eral years. They brought him under the commandments of their laws. They
isolated him. But before they left him, Campbell made a telephone request that
insured that a public
would return for him. Was the need to use the tele
phone deliberately misleading, an equivocation designed to give Campbell the
time to plan an attack upon the fortress of his enemies?
In his hour alone, Campbell no doubt confronted his own state of power
lessness. Through what can described as either an act of
or divine inter
vention, the light of the jailhouse was extinguished. But in that darkness,
Campbell's sight seems to have been restored, along with
strength and an
understanding of how best he could damage his enemies. When the jailhouse
was again illumined, Campbell was discovered hanging. Both representative
and performative of pulling or tearing the building down, Campbells gesture
(and the furor it raised) did in fact wound the enemy and its architecture. At
least the reputation if not the actual structure of the Neshoba County jail is now
in shambles because David Scott Campbell tore down the walls of his enemies
and died in the process. The Campbell family filed a $1.5 million wrongful
death lawsuit against the sheriff and the jailer that is still pending in Jackson.
Because of the “chorus” of media publicity surrounding Campbells death, other
jails throughout the state have been shut down. At least one is certain to be
demolished. On this reading, David Scott Campbell has posthumously
emerged as a victorious agent against the injustices of Mississippi.
Incidental self-killing theories
active interiority on the part of the
dead subjects. They force you to determine what the intentions of the subjects
were, pulling you away from motives and categorizations of suicide and exteri
orizing antagonistic forces, and focusing the subjects aggression against an
abstract “other” represented by the jail. What is most appealing about this the
ory is the heroism and subjectivity with which it endows the inmates in ques
tion, the way it links their
and motivations to the results that the hang
produced: the closing of uninhabitable spaces, the building of better jails,
the scrutinization of Mississippi’s entire jail system. Thus the hangings acquire
a prophetic function, influencing and redirecting Mississippi history. The
revenge that they accomplish implies justice in a story largely marred by repeat
ed accusations of injustice
both sides of the making/unmaking question.
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What you call something matters. It confers a particular kind of identity
and authority upon the thing named. Whether you call the forty-nine hang
ings lynchings or suicides will additionally assign sovereignty to particular
actors involved in the drama (and not to others). The territory in hot dispute
is political and intellectual, but at its core it is solidly somatic: the corpses of
forty-nine men and women. To call them suicides is to confer an
sov
ereignty on the inmates, assigning them the individual freedom and might to
have been directly responsible for their deaths. This assignment of sovereignty
is precisely what was so disturbing to many of the inmates’ loved ones, because
it appeared to obscure or excuse the responsibility of other people and institu
tions (by intent, neglect, or design) for these deaths, letting them “off the
hook.” But there is much more to this sovereignty than the exculpation of oth
ers or the appropriation of
unsettling taboo power on the part of the
inmates. As suicides, the hangings resonate in affirmative, exhilarating, con
ceptually complex and sublime ways.
KILLING TIME
Could a whole man not author
own death with a thought? Shut
ventricle like the closing of an eye?
—Cormac McCarthy

the

There are always suicides among people who are unable to say what they mean.
—John Irving

The Mississippi jail hangings have been classified as suicides by many organi
zations that have not provided a definition of what suicide is. Emile
Durkheim’s 1897 definition is a standard starting place, but Durkheim provid
ed a theory of suicide rates, not an explanation of suicide itself. Durkheim’s
definition does not delineate subcategories of self-inflicted death, such as mar
tyrdom or heroic self-sacrifice, and excludes much of the inner dimensions of
agency: intent, motivation, thought, and emotion. Pojman offers a more con
cise and useful definition of suicide as “an act in which a person intentionally
brings about
or her own death in circumstances where others do not coerce
that person to act. That is, (1) death is intended by the agent, (2) it is caused
by the agent, and (3)
one else is forcing the agent to this killing of self” (42).
If the freedom of the individual is severely limited, or if the fear is paralyzing,
then the self-destructive act cannot be authentically suicidal. Pojman’s defini
tion
also have significant implications if the context or locale of a self
destructive act seriously inhibits personal freedom, such as a jail.
The mean age for all forty-nine inmate deaths was 29.5. Five major stud
ies have reported a mean age between 28 and 29 for jail suicides (Stone,
“Means” 50). Every jail death in Mississippi was by hanging, and hanging is
considered to be one of the older, more violent methods of suicide. And while
there are many ways to commit suicide in jail, Hayes and Rowan report that
hangings account for over ninety percent of all jail suicides nationwide. Pris
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oners recognize that jail bars always represent a potential hanging site (Anno
90). Guards and inmates have diametrically opposed semantic interpretations
of the word “bar.” For guards, a bar is a barrier to prevent inmate escape, while
for suicidal inmates a bar may be a place to fasten and hang themselves, a means
of nihilistic escape from their side of the bar, thus “crossing the bar” (as in
Alfred, Lord Tennyson’s famous poem) without
crossing it.
Suicide is both a validation and an invalidation of life, an expression of cri
sis and
effort to resolve crisis. It is an invisible institution, an uncivil reli
gion of self-denial and self-affirmation. The rash of jail hangings in Mississip
pi and the publicity surrounding them have helped reveal this aspect of self
destruction as a normative form of communication. What is being communi
cated, however,
further elucidation.
Exhibit Three: Ronald B. Berryhill

Thursday, November 11, 1993. Ronald B. Berryhill, a 43-year-old white male,
has been jailed at the Hinds County Detention Center since St. Patrick’s Day.
The Batesville man is being held on capital murder and armed robbery charges
in the March 12 slaying of Richard Lamonte, 36, a clerk at the Junior FoodMart Shell Service Station on Springridge Road in Clinton. Though inmates
have reported that Berryhill is “acting strangely,” according to Sheriff Malcolm
McMillin he has said nothing that would indicate that his behavior is abnor
mal for a man confined for months. Berryhill has, however, missed dinner
Wednesday night and given away several personal items to fellow prisoners that
evening.
Ronald Berryhill plans his final hours carefully. He makes his bed. He
stores the rest of his gear neatly in a bag
the floor near it. He ties a part of
a sheet to the middle of the door of his cell, 310-B. He squats and leans for
ward and suffocates himself to death. Sheriff McMillin will later point out that
Berryhill has even tied the sheet so that he can change his mind any time about
proceeding with the hanging. According to Hinds County Coroner Robert
Martin, Berryhill’s body shows no sign of a struggle.
Berryhill’s cell is a one-man unit with no contact and only a limited view of
the block’s other inmates. Guards look in on prisoners every hour. At 4:15 a.m.
Berryhill is found by officers Joe Broadway and Craig Stevens. The body is
warm when discovered. Stevens attempts CPR but fails to revive Berryhill. He
is pronounced dead on arrival at Mississippi Baptist Medical Center at 5:15
a.m.
Martin
the death a suicide, making Berryhill the third inmate to hang
himself while in McMillin’s custody. The sheriff says he is
with the
officers’ performance and routine and has no plans to change jail security. “I
’t see anything
could have done to prevent
But
matter how many
times I say that, the fact remains that he was in my custody. It’s my responsi
bility. ... If we had any indication he was suicidal, we
have increased
checks or put him in more secure quarters. But we didn’t know.”
If convicted of capital murder, defined as killing during the commission of
certain other felonies, Berryhill would have faced life in prison or death by
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lethal injection. Armed robbery, with which Berryhill was also charged, carries
a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

PAIN: An Alternative Methodology
Suicides
the aristocrats of death — God’s graduate students, acting out
their theses to prove how limited
the alternatives He had allowed Him
self and his creatures. Their act was, at its best, superb literary criticism.
—Daniel Stern

Psychological and sociological perspectives dominate the contemporary analy
sis of inmate suicides.7 This seems reasonable enough
the face of it given
the complementary domains addressed by the two schemes: the inner workings
of the self on the one hand, the external pressures of the social environment on
the other. Yet both paradigms seem insufficiently attentive to the more mak
ing-oriented dimension of the jail hangings, threatening to obscure or preclude
altogether the creativity and subjectivity present in those acts. Both also seem
to cast the inmates in passive roles, as the objects of forces beneath or beyond
the purview of conscious awareness and volition. Clearly, however, a truly com
prehensive framework for interpreting the will to die in Mississippi jails should
be adaptable enough to venture beyond the reigning paradigms and to explore
a number of other salient contexts that suggest themselves, including philosoph
ical (new ways of thinking about freedom), artistic (volitional craftiness and a
contagious creativity), institutional, even nomological (challenges to the systems
and laws of the state). These four categories in particular are not as arbitrary
as they might seem, for as it turns out, they remap the conceptual field of
inmate suicide in a way that offers distinct advantages over the more tradition
al dual framework. Specifically, the philosophical, artistic, institutional, and
nomological models — which it would not
inappropriate to give the
acronym PAIN — form a composite frame of
that provides greater
comprehensivity and at the same time greater refinement than the existing
binary approach. Moreover, as
soon be evident, this alternative methodol
ogy permits a greatly enhanced sensitivity to the making-oriented aspects of
suicide.
Philosophical Hangings: The Open Door
Has it smoked in the chamber? If the smoke is moderate, I will stay, if it is
excessive, I go
for you must remember this and hold it fast, that the door
is open.
—Epictetus

Suicides pose a potent challenge to power that is a problem not only for jails
and penitentiaries but also for philosophers. Most philosophical discussions of
suicide center
the definition of the act and whether or not it is a rational or
irrational, moral or immoral modality of thought and behavior. From this per
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spective, the principle questions posed by jail suicides are: if being in jail is the
result of coercion and excludes or seriously compromises freedom of choice,
then can self-destruction that results from the fear and despair of incarceration
be truly considered suicide? Are jail hangings morally acceptable or unaccept
able? Jail suicides may indeed be a proof of guilt, but whose? Are they acts of
creation or acts of resistance, or
both? What are you to make of these
assertions of freedom in institutions designed to limit such acts? Are the
nihilistic implications of the acts consistent with the penal environments or
subversive of them? While the philosopher Immanuel Kant argues that
“Human beings are sentinels on earth and may not leave their posts until
249).
suicide
one
As
negative
by
another
hand” (quoted " in Pojman
45), Kant’s argument seems
evedfreedom.
choose
inconsistent when you are not the sentinel but the watched, not guard but pris
oner.
Suicide is one of the very few open doors in a jail or a prison. In Western
cultures, the idea of suicide as a making goes at least as far back as the Stoics,
many of whom considered self-inflicted death to be the supreme assertion of
human
The Stoics believed that knowledge is inseparable from pain
and suffering. Seneca argues that contempt for one’s body is a sure sign of
freedom: You can open up the road to freedom with a lancet, and give tran
quility at the price of a pinprick” (Rist 130). Such an attitude toward the body
is far removed from the ideas of Scarry, for the Stoics would deny that the body
is the exclusive or even primary site of human meaning. Yet both would agree
that the body is essential to the reading of
as either a making or an
unmaking. For Stoics, the ability to be a co-worker with fate and to choose the
manner of one’s own death is the highest kind of freedom (Rist 130). If Sto
icism is thus
of the earliest philosophical justifications for Western suicides
as acts containing an element of making, we should note as well that its under
currents run deep in the prison mentality.
with the Stoics, suicidal inmates
possess a
concept of freedom. They
suicide as the final vindica
tion of their freedom, the only genuinely free act remaining for them. They
link a negative concept of freedom with “an obsession with the possible means
by which freedom can be obtained” (Rist
Such views may
grounded
in sharp hatred of life itself. Freedom in jail is the state in which you cannot
be forced to act. By hanging yourself in jail, you commit your last free act, and
you put an end to any and all coerced ones.
In some of the three exhibits, you can see a rather Stoic resignation on the
part of jailers and law enforcement officials who regard suicide as a matter for
the prisoners to decide for themselves. But Stoicism is also at work behind the
actions of the prisoners. In Raymond Berryhill’s ritual of death in particular, a
curious muffled echo of the Phaedo comes to mind. Berryhill’s brave and quiet
demeanor evokes that of Socrates. In his death the Stoic code of honor was rig
orously upheld. He made his bed and packed his things away. He was cautious
and considerate enough not to wake his fellow inmates. In the respectful eyes
of Sheriff McMillin, Berryhill killed himself with the highest degree of deco
rum and honor available to him in a jail cell,
he hanged himself in such a
manner that he maximized his freedom to
between living and dying.
McMillin too upheld his part of the code by both acknowledging the practical
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impossibility of preventing Berryhill's suicide and at the same time accepting
full responsibility for his death. This sheriff’s verbal dance shows how jail sui
cides simultaneously contest and support the categories of making and unmak
ing. Do jail hangings give up their lives because of the world they inhabit or
the world they have lost? The
would probably include a measure of
both possibilities. The meaning with which the subjects have endowed their
world is lost in the primal tyranny of the jail, which
if not completely
unmakes that world.
Time has long been a topic of metaphysics, and inmates
perceive the
philosophical contexts of time as a contributing factor in their unmaking. In
jail, an overwhelming emphasis on time — doing it, serving it — has the para
doxical effect of exposing its subjects to the
irrelevance of the future and
the fatal impact of time on the body: you die. Jail
grotesquely exag
gerates both “doing time” and undoing it, while the suspensory nature of a jail
hanging represents both a prolongation of time and a cessation of
Artistic Hangings
Let us begin then by considering hanging as a fine art. A great American crit
ic has stated that art of the highest or finest quality involves three things.
First, a reproduction of natural phenomena[,] second, an expression of the
thoughts and emotions of the artist, and third, an embodiment of both these
features in an external product,
a symphony, a poem, a painting, a build
or a statue. Or a hanging, I would add.
—Charles Duff

Why do most modern scholars and cultural critics dismiss the creative compo
nents of suicide, and insist upon interpreting all suicides, in general and in jail,
as acts of unmaking exclusively? Albert Camus is the shining exception, a man
with the courage and vision to explore the intrinsic creativity of suicide. In The
Myth of Sisyphus, Camus writes that “suicide has never been dealt with except
as a social phenomenon. On the contrary,
are concerned here, at the outset,
with the relationship between individual thought and suicide. An act like this
is prepared within the silence of the heart, as is a great work of art” (4). Camus
argues that both suicide and art need interior silence to flourish. Jails seem
especially well-suited to provide a milieu where such silences can be produced.8
What Camus implies here is that
itself
in fact be construed as a
great work of art, and he convincingly explores the artistry inherent in suicide
in The Myth of Sisyphus.
For centuries, suicide has been acknowledged as a high art form, arguably
by the Stoics but without question by the Japanese in hara-kiri or seppuku. In
both Stoic and Japanese cultures, suicide has a different class resonance from
that of the Mississippi hangings, for in the former a method of self-immolation
sword is employed primarily by elites. By contrast, hanging yourself has had
a lower-class connotation since the eighteenth century (Miller 73). The Mis
sissippi jail hangings do not possess the ritually formalistic and conventional
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ized structure of Japanese suicide. Whatever artistry is present is self-taught,
its materials consisting of found or made objects.9 The suicides’ artistic impro
visations would lie within the method of dying, rather than the impulse to die:
anyone can wish to die, but to kill yourself in a space designed to keep you alive
demands imagination. The stresses and extremities of the jail environment may
even awaken a desire for artistic expression inherent in the
prior to
incarceration, a desire to be realized in the medium of self-cancellation. If, as
Scarry argues, pain obliterates language, the institutionally focused, perfected
pain ofjail may obliterate nearly all forms of creative activity, leaving the inmate
nothing to “speak” with save the obliteration of self.
Though hanging may clarify reality for the jail artists, it should not be
thought of as a form of therapy; for the normative healing function of therapy
is moot in the wake of the subject’s death. Nor should the jail hangings be
thought of as what is often pejoratively called “victim art.” In their grotesque
recovery of agency, as subjects of their own deaths, the inmates do not capital
ize on their victimization but actively reject and speak back to it. Their cre
ativity is revived through their work, but not in a self-promoting or self-aggran
dizing fashion.
Jail hangings evade the pressures of compliance and conformity in most
ingenious ways,10 and their evasive, transgressive, and subversive qualities
interpretation of the acts as art. Art of course can be judged as product and as
process. Either inside or outside of aesthetic evaluations, jail hangings meet
Duff’s somewhat dated criteria for judging art.11 By artificially terminating
life, the suicides reproduce the natural phenomena of dying. The texts certain
ly express the thoughts and emotions of the artists, though they cleverly and
frustratingly leave much of the interpretation of these expressions to their
immediate and later audiences. But the real tour de force of the hangings, what
makes them so beautiful and so terrible, is how fully they embody their art.
Jail suicides perform the art of self-negation. A convict who commits sui
cide out of the depths of despondency is an artist enacting a dream of expres
sive freedom upon his or her own body. In the complex creativity of these
forty-nine men and women, you
see a reenactment of the whole history of
human thought and art, a history in which great thinkers took the given, the
known, and found in it something new, in
artistic leap of the human mind
from known to unknown. They perceived another form of sleep in their bed
sheets.12 They found a new way to wear their old jeans.13 They challenged the
engineers from Nike in testing the tensile strength of their shoelaces. Their
transmogrifying acts are the making of metaphors, their occupied and impro
vised nooses the bridge from known to unknown. These “signifying” prisoners
were driven by necessity to turn need into imagination. They were tricksters,
emerging as trickster figures so often do wherever there is
abuse of power,
defiling the sacred, taking power from the oppressor. Despite being trapped by
the negation of their paradoxical art form, all are symbols of the creative
impulse, using their art to alleviate pain, which for Scarry is the crowning pur
pose, achievement and signature of the human imagination. In this respect
they embody a universal truth of art in a beautiful and horrifying aesthetic of
need.
see these forty-nine men and women in this way is to recognize the
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extent to which they died from openness and courage, suspended and stiffening by their own creative acts, driven to become living/dying tableaux.
No better example exists in which one body can truly be both creator and
destroyer than a suicide, especially a jail suicide. The
to be nothing and the
absence of will come together in a startlingly profound and performative way
— perhaps even a theatrical
for it may be that all self-violence in jail is
designed for the subsequent
of an audience. This makes it poten
tially vulnerable since it needs to be witnessed to be validated as art. In large
part because of the debate over their authorship and their journalistic depiction
as unmakings, the Mississippi jail hangings have not been presented to a pub
lic audience as works of art. Once revealed as makings, however, the power of
their iconic imagery rises before you. It speaks of stillness, of liminality and
resistance. This is more than giving the finger to the establishment, or burn
ing the flag, this is offering a dead body as an installation piece in a disciplinary
space designed to be utterly devoid of artistic expression. The subjects have
created art that refuses inert
that demands analysis and criticism, as
well as the affective responses of disbelief, anger, horror, revulsion. They exhib
it works that will have to be violated and destroyed, that must be taken down
by jailers and forensic specialists to examine and deconstruct. Insofar as they
anticipate the violation of their own artifice, they force those who take them
down, who tamper and desecrate and critique their art, to appear as barbaric as
the bludgeoner of Michelangelo's “Pieta.”
Read as artistic texts, these jail hangings play a transformative role once
envisioned only for high
They may even invoke the religious iconog
raphy of the original sacrifice of Christ on the cross.14 Though their work will
hang in a museum — unless jails become museums or museums become
jails — they demand artistic acknowledgement, and upon receiving it they are
even more beyond cooptation, emerging as one-of-a-kind masterpieces of indi
vidual expression in an age when other works can be
copied, com
modified, put on T-shirts and peddled to a mass audience.
Hanging
thus be viewed as the fruit of human ingenuity, an art form
that proliferates in the spaces of jails. As
or makings, hangings reveal
something about the uncertain liminal universe of jail. You confront a repre
sentation of death whose medium is also death. In this sense, jail hangings are
far more radical than snuff films, where there remains uncertainty whether the
death depicted is
actual death or
a cleverly packaged dramatization.
Snuff films offer a representation of death in which the medium is only
rumored to be death, though the viewer cannot ever know. Jail suicides are pro
ductions of radical commitment, inspiring awe, horror, and respect; snuff films,
on the other hand, produce radical undecidability and perhaps even a strange
aesthetic pleasure accompanying their indeterminacy. Jail suicides make art
whose principles are alien to established norms; they are deaths external to soci
ety, and at the same time, as you shall see in the following two sections, at the
very heart of
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Institutional Hangings: By Design and Decay
Whensoever any affliction assails me, mee thinks I have the keyes of my prison
in mine owne hand.
—John Donne

Stone describes jails in the United States as 'one of the most maligned and for
gotten components of the criminal justice system” ("Jail Suicide” 84).
more vividly than riots, stabbings, and sit-down strikes, penal suicides remove
jail from abstract consideration and reinsert human actuality in the picture.
They
direct evidence of the absence of conditions amenable to life. The
stressfulness of jail, the chronic, quotidian peril of living in jail or prison, may
in itself be a sufficient cause for self-injury.
The first question institutional perspectives can
address is absolutely
critical: why did the jail suicide rate in Mississippi suddenly and significantly
jump the mid-1980s? Two strong explanations exist. First, jails and prisons
became seriously more overcrowded during this time than during the previous
decade. Because of the overcrowding of prisons,15 Mississippi officials were
forced to house state prisoners in county jails, prisoners who lived for months
at a time in a state of limbo, uncertain of their status in the state penal system.
The second explanation lies within the states propensity to jail the mentally ill
without charges, a trend which began to accelerate in the late 1970s. Nation
ally, Mississippi ranks second to another southern state, Kentucky, in the per
centage of jails holding mentally ill people either not
charges or facing
trivial ones. According to a national study, an astounding 75.9 percent of
in Mississippi held such prisoners.16 The abuse of
as makeshift prisons
and mental hospitals is epidemic primarily because legislators and citizens
appear unwilling to fund the expansion of such facilities.
Jails have long been locations of important state activities in Mississippi.
Political fire-eater Theodore Bilbo launched his 1915 gubernatorial campaign
from an Oxford jail cell, where he was being held for contempt of court. Hun
dreds of voter-rights demonstrators
arrested and jailed for their political
protests in Mississippi during the 1960s. But there does not have to be such an
overt presence as these for jails to be scenes of intensely political acts. The most
subversive and transgressive acts that have taken place in Mississippi in the last
twenty years are the inmate hangings.
According to Copeland, "The need for society to jail certain of its members
has evolved with time. Historically, the nature of the incarceration has changed
from one of pure punishment to those including rehabilitation with return to
society of the offender” (341). But Mississippi has had great difficulty making
the transition from penal labor to a less utilitarian view of its prisoners (see
Griffiths), and the state has been
reluctant to remove an overt puni
tive element from its correctional facilities. Indeed, in 1994, the state legisla
ture considered a bill to allow caning as a punishment for certain crimes.
In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault offers
of the best explana
tions of the social and historical contexts in which modern penal institutions
emerged. Foucault argues that incarceration lies at the heart and soul of the
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modern state, the crucial site for the totalitarianism of the norm. Breaking the
law is always
attack on the
of the state. A jail cell is inherently
isolating, a constant reminder that you are alone, naked before the overwhelm
ing power of the
A prisoner is objectified, a case to supervise, examine,
manipulate, and coerce.
The peculiar dialectic of the jail lies at the heart of community organiza
tion. All jails invert, or turn inside out, the conventionally narrated social sym
bolism of “insider” and “outsider.” If you are placed “inside” a jail, you are
immediately defined in both socio-political and symbolic terms as “outside”
your own community. You are, at least temporarily, labeled an alien,
out
sider. However, if you are “outside” the jail, you are defined
those same
terms as “inside” your community or larger polity. To be locked inside a jail by
the boundary rules of law immediately brands you as marginal, illicit, wrong
doing, while simultaneously
the public to define itself as good and on
the right side of the law by locking itself outside of that marginalizing space.
Often the jail, rather than the courthouse, is the most obvious symbol of
the dominant regime in Mississippi towns. The sheriff (or “high sheriff,” as he
is often called in blues songs), whose office is often in the same building as the
jail, is a more visible symbol of the law than most judges. The association of
jails with pain has long been a standard theme Mississippi blues songs, such
as Rubin Lacy’s “Mississippi Jail House Groan”:
Eee
in my jail now: with my back turned to the wall
And she brought me coffee and she brought me tea
And she brought me everything: now but that lowdown jailhouse key
Mmm: Mmm
I promised not to holler now: now mama now hey hey
I looked at my mama: and I hung my head and cried
If my woman kills me now: lord I’ pray to

The non-verbal expressions of “ ” and “mmm” echo Scarry’s notion of
unmaking, in that they signal in their shrieks and groans a destruction not only
of language but of articulable psychological content, a prologue to the disinte
gration of the singer’s world. The recent jail suicides seem to recognize, as Lacy
did before them, the central paradox of so many Mississippi jails: though it
often lies literally at or near the center of civic life, the centralized space of the
jail defines and enacts marginality. At the heart of the law-abiding universe lies
a black hole of pain and unmaking that is the jail.
Foucault shows how embedding
into the structure of a house
of incarceration is the architectural first step in a process of punitive making
that ironically renders prisoners into malleable sites for the application of
power. As much about the birth of the prisoner as about the birth of the prison,
Foucault’s convincing work describes prison incarceration and disciplinary
techniques outside of prisons as purposefully designed to create and mold a real
or potential delinquent’s individuality in a socially productive and appropriate
way: to produce “docile bodies.” (Re)making in jails and prisons is often
unmaking in disguise, wearing the mask of discipline: “Discipline makes indi
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victuals: it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as
objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault 170). Foucault views social
scientists as auxiliaries to the criminal justice system in that physical or psy
chological examination of prisoners is another form of assault, an affirmation of
masked power. Foucault goes one step further, however, in explaining the ratio
nale for this violence: the life of a criminal must be valued and put to demon
strable use so that a regime can maintain hegemonic power over the masses.
As structural embodiments of the state will, jails represent a will that is
crumbling, one that suicides demonstrate to be short on infrastructure, “back
bone.” Most of Mississippi’s jailed inmates live in structures that are falling
apart before their very eyes. Jail hangings might be read as a grotesque visual
pun on the institutional goal of producing docile bodies. And if jail is indeed,
as Foucault claims, a school
crime, then hangings give an especially subver
sive spin on commencement exercises.
It is important to remember that the purpose of most jails is not to reform
but merely to incarcerate. All but one of Mississippi’s hangings took place in
jails or detention centers, not prisons, and Foucault’s ideas have greater rele
in the latter than in the former. Prisons punish, whereas jails only hold.
Lacking this punitive modality, jails may become places ripe for dangerous con
templation. So that the softer, less scrutinizing, and less punishing jails
become, the higher the rate of
be.
The Justice Department’s investigation and critique of Mississippi jails sug
gests that too little institutional watching — not too much — contributed to
the inmate’s unmaking. Law enforcement officials today constantly complain
about what they cannot see; more efficient panoptical control, they imply,
would help prevent inmate suicide. From the perspective of the forty-nine
inmates, however, the crucial acts of watching are those that follow hanging
rather than those that prevent it. The inmates knew, even desired, that they
would be watched. In this way, the jail hangings subvert the whole idea of
institutional watching, exploiting it to hang not only themselves but ultimately
the state as well. They simultaneously say “why didn’t you watch?” and “just
watch this!” As acts of flagrant resistance to and contempt for surveillance, they
thumb their noses at the technological marvels of open tiers and observation
towers, offering physical proof that total panoptical control is little more than
an establishment fantasy.
Foucault also stresses that penal institutions strive for an ideal of an inter
rogation without end. But inmate hangings turn the tables on jails and jail
authorities, interrogating the jails without end, asking the authorities, “Why
did your prisoners die? How
you have prevented these deaths?” The
hangings have caused the same interrogative tools and punitive techniques to
be used against the system that the system used against them: the arsenal
wielded by an army of technicians, policy wonks, and lawyers. The jail hang
ings have labeled the jails, not the prisoners, ill, unstable, delinquent and dan
gerous. As a result, many of the jails and some of the jailers have been disci
plined, punished, and reformed. Foucault correctly points out that it is the
power of violence rather than the application of law that prisoners
and
this holds true in the rare instances when power shifts from guards to inmates
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(Foucault 266). If the inmates hanged themselves, then their power is “beyond
discipline” — a dangerous and potentially self-defeating message coming from
a states penal institutions.

Nomological Hangings: Martyrdom in Mississippi
I am killing myself to
my independence and my new terrible freedom.
—Feodor Dostoevsky, The Possessed

According to Lester and Baker, “Many people kill themselves, or attempt to kill
themselves[,] partially in response to legal problems. Suicide is common in jails
and prisons, often in those who have been incarcerated for relatively minor
offenses” (78). The writings of Robert Cover can best establish a nomological
context and purpose for the jail hangings. Cover, in an article entitled “Vio
lence and the Word,” offers the devastating observation, “Legal interpretation
takes place in a field of pain and death” (1601). Legal acts impose violence on
others and are built upon “commitments that place bodies on the line,” com
mitments of and by officials that are realized in the flesh (1605). Cover intro
duces the topic of the law’s imposition on bodies through a discussion of mar
tyrdom, rebellion, and revolution as violent refusals to accept in a shared phys
ical space the normative future imposed by a dominant power.
Monelli v. Department of Social Services (1978) established that local gov
ernments could be sued for violating the rights of police suspects and jail
inmates (Winfree 642). This is one way of fighting back at a system as defi
cient as Mississippi’s, using the oppressors’
to your
by turning it
against them. Another method requires taking the law into your own hands
and becoming a secular martyr: “Martyrs insist in the face of overwhelming
force that if there is to
continuing life, it will be not on the terms of the
tyrant’s law. Law is the projection of an imagined future upon reality. Martyrs
require that any future they possess will be on the terms of the law to which
they are committed” (Cover, “Violence” 1604). Are the jail hangings an exam
ple of Mississippi martyrdom, a dramatic reconfiguration of what Cover calls
the nomos, the normative universe? Construed this way, suicide would become
almost an obligatory act, an imaginary triumph in the face of the overwhelm
ing injustice of the state’s jails, literally the creation of a new kind of order.
Because pain and
are law’s field, even routine legal acts either
imply the infliction of pain or are grounded in the potential to inflict it. Cover
shows that you cannot separate legal interpretation from punitive violence.
From the perspective of a defendant or prisoner, the legal judgment is “an expe
rience of being violently dominated, and it is colored from the beginning by the
fear of being violently treated” (Cover, “Violence” 1608). What is it about
being arrested and locked up that
some subjects want to disavow state
law for the undeterrable
to self-violence? If the suicides are rejecting a
particular form or understanding of law by means of their suicides, what under
standing of law are they offering in its place? Is it that the legal order mobi
lizes
and that
suicide a prisoner attempts to mobilize law for dif-
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ferent ends? Many of the subjects were not sentenced by Mississippi courts, yet
their
detention was already part of the field of pain and death in which
they would have been judged. Indeed, four of the juvenile inmates who hanged
themselves were illegally detained in adult jails, without bond or bail, in direct
violation of federal regulations.17
Undoubtedly, the continuum of legal violence begins well prior to legal
conviction. Suicides anticipate being marked by the state’s judicial system and
defy submission to it. The forty-nine suicides tended to
early in the
tenure of the inmates, suggesting that they immediately and reflexively resisted
displaying the attitudes necessary
survival in the hierarchical structures of
the penal system. They were unable or unwilling to lose their capacity to think
and act autonomously. They were freshly disgruntled and had not yet con
trolled their inhibitions against violence. While inmate beatings
with
unfortunate frequency, most prisoners are not abused this graphically. And yet
merely to
guarded is to be dominated by the law. And to be dominated is to
be beaten, defeated.
Because of its civic prominence and cultural centrality, the jail is a core site
for "normative mitosis,” a concept Cover introduces in his article “Nomos and
Narrative.” Cover cites several insular American groups such as the Amish and
Mennonite communities to demonstrate this idea of normative mitosis, where
“a world is turned inside out” by acts of creative resistance to the existing nomological order; “a wall begins to form,” delineating an alternative vision of law
with an integrity and coherence of its own; but
whose very legitimacy looks
different “depending upon which side of the wall our narratives place us on”
(“Nomos” 31). Cover points out that the legal order of the United States, and
indeed that of most democratic forms of government, is founded upon the con
sent of individuals to a social contract; acts such as secession are revolutionary
responses to a legal order grounded in such principles. In this context, jail
hangings can be read as revolutionary normative responses to the legal order,
revolutionary ways for the accused to redefine the social contract forced upon
them, a contract that in its existing form mobilizes violence against them yet
denies them the right to mobilize a similar violence against themselves and to
bear personal responsibility for that violence. They are legal acts, where
lence is imposed by a judge located not outside but inside the body of the
accused. Jail hangings are a form of legal interpretation that expresses a will
ingness to die for an understanding of a normative future far different from that
of the dominant power. They express a longing for, and to a very real degree
create, an alternative normative structure and architecture, allowing the inmates
to feel at home within the alien space of jail, where they can invoke the reas
suring intimacy of “dressing,” “sleeping,” and “showering,” even while
grotesquely parodying these activities. On this view, jail hangings are
ulti
mate display of normative mitosis. Indeed, one might even suggest that the
very “ ” of the jail divides, for the ideal unity of prisoner and cell that disci
plinary techniques have as their goal is forever broken in
by the physical
and metaphysical weight of the inmate’s lifeless body. Where physical space
under the control of the legal system once circumscribed the corporeal space of
its subject, that latter space is now defiantly reclaimed as the autonomous and
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arbitrary universe of the individual. Moreover, the subject will physically sep
arate from the cell upon the discovery and removal of the body, a final disturb
ing division, a rapture and rupture of the old order.
The violence against the government of Mississippi implicitly performed by
a jail hanging can be read as a revolt against the violence implicit in the law
itself. Thus hangings throw into question who the oppressor is: the subjects
themselves? The jailers? The jails? The law? Whatever the answer, jail hang
ings indicate a strong commitment to live or
a nomos other than that of
the state of Mississippi: namely, the dignity, honesty, and sovereignty of a pure
form of American individualism. Inmate suicide is a singular act of subversion,
both a renunciation and
enunciation of violence. It says to the practitioners
of law that you will tolerate no legal acts of pain and violence upon your body
other than your own, and it says to the body that you are allowed through selfviolence to remove yourself from the threat and imposition of violence by oth
ers, to put your body on the line in the articulation and defense of a normative
world.
Cover argues persuasively that “legal interpretation is either played out on
the field of pain and death or it is something less or more than law” (“Violence”
1606-7). The inmate suicides, however, raise the nagging question of who gets
to play Cover's game. Legal jurisdiction does not acknowledge the self-can
celling properties of inmates, yet it can
fully extinguish them
Even
the terminal self-judgments of the jailed are pronounced independent of any
state-appointed official or court of law. For the Mississippi sheriffs who had
hangings forced upon them, jail suicide is the crisis point at which the relation
between state power and the individual subject is threatened with inversion.

Billy Holliday s famous song “Strange Fruit” at once captured and indicted the
whole ineluctable racial heritage of the South. With a singular strength of
voice and conviction of heart, Holliday sublimely contrasted the vigilantism of
lynching and its “strange and bitter crop” to the gallant southern landscape with
its lush pastoral scenery. Through the haunting beauty of her singing, Holliday
was able to “harvest” black southern lynchings of the 1930s and 1940s for a
national audience, reaping jazz genius and political outrage from those bar
barous acts. In recent times, Mississippi has produced fresh fruit from new
nooses. But these contested jail hangings look more
estranged than strange
fruit. The associations and relationships of the forty-nine prisoners to their
respective guards, families, audiences, and selves were severed by a single ques
tion: whose nooses? Beneath this question lay both a bitter argument over
authorship and the inherent complexities of jail
itself. Now that these
forces of estrangement have been descried with the help of theories of both
unmaking and making, it is at last possible to harvest the fruit of these Missis
sippi jail hangings.
Unlike the anonymous victims of Holliday's song, all forty-nine inmates
became subjects of national scrutiny, ending at least temporarily the invisibility
of the jailed and the jails of Mississippi. Outside observers examined both, ask
ing, “Whose justice is this?” In 1992 and 1993, when the authorship debate
was at its most shrill, few seemed to recognize that answers resided not only
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within the forty-nine inmates but within every jail inmate who ever wished to
resist, criticize, or
back to the state, only to discover that he or she had
the means literally within his or her grasp. These jail suicides were revolution
ary epiphanies, “eurekas” of creative expression which erupted from the inmates
in question and exposed jail incarceration to an unsuspecting public as a violent,
violating, and yet vulnerable arm of the law.
Through their hanging art, the forty-nine inmates ironically may have been
trying to vanquish the very lynching theories that many of their family mem
bers have so vocally
This possibility may be most unbearable to
those who first raised the authorship issue. Jail suicides force government
administrators and the public to acknowledge that while incarceration can
remove an undesirable from the privileges, benefits, and responsibilities of soci
ety at large, it denies an inventive individual very little in terms of the potential
for criticism, subversion, and resistance. What one inmate can make in the
solitude of a cell is something no power can easily destroy. The subjectivity of
inmates prevails, even when society creates spaces and systems designed to pre
vent acts of individual expression. All jail suicides
be interpreted as self
authored and somatic writs of habeas corpus that, upon being issued, offer a dev
astating rejection of the fact or conditions of legal restraint: “now that I have
rejected your laws, you have my death on your hands, on your watch. Yes, I am
unmade, but so too are you.” In Mississippi these criticisms probably indicted
the deplorable conditions of the jails as well.
In a story full of contingent truths and uncertainties, this much is certain:
jail suicides can happen in any jail at any time, and they are always strong
reminders that states incarcerate bodies, not wills. Need, necessity, and
sparked the creative acts ofJones, Campbell, and Berryhill. Their creativity and
ironic freedom distinguish them from Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman, and
from all other victims of politically authorized violence. In the midst of what
some might call squalor, they defiantly asserted their right to convert their
worlds into weapons and to hang freedom from their bodies, thus reinforcing
the primacy of their own individual values, systems, laws, and beliefs above
those of the state. The hangings punningly pointed out the gravity of jail con
ditions in Mississippi. The mean conditions of these jails and the indifference
of regulators and taxpayers toward the jailed may not have killed the forty-nine
prisoners, but they fertilized the plots for an urgent mode of self-expression to
prosper.
Yet some observers looked at Mississippi’s jails and jail hangings and saw
only decay. Atrophied perhaps by the security of the outside world, they did not
recognize that the decay they saw was need, and need is the ground in which
necessity gives birth to the human imagination. Because the jails they inhabit
ed were so rich with need, the imaginations of the forty-nine prisoners yielded
metaphors of making, symbols for the eternal searching of the human soul.
Thus the prisoners themselves,
converting decay into design, became fruits
worthy of praise.
From a holistic point of view, the idea of suicide is both incarcerating and
liberating, destructive and creative. The pure potentiality of suicide is necessary
and essential to being human and should never be demonized, even in the noble
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pursuit of suicide prevention. To distort the raw verve of suicide seems unnec
essarily reckless and cruel, a refusal to awaken from the conceit of a body’s
immortality. The most intimate enemy imaginable is the self; though you may
not believe in the universe of suicide, it lurks inside you, an invisible and there
fore titanic perception. To accept the existence of suicide is to accept the soul’s
constant complicity in its own pain, its own unmaking, its own death. Such
complicity is a crucial endowment, for, as Scarry teaches, it begins the big bang
of what could be, of human making, creativity and imagination. You cannot lay
down your sword and shield by the
if you do not first recognize them
as weapons. And even if you lay down your weapons, will you lay down your
blue jeans, your shoelaces and your bedsheets, every impromptu armament of
the jailed and estranged? The tools of jail suicide are also inventions, every bit
the equal of a metaphor a poem, and as such they are solutions, both to the
problem of inmate pain and to the unmaking of an inmate’s world. To see a
shoelace, a bedsheet, or a pair of jeans, not for what it is or is thought to be but
for what it could be — because you must and must because the necessity of your
own pain drives you to making, for pain is need and need imagination.

Notes
1. This and all subsequent exhibits are transcriptions of Jackson Clarion
Ledger accounts that have been modified for style. Details of content have not
been altered.
2. In April of 1989, Raheem Wells, the quarterback of the Kettering High
football team in Detroit, was murdered, allegedly by six teens who stole only his
Nike shoes. In November of 1989, Johnny
16, of Houston, was shot and
killed by Demetrick Taylor, 17, after Bates refused to relinquish his hightop
"Air Jordans.” Both incidents are described in the May 14,1990, issue of Sports
Illustrated.
3. The Stranger by Albert Camus successfully portrays the convergence
between making and unmaking in murder. While Meursault destroys the Arab,
he simultaneously encounters his own existence as a rational choice-making
agent. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus articulates how the physical unmaking
of suicide is the groundwork of the making of philosophical reasoning, an argu
ment that, as with murder, creates a convergence between making and unmak
ing.
4. See NAACP 27 for a Mississippi lynching that defines the historical
context of the recent jail hangings story.
5. Such was the case with detention officer Walter Brown on the night of
Sunday, May 23, 1993. Brown claimed he monitored cells at the Jackson City
Jail
opening cell blocks and shining a flashlight through the bars because
walking down the halls was too dangerous an assignment to perform alone. At
5:30 a.m. on Monday, May 24, the body of Timothy Lindsey, 18, was found
hanging by a bedsheet.
6. The involvement of the
Armed Forces may imply that the federal
government considered these jail hangings acts of war and was attempting to
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ascertain whether its enemy was the state of Mississippi, the forty-nine prison
ers in question, or perhaps both.
7. For
elucidation of sociological and psychological approaches to the
topic of jail suicides, see Danto; Deheer; Guy et al.; Haycock; Hayes, “Dark
ness”; Hayes, “National Study”; Pounder; and Winfree.
8. Foucault describes in Discipline and Punish how silence in the peniten
tiary is intended to promote self-awareness and penitence, not prison art or
poetry, some of which may be unrepentant and subversive.
9. Bobby Everett, who committed suicide in the Jackson City Jail in Janu
ary of 1993, was an artist working in another medium prior to discovering the
medium of hanging. At least on one occasion, Everett threw feces and urine on
jail guards to protest his incarceration. Judging, from several descriptions of his
erratic behavior inside and outside of jail, it seems highly possible that Everett
was a schizophrenic, a mental illness long known for its artistic tendencies.
10. Escape or jailbreak would be another legitimate art form, as acknowl
edged by the term “escape artists.” The 1994 film The Shawshank Redemption
es perfectly the artistry and volitional craftiness necessary for a suc
cessful jail or prison escape. Its reading of suicide, however, does not escape
melodrama.
11. Duff was speaking of the art produced by English hangman, though
his comparison applies equally well to self-hangings.
12. Berryhill made his bed with the appearance that it was complete, a
whole, when in actuality he had not merely short-sheeted his bed but had
deprived it entirely of its central meaning of comfort and rest.
13. Umberto Eco discusses in an essay entitled “Lumbar Thought” how
wearing blue jeans reduces interior thought by focusing mind and body on the
exterior world. Perhaps Campbell conceived of suicide because wearing jeans
made him aware of his groin, the source of his undoing. In hanging himself by
the armor of his jeans, Campbell directed attention to the very symbol which
had brought him in conflict with the local authorities.
14.
As Biathanatos implies, Christ himself may have committed suicide.
15. For a more detailed discussion of jail and prison overcrowding, see
“Mississippi’s Parole System: A Revolving Door,” Clarion Ledger, 23 March
1991, 1A.
16. See “State Second in Nation in Mentally Ill Jailed Without Charges,”
Clarion Ledger, 19 September 1992, 1A.
17. 1988 federal regulations mandate that juveniles (except those charged
with serious felonies or those previously certified as adult offenders) cannot be
housed within sight or sound of adults and must be supervised by a separate
staff. Three Mississippi juveniles died in adult facilities in 1988: Ronald
Bogan, 16, in Tunica County; Melvin Ellis, 14, in Warren County; and Tjuana
Barney, 14, in Washington County. Ricky Lee Galloway, 16, hanged himself in
Pontotoc County in 1992.
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1.
I am working on a project called “The X Tables.”
What better place to talk about this project than
Journal x? A new kind of review? When I was
graduate school happiness was finding one of those
bibliographical essays written by an expert covering
the best recent work in a given field, in which this
work was classified, grouped into distinct sets accord
ing to critical approaches and arguments, thus creat
ing a sense of order and possibility for the neophyte
overwhelmed
the quantity of materials produced
annually within the paradigm of specialization.
These essays were offered as objective compilations,
not exhaustive in quantitative terms, but final in their
authoritative judgments. The best part came at the
end, when the authority offered a series of sugges
tions for further work that remained to be done the
area. If you have watched a bird of prey bring food to
its chicks in some nature documentary then you
know how we jumped on these topical gifts from the
master.
Have things changed since those days? Is anyone
still working within the specialist paradigm of mas
tery? “Politics” has been one partial solution to the
impossible demands of scholarship, more efficient
than the burning of the library in Alexandria in elim
inating works from the list of required readings.
Nonetheless, the shelves in the library continue to fill
up with new volumes of books and journals, to which
must be added the growth in other media such as
disks, and the internet. Even if there are no
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more masters, there still is expertise in reading (but for how much longer?).
Perhaps there is a place then for a different kind of bibliographical essay with a
different focus: not one that covers a field, but
that explores the way a
given reader manages information within a specific style of learning, reasoning,
and writing.
How do I read? The editors of this journal spoke of the function of plea
sure in the operations of scholarship. They were using the term as a shorthand
allusion to that scene of our expertise that Roland Barthes and other French
theorists have complicated by opening it up to the psychoanalytic notions of
desire. Expert reading is not pleasure but bliss, in this theoretical sense ofjouissance. Should it even be called “reading” when it comes to the way I interact
with the infinity of pages and screens? Barthes confessed that he read far less
than people thought. Wittgenstein comes to mind as someone who seemed to
read very little in his field. In my case, I read more than it might seem, but no
matter how much I read it is nothing, infinitesimal, in comparison to the
amount of writing produced. My relationship to books, then, is not quantita
tive control but a certain attitude, a mode of being within an information
ronment.
Could the way I read be put into an expert system? Artificial intelligence
has had some success with simulating expert knowledge. Certain kinds of
expertise turn out to be easier to put into a machine than is quotidian common
sense. These expert systems demonstrate the literate nature of
— that
expertise is precisely a formation of the apparatus of the alphabetic era — in the
diagnostic format within which they operate. The true and perhaps final heir
of the Platonic dialogue is the AI machine. Grammatology, that is, indicates
that AI is to print knowledge what photography was to painting: a form of
automation that took over many of the features of a craft, putting them into a
technology that made the craft available to the amateur.
This speculative analogy is suggestive in several respects. Automation does
not eliminate experts or painters, but it
their function. As for the ama
teurs, they have been left on their own for the most part. Photography is not
yet taught in our schools as a central part of mass literacy, but eventually it will
be. These possibilities suggest several areas in need of invention: what
of reading when it is relieved of the tasks (and joys) of scholarship? What kind
of education will be possible when the work of specialization is done by expert
systems? Experts and amateurs alike will require new methods and practices.
The part of expertise that so far has escaped machine intelligence is its
madness. Perhaps I need a better term to characterize my relationship to read
ing. “Desire” might work. One goal of “The X Tables” is to persuade the AI
movement to recognize the place of the unconscious in mentality, to accept the
computer as the prosthesis of the body-in-the-mind not only in terms of com
mon sense (human intelligence is oriented in a material body) but also in psy
choanalytic terms in which the book as object carries investments shared by
babies, voices, turds, the phallus. I do not want to get into the theory for now,
other than to say that my relationship to books is overdetermined. Do I like to
read constantly? It is the nature of expertise to repeat itself endlessly. A con
temporary Inferno would be easy to design: just shift everyone over to a differ
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ent expertise (baseball players become lawyers, lawyers become astronauts,
astronauts become English professors).
My point is that interface design in computing is headed towards creating
computers that will help us with our reading. Expert systems are designed by
the formulation of algorithms that capture the behaviors of that expertise, as
extrapolated from the debriefings of hundreds or even thousands of individual
experts. One function
this series on the pleasures of reading, then, might
be as a resource for some future information architect. Another way to put it
might be more ethnographic: to accumulate a record of professional reading
while this practice is still commonplace. It may be that some day news
find worth noting the passing of native readers, the way they now note the
passing of the last speakers of a dead language.

2.
I think within a problematic that orients my reading. The condition for hav
ing the “Eureka!” experience of heuretics, after all, is to be looking for some
thing. To find things that make me want to write — or, better, to find texts that
how to write, that is my object. Heuretics in fact is a way to read
everything as a poetics. The madness, the obsessive behavior, according to the
theory, is due to the fact that the motivation of this quest is desire, a profound
want caused by the limitations of the human condition. This want cannot in
principle be satisfied. Moreover, knowledge of the nature of this condition does
not alter the experience of it,
more than does knowledge of fusion cause
stars to go out. The relationship rather is: may I use this knowledge to learn
how to harness this energy in myself, to teach others how to recognize this feel
ing themselves and turn it to constructive ends? Common wisdom has it that
contentment in an achievement-oriented culture such as ours is dependent
upon finding a fit between the demands of a career and the neuroses of the
practitioners. The training of scholars, then, might shift its focus from infor
mation to desire, to learning how to harness this madness to
knowledge
fusion. Nor is this madness one.
Not an origin, but an orientation, it starts with a question of knowledge. I
have in mind the grammatological question of the apparatus: what happens to
the practices of literacy when the principal interface for preserving meaning is
no longer the page but the screen (not that the screen is likely to last that much
longer in its present form either)? I am always wondering: how may I use the
new technologies to conduct teaching, research, and service.in the humanities?
One of the ways I have responded to that question has been to design a
called mystory, intended as a way to do academic writing that takes into account
the new audio-visual media. Mystory is also a way to bring into communica
tion these different levels of want — the want of disciplinary information and
the want of
The experience of pleasure happens when I find something that I recognize
as a relay for mystory. You might say that the new chapter I wrote for the sec
ond edition of Text Book (co-authored with Robert Scholes and Nancy Comley; St. Martins Press) is a response before the fact to this Journal x review. The
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new chapter was meant to complete our textual approach to introductory com
position by creating a section on a textualist
paper. The only (or at
least the
response to a text is another text: such is the coded formula for
a textualist research paper. The chapter featured the mystory as the genre that
would
a general education student to author a
In the context of the
AI discussion, I could add that mystory is a diagnostic capable of guiding the
customizing of a computer interface to fit the unique learning style of an indi
vidual user.
When I went to construct the chapter on the mystory I ran into a basic dif
ficulty: where to find examples of mystories to use as models? Why did I not
consider using the one I wrote myself (“Derrida at the Little Bighorn”)? Or,
even if there are few if any print mystories, there are plenty of hypertexts,
authored by students working with George Landow at Brown University. I did
not think that this lack of paper models was a major problem, since students
working their
through the first four chapters of Text Book will experience
everything necessary for grasping the nature of the genre in the abstract, as well
as the compositional strategies needed to execute the kinds of reasoning and
writing called for. Moreover, in teaching mystorically myself for some time, I
believed that one of the most interesting things about mystory was discovering
its poetics. Mystory was a Wittgensteinian sort of concept, consisting of a fam
ily of uses.
Even if there are
models of mystory, however, there are plenty of relays,
of the sort I described in Teletheory to evoke the properties of this mythical
genre. The fifth chapter of Text Book asks the students not just to write a
tory, but first to design the poetics for such a thing. I wonder if anyone has had
any success with that chapter, which I think of as being really very difficult?
The pleasure of constructing that chapter was to find relays — readings
of
which would suggest at least one attribute or property of a potential mystory.
Everything I learned from writing Teletheory, from generating “Derrida at the
Little Bighorn” out of a series of existing works, I tried to condense into this
assignment. I did not want to include my sample, since it is a “failure” (like
most experiments, a happy failure in that what I learned from making it allowed
to compose Heuretics), and because I did not want to prejudice the outcome.
The idea was to supply a brief selection from a given work, manifesting a
tain device or form, framed with the suggestion that this device, recontextual
ized, could become part of the instructions for a mystory.
In principle, these selections could come from anything, regardless of the
relevance of the original to the goals of mystory. In practice, however, all five
selections reflected the autoportraiture characteristic of mystory. The relays I
used as resources for generating the elements of a mystorical poetics include
short selections from Manhood, by Michel Leiris; Alias Olympia, by Eunice Lip
ton; “Incloser” (from The Birthmark), by Susan Howe; “How to Become Para
noia-Critical,” (from The Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dali), by Salvador
Dali; and The Way to Rainy Mountain, by N. Scott Momaday (which I also used
in Teletheory). The comments and assignments,
with the instructors
manual, of Text Book clarify the motivation of each
so I wont say any
more about them now, except to note that they represent a mini-exhibition of
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the kinds of writing that give me pleasure. The method of generating a poet
ics by extracting one feature from a relay, combining it with a number of other
such extracted features, and elaborating them into a set of instructions for com
posing
number of potential works, is even more pleasurable to contemplate.
What is heuretic reading — reading with the
of writing something
myself? I want to continue here the procedure initiated in Text Book, to add a
few more relays to the ones collected there, some of which might contribute a
new property to the mix, and others of which might simply elaborate further a
property already available in the initial offering. For example, I recommend to
any mystorian Susan Griffins A Chorus of Stones: The Private Life of War, In a
study as aesthetic as it is theoretical, Griffin demonstrates at length one of the
basic assumptions addressed by a mystory — the irreducible connection
between private and public existence, between individual and collective experi
ence, between memory and history. “For perhaps we are like stones; our own
history and the history of the world embedded in us,
hold a sorrow deep
within and cannot weep until that history is sung.” As the jacket prose
explains, Chorus “illustrates how it is that private life — family history, child
hood experiences, gender and sexuality, private aspiration and public image —
assume an undeniable role in the causes and effects of war.”
Griffin places her own private and familial experience at the center of her
meditation, which she explores in relation to comparative studies of the private/public symmetries legible in the lives of such historical figures as Mohan
das Gandhi and General Hugh Trenchard, Daniel Schreber and Heinrich
Himmler, and various other figures who became emblems of culture: Franz
Kafka, Rita Hayworth, Ernest Hemingway. One of the rationales of mystory
was that it simulated the
of invention. Biographies of the famous
inventors in the Western tradition, that is, indicate the important contribution
that experiences outside a discipline make to the specialized work of an expert.
In Teletheory I focused on the constructive side of this creative process by refer
ring to the lives of artists and scientists canonized in our histories. Griffin com
plicates my focus by showing that the same circulation of experience works for
the creators of evil — the inventors of weapons of mass destruction, the archi
tects of the politics of hate, are inventors too, whose products are generated out
of a mystory. Himmler and Gandhi may be understood in the same terms.
3.
I am always looking for examples of works that make the kinds of juxtaposi
tions featured in Chorus. James Michael Jarrett, who has published several arti
cles documenting his own experiments with mystory, sent me a brochure from
an exhibition by Glenn Ligon, entitled To Disembark, held at the Hirshhorn
Museum, Washington, D. C., from November of 1993 to February of 1994.
This brochure is itself a conceptual mystory, effective in its own right, even if it
not realized as
installation. In the installation, Ligon explores his sense
of identity by evoking the history of Henry “Box” Brown, a slave who shipped
himself to freedom in 1849. Ligon writes himself into this historical event in
a variety of ways: he introduces descriptions of himself composed by friends,
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for example, into nineteenth-century advertisements seeking the return of run
away slaves. Ligons installation is a relay showing the mystorian how to use
collective, historical materials to compose
image of ones own sense of self.
Another related relay illustrating this juxtapositional use of found histories
to evoke personal identity is the project by May Stevens, Extraordinary, Ordi
nary, “A collage of words and images of Rosa Luxemburg, Polish/German rev
olutionary leader and theoretician, murder victim (1871-1919) juxtaposed with
images and words of Alice Stevens (born 1895-) housewife, mother, washer and
ironer, inmate of hospitals and nursing homes.” The title names a project rather
than a single work, which includes paintings and exhibits as well as “an artist’s
book examining and documenting the mark of a political woman and marking
the life of a woman whose life would otherwise be unmarked.”
Rhetoricians have pointed out that juxtaposition has the effect of argument.
Sergei Eisenstein,
his invention of intellectual montage as a way to write
with a camera, used the device of montage to create a filmic equivalent of liter
ate concepts. Indeed, the entire collection of formal experiments produced
within the avant-garde movement in
and letters in our century might be
read as an exploration of the capacities of the devices of juxtaposition and rep
etition to support systematic reasoning. A profound demonstration of the basic
principles is Pig City ModelFarm, by Rob Kovitz. Soon after I came across this
book in a museum bookstore I ordered forty copies for
of my courses.
Unfortunately only five copies were still available (published byTreyf in Toron
to, 1992, with the warning “keep refrigerated”). The ingredients: found mate
rials drawn from two
domains, pig farming and utopia. Materials
include graphic as well as written information. The compositional technique is
simply to juxtapose and repeat quantities of materials from each of the
domains, interweaving them through a rather lengthy
The effect is that
of a penetrating, unforgettable critique of utopian thinking. How this effect is
created is a topic that deserves an article all to itself. In a word, Pig City evokes
a critique.
I am always on the lookout for relays, existing works, usually by artists,
poets, and filmmakers, that suggest ideas that might be generalized, emulated
using different materials, appropriated for another composition. This new
composition is not to be of the same sort as its sources, but a hybrid diverging
unpredictably from its causes. Sometimes I have access not to the work itself
but only to a description, as in the case of Ligon, but the idea of the relay is
strong enough to radiate beyond its embodiment in the work. This radiation
effect was explicitly featured in the multiples (a genre of cheap reproducible
s) and performances of Joseph Beuys.
small The desire to write Applied Grammatology came in part from seeing a small black-and-white photo of a Beuys
installation, “The Pack” (a group of
sleds, each equipped with a roll of
felt, a battery-powered lantern, and a glob of fat, spilling out of the back of a
battered Volkswagen bus). Such objects “broadcast” to those with the proper
receivers. I sympathize with those Asian filmmakers of a previous era who tried
to make the Hollywood movies they were only able to read about.
For example, even if I rarely go to the City, sometimes it is enough to read
the “Goings on About Town” column of The New Yorker, which is where I came
across this entry:
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Jim Shaw — A small but fascinating
of drawings titled “Dreams That
Money Can Buy,” after a 1944 Surrealist film by Hans Richter. Each draw
ing pairs a creepy or innocuous image with a new but skittishly handwrit
ten text. Even a cursory reading reveals that the words have no relation
whatsoever to the images. A precisely detailed drawing of two snarling
muzzled greyhounds is paired with this dreamlike sequence: “A young man
of indeterminate age, race, and gender is talking to a large African-American woman about his (?) allergies and troubled family history.. . . He walks
backward and compares himself to Jesus and turns into a werewolf.” This
is no dream — it’s Michael Jackson being interviewed by Oprah Winfrey.
In
all Shaws dreamtexts are descriptions of things he’s seen on TV —
everybody’s ready-made unconscious.

Such examples as I have been giving of works that become relays for mys
tery share a common
the collage/montage manipulation of found
materials and histories. Mystery takes everything as language, as raw material
for another text. Sometimes, as in the case of Jarrett sending me the Ligon
brochure, I receive a relay as a
Joseph Grigely, for example, sent me a copy
of the booklet published in conjunction with a project entitled, “Conversations
with the Hearing.” The title of the booklet is “Deaf & Dumb: A Tale.” The
tale must be inferred, extracted, from a compilation of outmoded, historical
publications concerning the deaf and dumb. This outmodedness (the booklet
faithfully reproduces the look, layout, and
of the originals being cited)
is an important part of the evocation. Beuys used obsolete gear in his perfor
mances in the same way. Perhaps Walter Benjamin explained best the value of
dated materials, whose outmodedness allows the symbolic power of the object
to become legible from behind the use value. Most of the fragments Grigely
collects address the education of individuals afflicted with the absence of hear
ing or speech: an account of an acoustic method for communication, first pub
lished in 1828; exercises for lip reading; an inventory of cases of individuals and
their handicaps; obituaries for instructors of the deaf from the early 1900s; a
sign language chart; a relevant extract from Rousseau; a list of trades taught at
institutions for the deaf and dumb; “anecdotes and annals” dealing with cases of
rape, infanticide, and other crimes happening to or perpetrated by the deaf and
dumb. The effect of this collage is quite extraordinary, in that it somehow man
ages to use these dated, public, impersonal fragments to evoke a disturbing nar
rative tale.
Susan Howe is the master of this method of historical evocation, while
showing how to add to the found histories her own poetic elaborations and
transformations. “Melville’s Marginalia,” included in The Nonconformist's
Memorial, exemplifies the mix of research, commentary, creative writing, formal
experiment, and layout that makes me want to write. She brings to our atten
tion the almost negligible career of James Clarence Mangan, to which she was
led by one of Melville’s marginalia. The whole thing could be a fiction, for all
I know, in the style of Borges’ “Pierre Menard.” I have not wanted to verify the
historical statements,
their accuracy doesn’t matter for the purposes of
a mystorical relay: the effect of learning something about oneself by research
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ing another. My attraction to hypermedia is due in part to the exact fit between
it and the collage/montage compilation mode.
4.

What is the appeal of collage/montage compositions? Why do they fit so well
with hypermedia? The answer has something to do with the promise of whole
ness, related to the way expert knowledge is constituted by an intuitive aware
ness of an intense complex of intertextual references. The divisions between
narrative and document, between fiction and argument, between the aesthetic
and the didactic, between the metaphysical and the practical, are rendered
unnecessary in hypermedia, thus promising a solution to information overload.
A great diversity of heterogeneous materials may be brought into relationship
and made legible, intelligible, both formally and materially: materially in the
digital mechanics of hypermedia (in which any item of information is equally
and uniformly near to any other item, coupled by a jump), and formally in the
aesthetics of mystory and the method of chorography. Hypermedia and mystory, that is, are homologous to the associative allusive structure of expert
knowledge (mystory supported by hypermedia makes it
to map expert
knowledge onto quotidian cognition — to use schemata as if they
con
cepts). The commentators tell us that in our electronic culture the image is
replacing the concept as the basic unit of communication, and that the danger
of this situation is that the kind of reasoning we teach in school as the basis of
critical thinking is bypassed by the slogan-picture hybrid of image discourse.
The answer is: teach image discourse in the schools and use it ourselves.
If the image is the problem it is also the answer to the information overload
afflicting our message-saturated civilization. The design of a collage/montage
text includes the foregrounding of an image that organizes the whole into a
memorable unit. The formal principle is that of the mise-en-abyme (putting
the abyss) — the selection of a schemata that is emphasized through repetition
and elaboration to signal its function as the source of formal
Although the image
be either diegetic or nondiegetic (motivated or unmo
tivated by the materials being collected), the most effective relays in my expe
rience have all been diegetic. A relay for this effect may be found in the film
Time Indefinite,
Ross McElwee (whose
Shermans March provided
of the key relays in Teletheory). Time Indefinite continues McElwees autobiog
raphy, moving from the multitude of girlfriends documented in Shermans
March to his engagement and marriage.
Interpolated throughout this two-hour film is an image of a boy fishing
with his father. All the footage of family and friends, the rituals associated with
birth, marriage, anniversary, and death, is organized and framed within this
scene. While McElwee narrates in voice-over his own experience as a boy fish
ing with his father,
see a child being taught by his father how to deliver the
coup de grace to a small fish. The child attempts to stomp
the head of the
fish while it is flipping and flopping on the boards of the pier. Some time later
McElwee returns to this fish, a close-up of the creature
gills beating,
mouth working, framed and photographed at unusual face-front angle. This
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angle and shape of the framing link the fish to the toothless mouths of McElwee’s dying grandmother and his infant son. The closeup of the son that con
cludes the film echoes uncannily with the closeup of the dying fish. The repe
tition of shapes and angles produces a powerful mood, a commentary showing
us the attitude the filmmaker takes towards the life
has recorded: he feels in
the environment of family ritual like a fish out of water.
Another example of this organizing power of an image is in Tim O’Brien's
The Things They Carried. The temporal discontinuities of the author’s experi
ence — childhood, combat in Vietnam, civilian life after war — are integrated
in a superb example of a diegetic image: a description of the equipment carried
into combat by an infantryman. “As PFCs or Spec 4s, most of them
com
mon grunts and carried the standard M-16 gas-operated assault rifle. The
weapon weighed 7.5 pounds unloaded, 8.2 pounds with its full 20-round mag
azine. Depending on numerous factors, such as topography and psychology, the
riflemen carried anywhere from 12 to 20 magazines, usually in cloth bandoliers,
adding on another 8.4 pounds at minimum, 14 pounds at maximum. When it
was available, they also carried M-16 maintenance
— rods and steel brush
es and swabs and tubes of LSA oil — all of which weighed about a pound.”
This detailed inventory of the weight of the rifle and ammunition is extended
to all the equipment the soldier carries.
This insistence on physical details inevitably begins to evoke an allegori
cal signal: there is something more to this weight. O’Brien’s list of what the
soldier carries into battle continues on past standard issue to those personal
items that mark the humanity of the individual — anything from good-luck
pieces to letters from home. These personal objects give way in turn to things
metaphysical, to a complex, infinite immensity of emotions, from
and
values through concerns and worries about love relationships to visceral fear
of mutilation or death. “They shared the weight of memory. They took up
what others could no longer bear. Often, they carried each other, the wound
ed or weak. They carried infections. They carried the land itself— Vietnam,
the place, the soil — a powdery orange-red dust that covered their boots and
fatigues and faces. They carried the sky. The whole atmosphere.” Such is the
device rendered to perfection: the material, sensible, concrete, physical, exter
nal given reality transforms into a vision of things abstract, spiritual, invisible,
inchoate, internal. Sometimes an exact measurement between the two realms
is possible, as in the case of Ted Lavender, whose fear could be counted by the
extra rounds he carried for his grenade launcher, each round weighing 10
ounces. The normal supply was 25 rounds, but at the time he was killed Ted
Lavender was carrying 34 rounds.
Marguerite Duras once said that writing requires looking outside for some
thing that is already within oneself. I have learned that this external search is
necessary in order to understand the nature of this interiority, which has no
shape, no quality other than force, energy. A relay for what happens might be
“The Marina Trench,” by Sigrid Nielsen, in which (as Glenn Jordan and Chris
Weedon explained in Cultural Politics') the deepest area of the ocean is made to
symbolize a feminine or even lesbian mode of relationship: “That is part of the
Marina Trench: silence. You cannot speak; if you open your mouth the water
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will rush into your jaws. No one has ever been able to explain to me why that
silence falls between women. It is a place on the map of the women’s world,
that silence .. . like a wall of water which resists everywhere at once. This story
is not a protest, no more than the purple spots on the map, the sounding in feet
and meters, the name in boldface
the warning to proceed cautiously.”
With such an image
the Marina Trench outside evoking this
of sep
aration inside — I
at the fundamental unit of mystorical structure. In my
forfor myself, (text
rch I seek just such an image
adequate to evoke for me first this
pressure of imbalance, to bring into equilibrium the inside with the outside.
Once such an image is located, it acquires mythological power for its author
(but only for that author — a personal mythology), the ability to condense and
contain and actively direct one’s passage through the archive of world knowl
edge.

5.
The “atmosphere” that O’Brien spoke of is one of the guiding concerns of “The
X Tables.” The conceptual or disciplinary point of departure for this concern
has to do with the way images communicate by evoking atmosphere (the silence
between women measured in terms of foot-pounds at the bottom of the ocean).
In image discourse and electronic media, atmosphere is shifting from a back
ground to a foreground status. Writing online has a much larger dimension of
performance than was the case in literacy. English departments need to col
laborate more with Theater in order to develop this aspect of composition. I
have used Michael Chekhov’s Lessons for the Professional Actor in some of my
courses to try to articulate this condition. Chekhov, a student of Stanislavsky
who modified his master’s technique in some important respects, offers a vari
ation on the account of Method acting given in Heuretics.
The key to the Method for Chekhov is in the atmosphere that an actor
finds to guide the performance of the role. What attracted me to the Method
in the first place as the analogy for chorography (mystory elaborated into a
rhetoric) is its account of how actors use their inner lives, their memories and
personal histories, as resources
creating a character. This relationship may
be generalized into a relay for reading as such. Or rather, for heuretics — read
ing with an aim towards writing. The postmodernist element of this approach
may be obvious: the commitment to making a new work out of an existing one
). The Chekhov Lessons could be read in conjunction with David Savran’s
documentary commentary on the Wooster Group, Breaking the Rules. This jux
taposition suggests that the Wooster Group approaches a play in the manner of
a single actor rehearsing a role and seeking an atmosphere for the role that
might be condensed into a single psychological gesture. Savran describes the
Wooster Group as “deconstructing” such canonized plays as The Cocktail Party,
Our Town, and The Crucible. A production that is an apt relay for mystory is
the Wooster Group’s Route 1 & 9.
An obvious reason for the value of the Wooster Group in general is the way
it has used the autobiographical expressions of Spalding Gray as raw material.
Equally important is the way the Group juxtaposes Gray’s life story with clas
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sic plays. In Heuretics I spoke of electronic composition as similar to throwing
away the performance of a play in favor of the personal material an actor gen
erates as part of rehearsing. Route 1 & 9 does precisely this when a scene from
Our Town is
on a monitor while the actors reproduce in blackface a Pig
meat Markham vaudeville routine. One
to understand this juxtaposition is
to read it as the replacement of a performance of the play by a presentation of
the private associations generated by actors for the rehearsal of the play: the
Pigmeat Markham routine is the psychological gesture that creates the atmos
phere the Group wants to produce in its performance — its remake — of Our
Town. Instead of showing us the play, they give us the atmosphere directly.
I am learning from Chekhov and the Wooster Group how to write “The X
Tables.” I want to learn from the acting analogy how to develop a pedagogy of
atmosphere. The histories of creativity and of philosophy indicate that part of
becoming creative in one’s life and work has to do with learning how to recog
nize and then tap into the grounding enframing mood, the emotional state of
mind, that constitutes the background of consciousness. In the creative process
one accesses this mood, no matter what the object of work might be. The spe
cific contribution the humanities
of knowledge has to make to the edu
cational enterprise in general concerns this creative process: mystory is
designed to help students encounter and
the mood dimension of
cognition. Perhaps the best exploration of such a pedagogy that I have read is
Robert B. Ray’s The Avant-Garde Finds Andy Hardy, itself a heuretics, showing
how to textualize popular culture, using the Andy Hardy films starring Mickey
Rooney.
To try to push this thread a bit further: the “X” in “The X Tables” refers
among other things to the “logic of sense” invented by Gilles Deleuze and
explained most directly in a book
that title. I tested this logic in a text enti
tled “The Miranda Warnings” (in George Landow, ed., Hyper/Text/Theory). In
that text I
the Supreme Court “Miranda” decision with the career of
Carmen Miranda: the floating signifier, the
is the term miranda. Given the
of mystory, I am compelled to follow this miranda further, to see what
might be gathered within the parameters of this puncept. An immediate asso
ciation is with Prospero’s daughter. Indeed, a review of the history of The Tem
pest reveals a direct connection with the problematic of postcolonial identity
included in Heuretics. This play has been the subject of numerous remakes in
our century in association with a postcolonial cultural politics.
At the moment I am only collecting some of these versions, all of which
shift the point of view or the point of identification from Prospero to one of the
helping figures: either Ariel or Caliban. Among the ones that interest me most
would be: A Tempest by Aimé Césaire; Philadelphia Fire, a novel by John Edgar
Wideman; the films by Peter Greenaway (Prospero's Books) and Paul Mazursky
(Tempest); the artist’s book by Jimmie Durham (The Caliban Codex). Then
there are the poems composed under the “Ariel” title by T. S. Eliot and Sylvia
Plath. A major movement in Latin American letters in the early 1900s was
called Arielism, which argued for the superiority of the aristocratic, high cul
ture of South American traditions against the Caliban-like vulgarity of gringo
commercialism. More recently a Latino, mixed-race proletarian identification
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with Caliban has replaced the Hispanic upper-class identification with Ariel in
the political allegories generated out of The Tempest.
What about Miranda? “The X Tables” will have a relation to The Tempest
similar to the deconstructive one that the Wooster Group establishes with its
classic plays. Part of the purpose of such a project is to demonstrate a heuretic approach to scholarship. Rather than keeping absolutely separate the
hermeneutic and creative applications of a given theory, as has been the case
normally, heuretics studies a theory from both sides of its applications at once:
as it is developed into a means of interpretation
critics, and into a poetics by
artists. In order to understand the implications of Derridas theories it is as use
ful to consider the Wooster Group as it is to read Barbara Johnson. “The X
Tables” includes a remake of Shakespeare, then, constructed
hypermedia
rhetoric with miranda as the switch. Only a fragment of Shakespeare will be
materially present: it is a collage/montage of a heterogeneous body of materi
als constituting a certain problematic. To be tested is the proposition that
abstract reasoning may be conducted and directed by means of atmosphere.

6.
The specific atmosphere I am using is the samba feeling (Carmen Miranda
popularized samba in her Hollywood films during the era of the Good Neigh
bor Policy) known as saudade. “The X Tables” will reason via saudade. In
Heuretics I showed how the chorographer might inhabit a narrative by intro
ducing a heuretic code (the code of mystory) attached to the hermeneutic code
that engages the interest of the audience by
of enigmas (using the defi
nitions of these codes established by Roland Barthes in S/Z). The problemat
ic that has formed around The Tempest, in which the arguments of a postcolo
nial cultural politics have already been attached to the plots and characters of a
specific narrative drama, offers an ideal site for demonstrating another aspect of
chorography: how to attach the heuretic code to the hermeneutic or truth code
of an argumentative form. In Teletheory I used Barthes to show that the codes
he found in narrative have their exact equivalents in argumentative exposition:
enigmas are to plots what problems are to arguments. In Heuretics I demon
strated the inclusion of my mystory into a narrative (Beau Geste), but I did not
demonstrate the companion possibility, at least not explicitly: the attachment
of a mystory to an argument. “The X Tables”
take up this further devel
opment of chorography. In both cases, the premise is that what makes a read
want to write is the recognition that the enigmas and problems of narratives
and arguments are displacements of mystories. Or rather, that a map to one’s
inner coherence (the structure of one’s attention) becomes legible only through
its inscription within the available discursive practices. The sharp distinction
between concept and myth, between logic and dreamwork, that was necessary
in print is dispensable in hypermedia.
My excuse for talking in this abstract way about works-in-progress is that
projects such as this are what motivate
reading. Mystory as a research
method works in this way: why am I researching the status of The Tempest in
postcolonial theory and art? Because of the miranda puncept. I should have
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known that Shakespeare would be relevant for me, having produced a
ago a videotape for Paper Tiger Television in which I
” that the mean
ing of Hamlet is the Devils Millhopper sinkhole, a geological wonder just out
side the city limits of
Florida. How do you attach the heuretic
code to an argument? The premise of the method is that in electracy (electronic
literacy) the emotional features of argumentation acquire new prominence,
while logos or the devices of demonstrative proof are subordinated. The chorographer locates a central emotional appeal in argument and attaches to it —
replaces it with — a mood generated by the chorographers mystory. In my
case, this mood or state of mind is saudade. The experiment is to explore the
adequacy of saudade as the external name for this interior feeling constituting
my mood, my attunement to Being (as Heidegger might put it).
Consider some of the features of this experiment: I have no experience of
samba. Or rather, my experience is entirely mediated by mass and popular art.
The point is precisely to deconstruct this opposition between concept and expe
rience, having in mind the movement away from expert knowledge and toward
the attempt to embody expertise within a vernacular practice. I have no expe
rience of différance, either, but I think with it just the same. My saudade is not
that of a Brazilian (the Marina Trench in the story is not that of the oceanog
rapher). The attempt occurs on dangerous ground, mined with the paradoxes
of cultural politics. The rationale for taking the risks comes from the need for
a postcolonial cross-cultural internet/interface, for a discourse capable of glob
al comprehension. I have characterized this discourse elsewhere as "cyberpid
gin.” It involves people from different cultures learning the states of mind
available to their counterparts — precisely those states that differentiate one
group from another, which may be learned first aesthetically (for aesthetics is
the part of a practice that is transferable). The history of primitivism in the
avant-garde provides a valuable lesson in this matter of the transferability of
states of mind. "Primitivism” — now understood as racism-lite because it sim
ply inverts the valuation of the stereotypes — still has much to teach us as a
relay.
My approach to this problematic is to collect an archive that considers the
difficulty from both the hermeneutic and creative sides, which shows that the
artists have tended to embrace what the interpreters have condemned. A medi
ating anthology is Symposium of the Whole: A Range of Discourse Toward an
Ethnopoetics, edited by Jerome and Diane Rothenberg. Perhaps the prototype
in this context is the famous essay on "The Duende” by Federico Garcia Lorca.
Because of Lorca, duende is a part of my cognitive map of reality. Any num
ber of concepts naming states of mind unfamiliar to dominant Western culture
are in circulation. The film Koyaanisqatsi popularized the Hopi notion of
"nature out of balance” and applied it to modern industrial forms of life. The
Zen concept of mu or “no-mind, no-thing,” has entered our culture through the
work of the beat poets, among others. This exchange of culture-specific states
of mind is a fundamental part of the history of civilization. Zen in America or
Elvis in Japan: these are inventions (heuretics is the logic of inventions of this
sort) whose design has to become part of our vernacular. Chorography is a
method for bringing this phenomenon into pedagogy and the discourse of
learning in general.
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Poets and artists have an important role to play, as they have always had, in
the growth of language and culture. How many words did Shakespeare invent?
Lorcas relation to Gypsies, or Picassos to Africans, might be reframed terms
of translation or mediation rather than
terms of the artist-hero of primi
tivism (the colonialist aspect of the cultural appropriation that rightly has been
ed into question). The vanguard experiments must now be extracted from
their institutional entanglements in the arts and generalized into a quotidian
amateur attitude capable of supporting a global internet conversation across
civilizations. Some of the most important parties to this conversation have
already gathered in the virtual space of The Tempest. The “X” of “The X Tables”
marks this spot.
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